Files
certctl/deploy/helm
shankar0123 9c1d446e40 fix(security,config): remove unimplemented JWT auth-type, close silent downgrade (G-1)
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.

We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.

The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.

Files changed:

Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
  AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
  literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
  authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
  ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
  Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
  the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
  references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
  config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
  validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
  authenticating-gateway pattern.

Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
  (two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
  whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
  guard against future re-introduction),
  TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
  TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
  hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
  TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
  inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
  TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
  into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
  cover the api-key happy path.

Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
  inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
  jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
  simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
  JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
  section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
  Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
  forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
  standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
  with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
  docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
  ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.

Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
  helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
  template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
  a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
  server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
  top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
  G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
  the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
  gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
  walkthrough.

Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
  Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.

Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
  guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
  (map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
  default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
  branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
  (Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
  protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
  fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.

Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
  account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
  one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
  external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.

Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
  diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
  regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
  with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
  longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
  with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
  (oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
  front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
  See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'

config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.

Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
      §2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
      Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
      validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
2026-04-25 00:22:23 +00:00
..

Certctl Helm Chart

Production-ready Helm chart for deploying certctl (self-hosted certificate lifecycle management platform) on Kubernetes.

Table of Contents

  1. Quick Start
  2. Chart Features
  3. Prerequisites
  4. Installation
  5. Configuration
  6. Usage Examples
  7. Upgrading
  8. Uninstalling
  9. Architecture
  10. Security Considerations
  11. Troubleshooting

Quick Start

# Add the chart repository (when available)
helm repo add certctl https://charts.example.com
helm repo update

# Install with default values
helm install certctl certctl/certctl \
  --set server.auth.apiKey="your-secure-api-key" \
  --set postgresql.auth.password="your-secure-password"

# Check installation status
kubectl get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=certctl

Chart Features

  • Server Deployment — certctl control plane with configurable replicas
  • PostgreSQL StatefulSet — Persistent database with automatic schema migration
  • Agent DaemonSet or Deployment — Flexible agent deployment (per-node or custom replicas)
  • Ingress Support — Optional HTTPS ingress with cert-manager integration
  • Security Contexts — Non-root containers, read-only filesystems, minimal capabilities
  • Resource Limits — Configurable CPU and memory requests/limits
  • Health Checks — Liveness and readiness probes on all containers
  • ConfigMaps and Secrets — Centralized configuration management
  • Service Account and RBAC — Optional cluster role bindings
  • Pod Disruption Budgets — HA-ready with configurable disruption budgets
  • Monitoring — Optional Prometheus ServiceMonitor support

Prerequisites

  • Kubernetes 1.19 or later
  • Helm 3.0 or later
  • Optional: cert-manager (for automatic TLS certificate provisioning)
  • Optional: Prometheus (for metrics scraping)

Installation

1. Using Chart from Repository

helm repo add certctl https://charts.example.com
helm repo update
helm install certctl certctl/certctl -f my-values.yaml

2. Using Local Chart

cd deploy/helm
helm install certctl certctl/ \
  --set server.auth.apiKey="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" \
  --set postgresql.auth.password="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"

3. Minimal Production Installation

helm install certctl certctl/certctl \
  --namespace certctl \
  --create-namespace \
  --set server.auth.apiKey="change-me" \
  --set postgresql.auth.password="change-me" \
  --set server.replicas=2 \
  --set server.resources.requests.cpu=200m \
  --set server.resources.requests.memory=256Mi \
  --set ingress.enabled=true \
  --set ingress.className=nginx \
  --set ingress.hosts[0].host=certctl.example.com

Configuration

Server Configuration

server:
  replicas: 1                    # Number of server replicas
  port: 8443                     # Service port
  auth:
    type: api-key               # Authentication type
    apiKey: "your-api-key"      # REQUIRED for production
  logging:
    level: info                 # Log level (debug, info, warn, error)
    format: json                # Output format
  issuer:
    local:
      enabled: true             # Enable local CA issuer
    acme:
      enabled: false            # Enable ACME issuer
      directoryURL: ""          # ACME directory URL
      email: ""                 # ACME registration email
      challengeType: "http-01"  # Challenge type (http-01, dns-01, dns-persist-01)

