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854135dfb7
RefreshKeys), hand-rolled group-claim resolver, 21+ negative-test
matrix, token-leak hygiene, IdP downgrade-attack defense
Phase 3 of the bundle ships the business logic that turns the Phase 2
storage primitives into a working OpenID Connect 1.0 + RFC 7636 PKCE
authorization-code flow against any enterprise IdP (Okta / Azure AD /
Google Workspace / Keycloak / Authentik / Auth0).
Service surface:
- Service.HandleAuthRequest(providerID) -> authURL, cookie, preLoginID
Builds the IdP redirect with PKCE-S256 (mandatory; RFC 9700 §2.1.1),
server-generated 32-byte state + nonce, persisted to the pre-login
row keyed by the cookie value.
- Service.HandleCallback(cookie, code, state, ip, ua) -> *CallbackResult
11-step validation: pre-login lookup-and-consume (single-use),
constant-time state compare, code-for-token exchange with PKCE
verifier, ID-token verify (alg pin via go-oidc/v3), service-layer
re-checks of iss / aud / azp (multi-aud requires it; mismatch
rejected) / at_hash (REQUIRED when access_token returned —
Phase 3 lifts the OIDC core "MAY" to a service-level "MUST") /
exp / iat-window / nonce, group-claim resolution with userinfo
fallback, group->role mapping (fail-closed on no match),
user upsert, session mint via SessionMinter port.
- Service.RefreshKeys(providerID) — explicit cache eviction +
re-load. Re-runs the IdP downgrade-attack defense so a provider
that later rotates to advertising HS* / none is caught BEFORE the
next user login attempt.
Security posture (every fail-closed branch is a sentinel error +
test):
- Algorithm pinning: allow-list {RS256, RS512, ES256, ES384, EdDSA};
deny-list {HS256, HS384, HS512, none}. Belt-and-braces re-check
via isDisallowedAlg after go-oidc.Verify.
- PKCE-S256 mandatory (oauth2.GenerateVerifier + S256ChallengeOption);
`plain` rejection sentinel exists for defense-in-depth.
- State + nonce: 32-byte crypto/rand, base64url-no-pad,
constant-time compare, single-use.
- IdP downgrade-attack defense: at provider creation / RefreshKeys,
reject any IdP whose discovery doc advertises HS* / none in
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported.
- JWKS fail-closed: in-flight login fails 503; existing sessions
untouched. isJWKSFetchError detects the gooidc verify-error
shape; ErrJWKSUnreachable is the wire mapping.
- Token-leak hygiene: ID tokens, access tokens, refresh tokens,
authorization codes, PKCE verifiers, state, nonce, signing key
bytes — NEVER logged at any level. logging_test.go pins the
invariant via a slog buffer + grep-assert across HandleAuthRequest,
HandleCallback, alg rejection, and provider-load paths.
Group-claim resolver (internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim/):
- Hand-rolled per Decision 10 (no JSON-path lib; ~150 LOC).
- URL-shape paths (https:// / http://) treated as a single
literal key — Auth0 namespaced claims like
https://your-namespace/groups work without splitting on the
dots in the URL.
- Dot-separated paths walked through nested map[string]interface{}.
- []interface{} / []string / single-string normalized to []string;
bool / number / object / nil → fail closed.
- 18 unit tests + sentinels (ErrPathEmpty, ErrSegmentMissing,
ErrSegmentNotObject, ErrInvalidValueType).
Test surface:
- service_test.go: 57 test functions including all 21 prompt-mandated
negative cases (wrong aud / wrong iss / expired / unknown alg /
alg=none / HMAC alg / azp missing on multi-aud / azp mismatched /
at_hash missing / at_hash mismatched / iat in future / iat too old /
nonce mismatched / state mismatched / state replayed / PKCE plain
sentinel / pre-login replay / forged cookie / IdP downgrade /
group-claim missing / group-claim unmapped) plus the userinfo
fallback matrix (happy path + endpoint-missing + endpoint-failing +
userinfo-also-empty), HandleAuthRequest entry point + RNG-failure
paths, upsertUser update + create + display-name fallback +
Validate-error paths, decryptClientSecret real-encrypt round-trip
+ bad-passphrase, alg-parser malformed-header matrix.
- logging_test.go: 4 hygiene tests pinning no token / code / verifier /
state / cookie / client_secret / alg name appears in any captured
log line.
- groupclaim/resolver_test.go: 18 cases covering Okta string-array,
Keycloak realm_access.roles, Auth0 namespaced URL claim,
single-string normalization, deeply-nested 3-segment walks, and
every fail-closed branch.
Coverage:
internal/auth/oidc 92.2% (floor: 90)
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim 100.0% (floor: 95)
internal/auth/oidc/domain 96.2% (floor: 90)
Coverage gates added at .github/coverage-thresholds.yml so a future
regression in any fail-closed branch fails CI before the commit lands.
Phase 3 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md is closed. Next up: Phase 4
(Session service: cookies, revocation, sliding-vs-absolute expiry).
143 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
143 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
// Package groupclaim resolves the operator-configured `groups_claim_path`
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// against an ID token's parsed claims, returning the user's group
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// membership as a `[]string`.
