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2a1a0b347c
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.
WHAT.
Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.
WHY.
Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.
HOW.
Migration:
migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip TEXT,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent TEXT;
Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
values for the leg in question.
Domain:
internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
UserAgent fields.
Repository:
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.
Service:
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
userAgent) as positions 5–6.
- PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
as positions 5–6.
- HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
threaded to the store.
- HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
proxy compat).
- New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
- SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
for main.go config wiring.
Adapter:
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
fields through to the repo row.
Handler:
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
- LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
and passes to the service.
- classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
audit categories.
Config:
internal/config/config.go
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.
Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues (rolling-
deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
(operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)
Mechanical fan-out:
- stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
- All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
semantics.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/config/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... PASS
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
168 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
168 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
package repository
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"time"
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oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
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)
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// Sentinel errors for the OIDC repositories. Postgres implementations
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// translate SQLSTATE codes into these so handler / service code can
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// branch via errors.Is.
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var (
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// ErrOIDCProviderNotFound: Get / GetByName returned no row. HTTP 404.
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ErrOIDCProviderNotFound = errors.New("oidc: provider not found")
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// ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName: Create tripped the (tenant_id, name)
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// UNIQUE constraint. HTTP 409.
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ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName = errors.New("oidc: provider with this name already exists in tenant")
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// ErrOIDCProviderInUse: Delete failed because at least one users row
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// references the provider via oidc_provider_id (FK ON DELETE
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// RESTRICT). HTTP 409.
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ErrOIDCProviderInUse = errors.New("oidc: provider has authenticated users; revoke all sessions before delete")
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// ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound: Get returned no row. HTTP 404.
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ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound = errors.New("oidc: group-role mapping not found")
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// ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate: Add tripped the
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// (provider_id, group_name, role_id) UNIQUE constraint. HTTP 409.
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ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate = errors.New("oidc: group-role mapping already exists")
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)
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// OIDCProviderRepository wraps the oidc_providers table. Phase 3's
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// OIDCService consumes List + Get to look up the IdP for token
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// validation; the GUI / CLI wire Create / Update / Delete behind
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// auth.oidc.* permission gates per Phase 5.
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type OIDCProviderRepository interface {
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// List returns every configured provider in the tenant. Order:
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// created_at ASC for stable GUI rendering.
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List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// Get returns one provider by id. ErrOIDCProviderNotFound on miss.
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Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// GetByName returns one provider by (tenant_id, name).
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// ErrOIDCProviderNotFound on miss.
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GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// Create persists a new provider. Caller MUST have already called
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// p.Validate() and encrypted the client_secret_encrypted byte
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// stream via internal/crypto/encryption.go. Returns
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// ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName when the (tenant_id, name) UNIQUE
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// constraint fires.
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Create(ctx context.Context, p *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider) error
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// Update writes the full mutable field set back to the row.
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// Immutable fields (id, tenant_id, created_at) are read-only;
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// updated_at is set to NOW() by the implementation.
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Update(ctx context.Context, p *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider) error
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// Delete removes a provider by id. Returns ErrOIDCProviderInUse
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// when at least one users row references this provider (FK ON
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// DELETE RESTRICT). Phase 5's handler maps to HTTP 409.
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Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
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}
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// GroupRoleMappingRepository wraps the group_role_mappings table.
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// Phase 3's OIDCService.HandleCallback uses Map() to translate IdP
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// group claims into role IDs; the GUI / CLI wire ListByProvider /
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// Add / Remove for operator configuration.
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type GroupRoleMappingRepository interface {
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// ListByProvider returns every mapping for the named provider.
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// Order: group_name ASC for stable GUI rendering.
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ListByProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) ([]*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error)
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// Get returns one mapping by id. ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound on miss.
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Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error)
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// Add persists a new mapping. Caller MUST have called m.Validate().
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// Returns ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate when the
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// (provider_id, group_name, role_id) UNIQUE constraint fires.
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Add(ctx context.Context, m *oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping) error
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// Remove deletes a mapping by id.
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Remove(ctx context.Context, id string) error
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// Map resolves an IdP-supplied list of group names against the
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// provider's mappings. Returns the deduplicated set of role IDs
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// the user should hold. Empty result means the user matches no
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// mapping (Phase 3 fail-closed: no session minted, audit row
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// `auth.oidc_login_unmapped_groups`).
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Map(ctx context.Context, providerID string, groupNames []string) ([]string, error)
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// PreLoginRepository — Bundle 2 Phase 5.
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//
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// Holds short-lived rows that carry OIDC state + nonce + PKCE verifier
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// across the IdP redirect. Distinct from the sessions table because
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// sessions doesn't carry OIDC-specific columns. 10-minute absolute TTL
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// at the schema layer (oidc_pre_login_sessions.absolute_expires_at);
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// the GC sweep deletes expired rows.
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//
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// Cookie wire format `v1.<pl-id>.<sk-id>.<HMAC-SHA256>` matches the
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// post-login session cookie format exactly; signing-key id is the
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// active SessionSigningKey at handshake time.
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// =============================================================================
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// PreLoginSession is the row shape for oidc_pre_login_sessions. Held
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// here (not in oidc/domain) because it's a Phase-5 storage primitive,
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// not a domain concept the wider service layer reasons about.
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type PreLoginSession struct {
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ID string // prefix `pl-`
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TenantID string
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SigningKeyID string // FK to session_signing_keys.id
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OIDCProviderID string // FK to oidc_providers.id
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State string
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Nonce string
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PKCEVerifier string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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AbsoluteExpiresAt time.Time
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 — UA / IP binding (RFC 9700 §4.7.1).
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// Persisted at /auth/oidc/login; compared on consume to defeat
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// pre-login cookie theft. Either column may be empty for in-flight
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// rows from a pre-deploy code path during a rolling deploy; the
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// consume-side check only enforces when BOTH the row AND the
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// incoming request carry non-empty values.
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ClientIP string
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UserAgent string
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}
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// Sentinel errors for PreLoginRepository.
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var (
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// ErrPreLoginNotFound: LookupAndConsume found no row with the
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// supplied id. The handler maps to HTTP 400 (replay or forgery).
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ErrPreLoginNotFound = errors.New("oidc: pre-login session not found or already consumed")
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// ErrPreLoginExpired: the row was found but absolute_expires_at is
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// in the past. The handler maps to HTTP 400. The row is also
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// deleted (the consume side of LookupAndConsume).
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ErrPreLoginExpired = errors.New("oidc: pre-login session expired (10-minute TTL exceeded)")
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)
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// PreLoginRepository wraps the oidc_pre_login_sessions table.
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type PreLoginRepository interface {
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// Create persists a new pre-login row. Caller MUST have already
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// generated the random id, state, nonce, and PKCE verifier;
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// CreatedAt + AbsoluteExpiresAt default to NOW() and NOW()+10min
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// at the schema layer when zero.
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Create(ctx context.Context, p *PreLoginSession) error
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// LookupAndConsume reads the row by id AND deletes it atomically
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// (single-use). Returns ErrPreLoginNotFound if no row matches OR
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// if the row was already consumed by a concurrent caller.
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// Returns ErrPreLoginExpired if the row was found but expired
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// (the row is still deleted in this case so retries don't
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// re-trigger the expiry check).
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LookupAndConsume(ctx context.Context, id string) (*PreLoginSession, error)
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// GarbageCollectExpired deletes pre-login rows whose
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// absolute_expires_at is in the past. Returns the count deleted.
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// Wired into the same scheduler sweep as expired post-login sessions.
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GarbageCollectExpired(ctx context.Context) (int, error)
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}
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