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a1ec42065a
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit
identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern:
(1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the
error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and
audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST
AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably
logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every
authorization event is durably logged.'
(2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection
from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action
row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the
auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic.
This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites
in the auth surface:
- internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass)
Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with:
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action
committed; audit row may be missing)',
'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource,
'err', err)
}
Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN
logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows
can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from-
audit-table.
Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in
this commit:
- service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method;
accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing
helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure)
- service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method
- test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the
extended interface
The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
(role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval
submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are
deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the
corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively
that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The
silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches
the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
221 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
221 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// RoleService manages roles + role-permission grants.
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type RoleService struct {
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repo repository.RoleRepository
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permRepo repository.PermissionRepository
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authorizer *Authorizer
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audit AuditService
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}
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// NewRoleService constructs a RoleService.
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func NewRoleService(repo repository.RoleRepository, permRepo repository.PermissionRepository, authorizer *Authorizer, audit AuditService) *RoleService {
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return &RoleService{
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repo: repo,
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permRepo: permRepo,
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authorizer: authorizer,
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audit: audit,
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}
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}
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// List returns every role in the caller's tenant. Requires
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// `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) List(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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tenantID := caller.TenantID
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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return s.repo.List(ctx, tenantID)
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}
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// Get returns the role with the given ID. Requires `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) Get(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return s.repo.Get(ctx, id)
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}
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// Create stores a new role. Requires `auth.role.create`.
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func (s *RoleService) Create(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.create"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if role.TenantID == "" {
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role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.create", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name, "tenant_id": role.TenantID})
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return nil
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}
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// Update modifies an existing role. Requires `auth.role.edit`.
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func (s *RoleService) Update(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, role); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.update", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name})
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return nil
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}
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// Delete removes a role. Requires `auth.role.delete`. Returns
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// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still reference
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// the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
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func (s *RoleService) Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.delete"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.repo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.delete", "role", id, nil)
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return nil
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}
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// ListPermissions returns the (permission, scope) grants on the role.
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// Requires `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return s.repo.ListPermissions(ctx, roleID)
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}
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// AddPermission grants a permission to a role at the given scope.
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// Requires `auth.role.edit`. Returns ErrInvalidPermission if the
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// permission name is not in the canonical catalogue.
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func (s *RoleService) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !s.permRepo.IsCanonical(permissionName) {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPermission, permissionName)
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}
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perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
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RoleID: roleID,
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PermissionID: perm.ID,
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ScopeType: scopeType,
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ScopeID: scopeID,
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}
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if err := s.repo.AddPermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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details := map[string]interface{}{
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"role_id": roleID,
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"permission": permissionName,
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"scope_type": string(scopeType),
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}
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if scopeID != nil {
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details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.add", "role", roleID, details)
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return nil
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}
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// RemovePermission revokes a previously-granted permission from a role.
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// Requires `auth.role.edit`.
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func (s *RoleService) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
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RoleID: roleID,
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PermissionID: perm.ID,
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ScopeType: scopeType,
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ScopeID: scopeID,
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}
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if err := s.repo.RemovePermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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details := map[string]interface{}{
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"role_id": roleID,
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"permission": permissionName,
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"scope_type": string(scopeType),
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}
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if scopeID != nil {
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details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.remove", "role", roleID, details)
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return nil
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}
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// requirePermission is the gate every public method runs first. System
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// callers bypass; everyone else must hold the named permission globally.
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// Returns ErrUnauthenticated when caller is nil, ErrForbidden when the
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// caller exists but lacks the permission.
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func (s *RoleService) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, perm string) error {
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if caller == nil {
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return ErrUnauthenticated
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}
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if caller.IsSystem {
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return nil
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}
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tenantID := caller.TenantID
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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ok, err := s.authorizer.CheckPermission(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), tenantID, perm, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrForbidden, perm)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// recordAudit emits an audit row tied to the caller. Best-effort: audit
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// failures are logged via panic-recover but do not fail the operation.
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//
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// Bundle 1 Phase 8: every role-mutation is an authentication /
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// authorization event. The auditor role queries
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// /v1/audit?category=auth to surface this slice.
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func (s *RoleService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, action, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) {
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if s.audit == nil || caller == nil {
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return
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}
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// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure — see
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// actor_role_service.go::recordAudit for the rationale. Silence-leg
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// closed by emitting WARN on audit-write failure; transactional-leg
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// (action + audit atomic via WithinTx) is a v3 follow-on.
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if err := s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, action, domain.EventCategoryAuth, resourceType, resourceID, details); err != nil {
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slog.WarnContext(ctx, "audit write failed (action committed; audit row may be missing)",
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"action", action,
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"resource_type", resourceType,
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"resource_id", resourceID,
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"actor_id", caller.ActorID,
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"err", err)
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}
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}
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// Ensure the compile-time pin: domain.ActorType is convertible to
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// authdomain.ActorTypeValue via string equality. If the underlying
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// types ever diverge this won't compile.
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var _ authdomain.ActorTypeValue = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey)
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