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//
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// Auth Bundle 2 Phase 3 ships this without a JSON-path library
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// dependency per the pre-bundle dep audit. The contract is narrow
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// enough that ~40 LOC of straight Go covers every documented use case
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// (Keycloak, Auth0, Okta, Azure AD, Google Workspace) without the
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// transitive footprint or maintenance liability of pulling in
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// PaesslerAG/jsonpath, ohler55/ojg, or tidwall/gjson.
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//
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// Resolution rules:
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//
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// 1. URL-shape paths (prefix `https://` or `http://`) are treated as a
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// single literal key. This handles Auth0's namespaced claims like
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// `https://your-namespace/groups`.
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// 2. Dot-separated paths (e.g. Keycloak's `realm_access.roles`) are
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// split on `.` and walked through nested `map[string]interface{}`
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// chains. A non-object segment or missing key fails closed with a
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// clear error.
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// 3. The resolved value is coerced to `[]string`:
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// - `[]string` → as-is.
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// - `[]interface{}` of strings → coerced.
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// - single `string` → wrapped in a one-element slice.
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// - any other type (bool, number, object, nil) → fails closed.
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//
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// Phase 3 callers MUST treat the empty-result case as fail-closed: no
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// session is minted, an audit row records `auth.oidc_login_unmapped_groups`
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// (the user's IdP returned a claim but it didn't match any of the
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// operator's mappings).
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package groupclaim
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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)
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// Sentinel errors. Service-layer callers branch on these via errors.Is.
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var (
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// ErrPathEmpty is returned when the configured path is the empty
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// string. The operator API layer + domain Validate() catch this
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// upstream; this sentinel exists so the resolver is safe to call
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// even with malformed config.
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ErrPathEmpty = errors.New("groupclaim: path is empty")
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// ErrSegmentMissing is returned when a path segment doesn't exist
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// on the current claims object (e.g. path `realm_access.roles`
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// applied to a token without `realm_access`). Phase 3's
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// HandleCallback maps to "no groups; fail closed".
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ErrSegmentMissing = errors.New("groupclaim: path segment missing")
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// ErrSegmentNotObject is returned when an intermediate path
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// segment resolves to a non-object (e.g. trying to walk into a
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// string). Indicates the IdP token shape doesn't match the
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// operator's configured path.
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ErrSegmentNotObject = errors.New("groupclaim: intermediate segment is not an object")
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// ErrInvalidValueType is returned when the resolved value cannot
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// be coerced to a string array. Bool, number, object, nil all
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// fail closed.
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ErrInvalidValueType = errors.New("groupclaim: resolved value is not coercible to []string")
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)
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// Resolve walks `path` through `claims` and returns the resolved
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// group list. See the package doc for the full contract.
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//
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// Per Phase 3's "complete path, not easy path" discipline: this
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// function does NOT modify `claims` and does NOT log any of its
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// inputs. Token-leak hygiene tests assert that paths through this
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// function never emit any of `claims`, `path`, or the resolved
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// value to the slog buffer.
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func Resolve(claims map[string]interface{}, path string) ([]string, error) {
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if path == "" {
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return nil, ErrPathEmpty
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}
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// Rule 1: URL-shape paths are single literal keys.
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var segments []string
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if isURLShapePath(path) {
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segments = []string{path}
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} else {
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segments = strings.Split(path, ".")
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}
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// Walk the segments through the nested map.
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var cur interface{} = claims
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for i, seg := range segments {
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obj, ok := cur.(map[string]interface{})
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: segment %q (index %d) applied to non-object", ErrSegmentNotObject, seg, i)
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}
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next, ok := obj[seg]
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q at index %d", ErrSegmentMissing, seg, i)
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}
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cur = next
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}
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// Coerce the resolved value to []string.
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return coerceStringArray(cur)
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}
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// isURLShapePath reports whether path is a URL-shape (Auth0-style
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// namespaced claim). Such paths are NOT split on `.`; they're treated
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// as a single literal key against the top-level claims map.
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func isURLShapePath(path string) bool {
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return strings.HasPrefix(path, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(path, "https://")
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}
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// coerceStringArray converts the resolved claim value to []string per
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// the rules in the package doc. Fails closed on any other type.
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func coerceStringArray(v interface{}) ([]string, error) {
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switch x := v.(type) {
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case []string:
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// Already the right type. Return a copy so the caller can't
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// mutate the underlying claims map by surprise.
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out := make([]string, len(x))
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copy(out, x)
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return out, nil
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case []interface{}:
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// JSON unmarshal into map[string]interface{} produces
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// []interface{} for arrays. Coerce each element to string;
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// any non-string element fails the whole resolution.
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out := make([]string, 0, len(x))
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for i, e := range x {
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s, ok := e.(string)
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: element %d is %T not string", ErrInvalidValueType, i, e)
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}
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out = append(out, s)
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}
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return out, nil
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case string:
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// Single string: wrap in a one-element slice. Some IdPs
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// return a single role as a bare string rather than a
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// one-element array; the resolver normalizes both shapes.
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return []string{x}, nil
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: got %T", ErrInvalidValueType, v)
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}
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}
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