PostgreSQL Configuration

postgresql:
  enabled: true                 # Use managed PostgreSQL
  auth:
    database: certctl
    username: certctl
    password: "your-password"   # REQUIRED
  storage:
    size: 10Gi                  # PVC size
    storageClass: ""            # Use default StorageClass

Agent Configuration

agent:
  enabled: true                 # Deploy agents
  kind: DaemonSet              # DaemonSet (one per node) or Deployment
  replicas: 1                  # For Deployment kind only
  discoveryDirs: ""            # Comma-separated cert discovery paths
  nodeSelector: {}             # Node affinity for DaemonSet

Ingress Configuration

ingress:
  enabled: false
  className: nginx
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-prod
  hosts:
    - host: certctl.example.com
      paths:
        - path: /
          pathType: Prefix
  tls:
    - secretName: certctl-tls
      hosts:
        - certctl.example.com

See values.yaml for all available configuration options.

Usage Examples

Example 1: High Availability Setup

# ha-values.yaml
server:
  replicas: 3
  resources:
    requests:
      cpu: 250m
      memory: 256Mi
    limits:
      cpu: 1000m
      memory: 512Mi

postgresql:
  storage:
    size: 50Gi

podAntiAffinity:
  requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
    - labelSelector:
        matchExpressions:
          - key: app.kubernetes.io/component
            operator: In
            values: [server]
      topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname

Deploy with:

helm install certctl certctl/certctl -f ha-values.yaml

Example 2: External PostgreSQL Database

# external-db-values.yaml
postgresql:
  enabled: false

server:
  env:
    CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: "postgres://user:password@rds.example.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=require"

Deploy with:

helm install certctl certctl/certctl -f external-db-values.yaml

Example 3: ACME + Let's Encrypt

# acme-values.yaml
server:
  issuer:
    acme:
      enabled: true
      directoryURL: https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
      email: admin@example.com
      challengeType: dns-01
      dnsPresentScript: /scripts/dns-present.sh
      dnsCleanupScript: /scripts/dns-cleanup.sh
      dnsPropagationWait: 30s

Example 4: Email Notifications via Slack + SMTP

# notifications-values.yaml
server:
  smtp:
    enabled: true
    host: smtp.example.com
    port: 587
    username: certctl@example.com
    password: "smtp-password"
    fromAddress: certctl@example.com
    useTLS: true

  notifiers:
    slack:
      enabled: true
      webhookUrl: https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL
      channel: "#certificates"

Upgrading

# Update chart repository
helm repo update

# Upgrade release
helm upgrade certctl certctl/certctl -f values.yaml

# View upgrade history
helm history certctl

# Rollback to previous version
helm rollback certctl 1

Uninstalling

# Delete the release (keeps data by default)
helm uninstall certctl

# Also delete persistent data
kubectl delete pvc --all -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=certctl

# Delete namespace
kubectl delete namespace certctl

Architecture

Components

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Kubernetes Cluster                                           │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                              │
│  ┌─────────────────┐                 ┌──────────────────┐  │
│  │ Ingress/LB      │                 │  Agent Pod 1     │  │
│  │ (optional)      │                 │  (DaemonSet)     │  │
│  └────────┬────────┘                 └──────────────────┘  │
│           │                                                  │
│           ▼                           ┌──────────────────┐  │
│  ┌─────────────────────────┐          │  Agent Pod 2     │  │
│  │ Server Deployment       │          │  (DaemonSet)     │  │
│  │ (1 to N replicas)       │          └──────────────────┘  │
│  │ - REST API              │                                 │
│  │ - Scheduler             │          ┌──────────────────┐  │
│  │ - UI Dashboard          │          │  Agent Pod N     │  │
│  └────────┬────────────────┘          │  (DaemonSet)     │  │
│           │                           └──────────────────┘  │
│           │                                                  │
│           ▼                                                  │
│  ┌──────────────────────────┐                               │
│  │ PostgreSQL StatefulSet   │                               │
│  │ - Database               │                               │
│  │ - PVC (persistent)       │                               │
│  └──────────────────────────┘                               │
│                                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Network Communication

