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43075a1b5c
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status counters + reload-trust endpoint. Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation: - internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the original plaintext byte-for-byte). - ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in- memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey- Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm / ErrServerKeygenDisabled. - ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2 multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth even if the route was registered). - New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen + /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml + openapi-parity guard updated. Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation: - New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration 000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6 follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it). - domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-* EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985 PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID. - ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU / attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take down the entire endpoint. Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust: - internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12 named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape + ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust() SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter. - Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at every success/failure leg. - internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim: Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added to AdminGatedHandlers). - New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/ est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard reproduced clean. - cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per- profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() + HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up. - Per-profile counter isolation regression test (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time pointer-identity check. Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean (excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build — disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/ service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1 already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED). Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases 8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation / docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
34 lines
1.7 KiB
SQL
34 lines
1.7 KiB
SQL
-- EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 6.1.
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--
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-- Add `required_csr_attributes` JSONB column to certificate_profiles so the
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-- EST `csrattrs` endpoint (RFC 7030 §4.5) can return a profile-derived OID
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-- list to enrolling clients. Clients use the response as a hint for which
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-- attributes / EKUs to include in their PKCS#10 CSR — example: the
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-- IoT-bootstrap profile might require `serialNumber` (OID 2.5.4.5) so the
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-- device serial appears in the issued cert's Subject DN.
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--
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-- Defaults to `[]` for back-compat (existing profiles see no behavior change;
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-- their EST csrattrs response stays the legacy 204-No-Content).
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--
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-- Also lands `must_staple` as a real column. The 5.6 follow-up wired
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-- CertificateProfile.MustStaple all the way through the issuer/service
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-- layer but the postgres repo never grew the column — every existing
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-- deploy implicitly has must_staple=false because the field couldn't be
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-- persisted. The column is added with default false so existing profiles
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-- behave identically; operators flipping must_staple via the API now
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-- actually round-trip to disk.
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--
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-- Both columns ship in the same migration to keep the schema-history
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-- contiguous; rolling back drops both.
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ALTER TABLE certificate_profiles
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ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS required_csr_attributes JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]';
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ALTER TABLE certificate_profiles
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ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS must_staple BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
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-- Index isn't necessary — required_csr_attributes is read on every EST
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-- csrattrs request but only at the per-profile granularity (always a
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-- direct PK lookup); must_staple is a per-issuance bool with no query
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-- pattern that benefits from indexing.
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