mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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aa139ee0d9
route + RFC 9266 channel binding + HTTP Basic enrollment-password +
per-source-IP failed-auth limit + per-(CN, sourceIP) sliding-window cap.
Two new shared packages so EST + Intune share infrastructure:
- internal/cms/ — RFC 9266 tls-exporter extractor (ExtractTLSExporter
with stdlib-panic recovery for synthetic ConnectionStates) +
CSR-side channel-binding parser via raw TBSCertificationRequestInfo
walk (the stdlib's csr.Attributes can't represent the OCTET STRING
binding value), VerifyChannelBinding composite, EmbedChannel-
BindingAttribute fixture helper, typed sentinel errors for missing
/ mismatch / not-TLS-1.3 mapped to HTTP 400 / 409 / 426 in handler.
- internal/trustanchor/ — extracted from scep/intune/trust_anchor*.go
so the EST mTLS sibling route + Intune dispatcher share the same
SIGHUP-reloadable PEM bundle primitive. intune.TrustAnchorHolder
is now `= trustanchor.Holder` (type alias) + NewTrustAnchorHolder =
trustanchor.New (function alias) — every existing call site compiles
unchanged. Intune's LoadTrustAnchor is a thin wrapper over
trustanchor.LoadBundle. White-box tests moved to the new package.
- internal/ratelimit/ — extracted from scep/intune/rate_limit.go (this
was Phase 4.1, in the same bundle). intune.PerDeviceRateLimiter
is now a thin wrapper preserving the (subject, issuer)→key
composition; EST handler reaches for SlidingWindowLimiter directly.
ESTHandler grew six optional fields wired by per-profile setters
(SetMTLSTrust / SetChannelBindingRequired / SetEnrollmentPassword /
SetSourceIPRateLimiter / SetPerPrincipalRateLimiter / SetLabelForLog)
plus four new mTLS-route methods (CACertsMTLS / SimpleEnrollMTLS /
SimpleReEnrollMTLS / CSRAttrsMTLS); shared internal pipeline
handleEnrollOrReEnroll(reEnroll, viaMTLS) keeps the auth/binding/
rate-limit gates DRY. New router method RegisterESTMTLSHandlers
registers /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,
simplereenroll,csrattrs}; AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes extends the
no-auth chain to /.well-known/est-mtls.
cmd/server/main.go's EST loop wires per-profile mTLS holder +
channel-binding policy + per-principal limiter + (when EnrollmentPassword
non-empty) Basic + source-IP limiter; new preflightESTMTLSClientCATrust-
Bundle returns *trustanchor.Holder so SIGHUP rotates the EST mTLS
bundle live without restart. SCEP + EST mTLS profiles now share a
single union mtlsUnionPoolForTLS passed to buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS
(replaces the protocol-specific scepMTLSUnionPoolForTLS); per-handler
re-verify enforces "cert must chain to THIS profile's bundle" so
cross-protocol bleed is blocked at the application layer even though
the TLS layer trusts certs from either pool's union.
Phase 3.3 source-IP failed-Basic limiter defaults: 10 attempts / 1h
/ 50k tracked IPs (no env var; tunable in a follow-up). Phase 4.2
per-principal limiter cap from CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_RATE_
LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H (existing field, Phase 1 shipped).
New tests:
- internal/cms/channelbinding_test.go: extractor + CSR-side parser +
composite + TLS-1.3 round-trip end-to-end + EmbedChannelBinding-
Attribute round-trip
- internal/trustanchor/holder_test.go: parseBundlePEM white-box +
LoadBundle + Holder Get/Pool/SetLabelForLog/Reload-happy/
Reload-keeps-old-on-failure/Reload-keeps-old-on-expired/
WatchSIGHUP-reloads-pool/WatchSIGHUP-stop-clean
- internal/api/handler/est_hardening_test.go: 16 named cases covering
mTLS no-trust-pool 500 + no-cert 401 + cross-profile cert 401 +
happy-path 200 + CACertsMTLS auth gate + CSRAttrsMTLS auth gate +
channel-binding required-absent-rejected + not-required-absent-
allowed + writeChannelBindingError mapping + Basic no-header 401
+ Basic wrong-password 401 + Basic correct-200 + Basic-no-password
no-gate + per-IP failed-attempt lockout 429 + per-principal
blocks-after-cap + different-principals-independent + no-limiter-
unbounded.
Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean for
cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/
cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green for cms/trustanchor/
api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/service. G-3
docs-drift guard reproduced locally clean (Phase 1 already
documented every new env var; Phases 2-4 added zero new env vars).
198 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
198 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
package ratelimit
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 4.1: this test file holds the
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// white-box tests for the SlidingWindowLimiter primitives that used to live
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// in internal/scep/intune/rate_limit_test.go (TestPerDeviceRateLimiter_
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// DefaultCapsHonored, TestPruneOlderThan, TestPruneOlderThan_NoOpWhen
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// NothingToPrune). The behavioral coverage in intune/rate_limit_test.go
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// stays — it exercises the wrapper's (subject, issuer)-composition contract
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// + the empty-subject short-circuit + concurrent race-freedom.
