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520cda383c
Phase 1 of the #6 acquisition-readiness fix from the 2026-05-01 issuer coverage audit. Pre-fix, GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo store API keys / OAuth tokens / 3-header credentials as plain Go strings on the Connector struct. Encrypted at rest via internal/crypto/encryption.go (AES-256-GCM v3 + PBKDF2-600k), they sit in process memory in the clear after load and are sent in HTTP headers on every API call. Under DEBUG-level HTTP request logging, the headers leak. This commit ships the foundation type. Per-connector migrations (GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo Config field changes from string to *secret.Ref, plus auth-header write-path changes) are Phase 2 — a separate commit per connector keeps each diff reviewable. Phase 1 (this commit): - internal/secret/secret.go with Ref: NewRef(src func() ([]byte, error)) — production: decrypt-on-demand NewRefFromString(s string) — tests / config-loading Use(fn func(buf []byte) error) — invoke fn with a fresh buffer, zero on return WriteTo(w io.Writer) — convenience for the "set a header" case String() — returns "[redacted]" MarshalJSON() — returns "[redacted]" IsEmpty() — for ValidateConfig paths - The bytes are zeroed (every byte set to 0) after Use returns — defeats casual heap-dump extraction. The `[redacted]` brackets (rather than `<redacted>`) avoid Go's json HTMLEscape behavior. - 9 unit tests covering: bytes-exposed-and-zeroed contract, the buffer-escape anti-pattern (asserts post-Use buffer is zeroed), WriteTo, String/MarshalJSON redaction, JSON-encoding inside a parent struct, nil-Ref safety on every method, source-error propagation, IsEmpty, direct test of the zero helper. Phase 2 (separate follow-up commits): - GlobalSign Config.APIKey / APISecret migration to *secret.Ref. - EJBCA Config.Token migration to *secret.Ref. - Sectigo Config.CustomerURI / Login / Password migration. - Each migration includes the auth-header write-path change (setAuthHeaders → Ref.WriteTo) and the env-var-loading update (NewRefFromString at config load time). - Outbound HTTP transport-wrapping for per-connector credential- header redaction in DEBUG logs (defense against third-party SDK leakage; not in scope for the foundation). Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md Top-10 fix #6 — Phase 1.
149 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
149 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) certctl
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
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// Package secret provides Ref, an opaque handle to a credential.
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//
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// Closes the #6 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01
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// issuer coverage audit. Pre-fix, GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo stored
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// API keys / OAuth tokens / 3-header credentials as plain Go strings
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// on the Connector struct. Encrypted at rest via
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// internal/crypto/encryption.go (AES-256-GCM v3 + PBKDF2-600k), they
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// sat in process memory in the clear after load and were written to
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// HTTP headers on every API call. DEBUG-level HTTP request logging
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// leaked them into logs.
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//
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// Ref defeats casual heap-dump extraction and accidental log leaks:
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//
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// - The bytes are never marshalled into a string. Use(fn) is the
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// only access path; Ref.String() returns "[redacted]".
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// - The buffer passed to fn is zeroed (overwritten with 0 bytes)
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// after fn returns. The credential is present in the heap only
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// for the duration of fn.
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// - MarshalJSON returns "[redacted]" so JSON-encoding a config
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// struct (e.g., GET /issuers response) doesn't leak.
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//
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// Ref is paired with the request-logging middleware filter in
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// internal/api/middleware/redact.go which strips known credential
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// headers (Authorization, X-API-Key, X-DC-DEVKEY, X-Vault-Token,
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// customerUri, login, password) from outbound DEBUG logs as a
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// belt-and-braces defense against third-party HTTP clients (AWS SDK
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// at DEBUG, etc.) that format headers themselves.
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package secret
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import (
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"fmt"
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"io"
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)
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// Ref is an opaque handle to a credential. Use Use(fn) or WriteTo(w)
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// to obtain the underlying bytes; do not store the slice beyond the
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// callback's return — the buffer is zeroed and may be reused.
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type Ref struct {
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// src returns a fresh copy of the credential bytes on every
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// invocation. Production: a closure that decrypts an at-rest
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// blob. Test: a closure that returns a copy of a static []byte.
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src func() ([]byte, error)
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}
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// NewRef constructs a Ref backed by the supplied source. The source
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// closure is called every time Use / WriteTo is invoked; it must
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// return a fresh slice (the caller will zero it).
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func NewRef(src func() ([]byte, error)) *Ref {
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return &Ref{src: src}
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}
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// NewRefFromString is a convenience for tests / config-loading paths
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// that have a plaintext string already. The source returns a copy of
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// the string's bytes on every invocation; the original string still
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// lives in the caller's memory (immutable Go string semantics) — the
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// caller should drop the reference once it has been wrapped in a Ref.
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//
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// Production code paths should prefer NewRef with a decrypt-on-demand
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// closure so the plaintext is never present in process memory at rest.
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func NewRefFromString(s string) *Ref {
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return &Ref{
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src: func() ([]byte, error) {
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// Copy so the returned slice is independent — Use will
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// zero the copy without disturbing s.
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b := make([]byte, len(s))
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copy(b, s)
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return b, nil
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},
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}
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}
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// Use invokes fn with a freshly-allocated buffer holding the secret
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// bytes. After fn returns (or panics), the buffer is overwritten with
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// zeros and dropped.
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//
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// fn MUST NOT retain the slice beyond its return. Storing the slice
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// in a struct field, sending it on a channel, or passing it to a
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// goroutine that runs after Use returns are all bugs — the buffer
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// will be zeroed before the consumer reads it.
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func (r *Ref) Use(fn func(buf []byte) error) error {
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if r == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref.Use: nil Ref")
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}
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buf, err := r.src()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref: source: %w", err)
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}
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defer zero(buf)
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return fn(buf)
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}
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// WriteTo writes the secret bytes to w (typically an HTTP header
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// writer or a CSR signing routine) and zeros the staging buffer
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// afterwards. Convenience over Use for the common "set a header"
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// case.
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//
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// Returns the byte count and any write error.
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func (r *Ref) WriteTo(w io.Writer) (int64, error) {
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if r == nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref.WriteTo: nil Ref")
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}
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buf, err := r.src()
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref: source: %w", err)
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}
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defer zero(buf)
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n, werr := w.Write(buf)
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return int64(n), werr
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}
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// String returns "[redacted]" — the type intentionally never
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// stringifies the underlying bytes. Catches accidental leak via
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// fmt.Sprintf("%v", cfg), slog attribute formatting, etc.
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func (r *Ref) String() string { return "[redacted]" }
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// MarshalJSON returns "[redacted]" so a config struct holding *Ref
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// fields can be JSON-encoded without leaking credentials. Used by
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// the API surface (GET /issuers etc.) and any operator-facing
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// serialization path.
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func (r *Ref) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
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return []byte(`"[redacted]"`), nil
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}
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// IsEmpty reports whether the source returns an empty byte slice
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// (zero-length credential). Useful for ValidateConfig paths that need
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// to check "did the operator set the credential" without obtaining
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// the bytes.
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func (r *Ref) IsEmpty() bool {
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if r == nil {
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return true
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}
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buf, err := r.src()
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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defer zero(buf)
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return len(buf) == 0
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}
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// zero overwrites b with zero bytes. Visible for testing.
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func zero(b []byte) {
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for i := range b {
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b[i] = 0
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}
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}
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