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3287e174dc
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
155 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
155 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
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)
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// resolveActor extracts the authenticated named-key identity from the request
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// context for audit-trail attribution. Returns the named-key name when set by
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// the auth middleware, or "api" as a safe sentinel when the auth middleware
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// did not populate the context (e.g., AUTH_TYPE=none, or internal/system calls
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// that bypass auth).
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//
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// Post-M-002: this is the single source of truth for handler-layer actor
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// resolution. Handlers must NOT hardcode string literals like "api-key-user"
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// or "api" — always go through this helper so the named-key identity flows to
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// services and the audit trail.
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func resolveActor(ctx context.Context) string {
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if user := middleware.GetUser(ctx); user != "" {
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return user
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}
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return "api"
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}
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// PagedResponse represents a paginated API response.
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type PagedResponse struct {
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Data interface{} `json:"data"`
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Total int64 `json:"total"`
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Page int `json:"page"`
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PerPage int `json:"per_page"`
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}
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// CursorPagedResponse represents a cursor-paginated API response.
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type CursorPagedResponse struct {
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Data interface{} `json:"data"`
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Total int64 `json:"total"`
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NextCursor string `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
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PageSize int `json:"page_size"`
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}
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// ErrorResponse represents a standard error response.
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type ErrorResponse struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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RequestID string `json:"request_id,omitempty"`
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}
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// JSON writes a JSON response with the given status code and data.
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func JSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data interface{}) error {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
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}
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// Error writes a JSON error response with the given status code and message.
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func Error(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message string) error {
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errResp := ErrorResponse{
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Error: http.StatusText(status),
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Message: message,
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errResp)
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}
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// ErrorWithRequestID writes a JSON error response including a request ID.
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func ErrorWithRequestID(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message, requestID string) error {
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errResp := ErrorResponse{
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Error: http.StatusText(status),
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Message: message,
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RequestID: requestID,
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errResp)
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}
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// encodeCursor creates an opaque cursor token from a timestamp and ID.
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func encodeCursor(createdAt time.Time, id string) string {
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raw := createdAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano) + ":" + id
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return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(raw))
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}
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// decodeCursor extracts a timestamp and ID from a cursor token.
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// Kept as var assignment to suppress unused lint — will be used when
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// cursor-based pagination is wired into list handlers.
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var _ = func(cursor string) (time.Time, string, error) {
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raw, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(cursor)
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if err != nil {
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return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor: %w", err)
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}
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parts := strings.SplitN(string(raw), ":", 2)
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if len(parts) != 2 {
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return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor format")
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}
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t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, parts[0])
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if err != nil {
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return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor timestamp: %w", err)
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}
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return t, parts[1], nil
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}
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// filterFields removes fields not in the allowed list from the response data.
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// Works with both single objects and slices.
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func filterFields(data interface{}, fields []string) interface{} {
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if len(fields) == 0 {
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return data
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}
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// Create field set for O(1) lookup
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fieldSet := make(map[string]bool, len(fields))
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for _, f := range fields {
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fieldSet[f] = true
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}
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// Marshal to JSON, then unmarshal to generic structure
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bytes, err := json.Marshal(data)
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if err != nil {
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return data
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}
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// Try as array first
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var arr []map[string]interface{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &arr); err == nil {
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for i := range arr {
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for key := range arr[i] {
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if !fieldSet[key] {
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delete(arr[i], key)
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}
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}
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}
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return arr
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}
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// Try as object
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var obj map[string]interface{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &obj); err == nil {
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for key := range obj {
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if !fieldSet[key] {
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delete(obj, key)
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}
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}
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return obj
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}
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return data
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}
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