  • Server → PostgreSQL: Internal cluster DNS (certctl-postgres:5432)
  • Agent → Server: Internal cluster DNS (certctl-server:8443)
  • External → Server: Via Ingress or Service (ClusterIP/LoadBalancer/NodePort)

Security Considerations

1. Secrets Management

All sensitive data is stored in Kubernetes Secrets:

  • PostgreSQL credentials
  • API keys
  • SMTP passwords
  • ACME account secrets

Best Practices:

  • Use sealed-secrets or external-secrets operator
  • Enable encryption at rest in etcd
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# Example: Using sealed-secrets
kubectl create secret generic certctl-api-key --from-literal=api-key="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubeseal -f - | kubectl apply -f -

2. RBAC

The chart creates minimal RBAC by default:

  • ServiceAccount per release
  • ClusterRole (empty, extensible)
  • ClusterRoleBinding

To restrict further:

rbac:
  create: true
  # Add specific rules here

3. Pod Security

All containers run with:

  • Non-root user (UID 1000)
  • Read-only root filesystem
  • No privilege escalation
  • Dropped capabilities (ALL)

4. Network Policies

Restrict pod-to-pod communication:

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: certctl-default-deny
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/instance: certctl
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress:
    - from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              name: certctl
  egress:
    - to:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              name: certctl
    - to:
        - podSelector: {}
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53  # DNS
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53

5. TLS/HTTPS

Enable HTTPS with cert-manager:

helm install cert-manager jetstack/cert-manager \
  --namespace cert-manager \
  --create-namespace \
  --set installCRDs=true

Then configure Ingress with TLS.

6. API Key Security

For production:

  1. Generate a strong API key: openssl rand -base64 32
  2. Store securely (Vault, sealed-secrets, etc.)
  3. Never commit to Git
  4. Rotate periodically
# Generate and deploy API key
NEW_KEY=$(openssl rand -base64 32)
kubectl patch secret certctl-server -p "{\"data\":{\"api-key\":\"$(echo -n $NEW_KEY | base64)\"}}"

Troubleshooting

1. Pods Not Starting

# Check pod status
kubectl get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=certctl
kubectl describe pod <pod-name>
kubectl logs <pod-name>

2. Database Connection Issues

# Verify PostgreSQL is running
kubectl get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres
kubectl logs -l app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres

# Test connection from server pod
kubectl exec -it <server-pod> -- \
  psql postgres://certctl:password@certctl-postgres:5432/certctl

3. Agent Not Connecting

# Check agent logs
kubectl logs -l app.kubernetes.io/component=agent

# Verify server is reachable
kubectl exec -it <agent-pod> -- \
  wget -q -O - http://certctl-server:8443/health

4. Persistent Data Loss

# Check PVC status
kubectl get pvc

# Verify data is being stored
kubectl exec -it <postgres-pod> -- \
  ls -lah /var/lib/postgresql/data/postgres

5. Permission Denied Errors

The chart runs containers as non-root (UID 1000). If you see permission errors:

# Temporarily allow root for debugging
server:
  securityContext:
    runAsUser: 0  # NOT FOR PRODUCTION

6. Out of Memory

Increase resource limits:

helm upgrade certctl certctl/certctl \
  --set server.resources.limits.memory=1Gi \
  --set postgresql.resources.limits.memory=2Gi

7. Certificate Validation Issues

For self-signed certificates:

kubectl exec -it <pod> -- \
  CERTCTL_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY=true <command>

Common Issues and Solutions

Issue Solution
ImagePullBackOff Update server.image.repository to your registry
CrashLoopBackOff Check logs with kubectl logs <pod>
Pending PVC Check storage class availability
Connection timeout Verify network policies and service DNS
High memory usage Adjust postgresql.resources.limits and server.resources.limits

Support and Contributing

For issues, questions, or contributions, visit:

License

BSL-1.1 (converts to Apache 2.0 in 2033)