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_AllowsUpToCap(t *testing.T) {
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 10)
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now := time.Now()
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for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
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if err := l.Allow("k", now.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("call %d should be allowed: %v", i+1, err)
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}
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}
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if err := l.Allow("k", now.Add(4*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, ErrRateLimited) {
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t.Fatalf("4th call should be rate-limited; got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_DistinctKeysIndependent(t *testing.T) {
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(1, 24*time.Hour, 10)
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now := time.Now()
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if err := l.Allow("k-1", now); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("first allow: %v", err)
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}
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if err := l.Allow("k-2", now); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("different key must have its own bucket: %v", err)
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}
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if err := l.Allow("k-1", now.Add(1*time.Second)); !errors.Is(err, ErrRateLimited) {
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t.Fatalf("repeat key should be limited; got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_WindowExpiry(t *testing.T) {
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(2, 1*time.Hour, 10)
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now := time.Now()
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if err := l.Allow("k", now); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := l.Allow("k", now.Add(30*time.Minute)); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Inside window — limited.
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if err := l.Allow("k", now.Add(45*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, ErrRateLimited) {
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t.Fatalf("inside-window 3rd call should be limited: %v", err)
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}
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// Past window — slots reopen.
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if err := l.Allow("k", now.Add(2*time.Hour)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("past-window call should be allowed (window reset): %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_DisabledBypass(t *testing.T) {
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(0, 24*time.Hour, 10) // maxN=0 → disabled
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if !l.Disabled() {
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t.Fatal("limiter with maxN=0 must report Disabled()=true")
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}
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now := time.Now()
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for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
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if err := l.Allow("k", now); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("disabled limiter must allow everything: %v", err)
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}
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}
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if got := l.Len(); got != 0 {
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t.Errorf("disabled limiter Len() = %d, want 0", got)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_NegativeCapDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(-1, 24*time.Hour, 10)
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if !l.Disabled() {
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t.Fatal("negative maxN must produce a disabled limiter")
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_EmptyKeyShortCircuits(t *testing.T) {
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// Empty key is the caller's defense-in-depth case — caller's validation
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// upstream should reject empty-key events first. Limiter must not build
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// a single shared bucket keyed by empty-key — that would be a chokepoint
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// for every empty-key event.
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(1, 24*time.Hour, 10)
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now := time.Now()
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for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
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if err := l.Allow("", now); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("empty key must short-circuit (call %d): %v", i, err)
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}
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}
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if got := l.Len(); got != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Len after 50 empty-key calls = %d, want 0 (no bucket created)", got)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_DefaultCapsHonored(t *testing.T) {
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// White-box test: exercises the constructor's default-fill branches.
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// Lives here (not in the intune wrapper test) because the fields
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// (window + cap) are package-private to ratelimit.
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(5, 0, 0) // window=0 → 24h default; cap=0 → 100k default
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if l.window != 24*time.Hour {
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t.Errorf("default window = %v, want 24h", l.window)
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}
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if l.cap != 100_000 {
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t.Errorf("default cap = %d, want 100000", l.cap)
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_MapCapEvictsOldest(t *testing.T) {
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// Cap of 3 keys to exercise the eviction branch deterministically.
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(2, 1*time.Hour, 3)
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now := time.Now()
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for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
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key := fmt.Sprintf("k-%d", i)
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if err := l.Allow(key, now.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("insert %d: %v", i, err)
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}
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}
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if l.Len() != 3 {
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t.Fatalf("Len = %d, want 3", l.Len())
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}
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// 4th key forces eviction of k-0 (its newest timestamp is oldest).
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if err := l.Allow("k-3", now.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("4th-key insert: %v", err)
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}
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if l.Len() != 3 {
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t.Errorf("Len after at-cap insert = %d, want 3 (cap honored)", l.Len())
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}
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}
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func TestSlidingWindowLimiter_ConcurrentRaceFree(t *testing.T) {
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("race-style test under -short")
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}
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l := NewSlidingWindowLimiter(50, 24*time.Hour, 10000)
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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for g := 0; g < 20; g++ {
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wg.Add(1)
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go func(id int) {
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defer wg.Done()
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now := time.Now()
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key := fmt.Sprintf("k-%d", id)
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for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
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_ = l.Allow(key, now)
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}
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}(g)
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}
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wg.Wait()
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if got := l.Len(); got != 20 {
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t.Errorf("expected 20 distinct keys; got %d", got)
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}
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}
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// White-box tests for the unexported pruneOlderThan helper. Live in this
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// package because the helper is package-private to ratelimit. The test
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// surface used to live in intune/rate_limit_test.go before the Phase 4.1
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// extraction.
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func TestPruneOlderThan(t *testing.T) {
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t0 := time.Now()
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in := []time.Time{
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t0.Add(-3 * time.Hour), // pruned (older than cutoff)
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t0.Add(-2 * time.Hour), // pruned (older than cutoff)
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t0.Add(-1 * time.Hour), // survives (-60m is NEWER than the -90m cutoff)
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t0.Add(-30 * time.Minute), // survives
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t0, // survives
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}
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out := pruneOlderThan(in, t0.Add(-90*time.Minute))
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if len(out) != 3 {
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t.Fatalf("len(out) = %d, want 3 (-1h, -30m, t0 all newer than -90m cutoff)", len(out))
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}
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if !out[0].Equal(t0.Add(-1 * time.Hour)) {
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t.Errorf("out[0] = %v, want -1h (oldest surviving entry)", out[0])
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}
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}
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func TestPruneOlderThan_NoOpWhenNothingToPrune(t *testing.T) {
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t0 := time.Now()
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in := []time.Time{t0.Add(-1 * time.Minute), t0}
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out := pruneOlderThan(in, t0.Add(-1*time.Hour))
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// Same slice header (no copy needed).
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if len(out) != len(in) {
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t.Fatalf("len(out) = %d, want %d", len(out), len(in))
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}
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}
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