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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
158 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
158 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"sync"
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)
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// KeyStore is the lookup contract NewAuthWithKeyStore consults to
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// resolve a Bearer token (already SHA-256 hashed by the middleware) to
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// a NamedAPIKey identity. The interface exists so the same auth
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// middleware can serve both the env-var-keys-only path (immutable
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// in-memory hash table built at startup) and the bootstrap-extended
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// path (env-var keys plus runtime-minted admin keys persisted in
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// `api_keys`). Bundle 2 will plug in an OIDC-session lookup behind the
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// same interface.
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//
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// LookupByHash MUST be safe for concurrent reads. Implementations that
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// support runtime additions wrap their backing slice/map in a
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// sync.RWMutex (see MutableKeyStore) so the request path remains lock-
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// free in the steady state.
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type KeyStore interface {
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// LookupByHash returns the NamedAPIKey whose SHA-256 hash matches
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// the supplied hex-encoded hash. The matched bool is false when no
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// entry matches; callers MUST treat false as "wrong key" (HTTP
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// 401) and never as "fall through to a default identity".
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//
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// The supplied hash is the output of HashAPIKey(token) — already a
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// 64-char lowercase hex string. Implementations compare it against
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// stored hashes via crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare so a
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// timing-attacking caller can't byte-by-byte recover a key.
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LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool)
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}
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// StaticKeyStore is the immutable Bundle-0 behaviour: the entries are
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// fixed at construction and the lookup is a constant-time scan. Used
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// by deployments that haven't enabled the Bundle-1 bootstrap flow and
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// by tests that don't need runtime additions.
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type StaticKeyStore struct {
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entries []entry
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}
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type entry struct {
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hash string // SHA-256 hex
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name string
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admin bool
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}
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// NewStaticKeyStore builds an immutable KeyStore from a slice of
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// NamedAPIKey values. Each key is hashed once at construction. The
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// returned store is safe for concurrent reads with no locking; mutation
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// is not supported.
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func NewStaticKeyStore(keys []NamedAPIKey) *StaticKeyStore {
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out := &StaticKeyStore{
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entries: make([]entry, 0, len(keys)),
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}
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for _, nk := range keys {
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out.entries = append(out.entries, entry{
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hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
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name: nk.Name,
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admin: nk.Admin,
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})
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}
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return out
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}
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// LookupByHash implements KeyStore.
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func (s *StaticKeyStore) LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool) {
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for i := range s.entries {
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hash), []byte(s.entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
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e := s.entries[i]
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return NamedAPIKey{Name: e.name, Admin: e.admin}, true
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}
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}
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return NamedAPIKey{}, false
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}
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// Len reports how many entries the store holds. Test/debug helper; the
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// request path uses LookupByHash which is the load-bearing contract.
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func (s *StaticKeyStore) Len() int { return len(s.entries) }
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// MutableKeyStore is the Bundle-1 Phase 6 KeyStore that supports
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// runtime additions. The Bundle 1 bootstrap flow inserts a new row
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// into `api_keys`, then calls Add(...) so the just-minted key
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// authenticates the very next request without a server restart. The
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// backing store loads the same `api_keys` rows on startup so DB-
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// persisted keys survive process restart.
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//
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// Concurrency: a sync.RWMutex guards a slice of entries. Reads
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// (LookupByHash) take the read lock; Add takes the write lock. The
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// in-memory slice mirrors the env-var named-key entries plus every
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// `api_keys` row loaded at boot plus every Add that fires after
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// startup.
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type MutableKeyStore struct {
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mu sync.RWMutex
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entries []entry
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}
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// NewMutableKeyStore seeds a MutableKeyStore with the provided keys.
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// Pass the env-var named keys here at boot; Add additional keys
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// (loaded from `api_keys` or minted by bootstrap) after construction.
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func NewMutableKeyStore(seed []NamedAPIKey) *MutableKeyStore {
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out := &MutableKeyStore{
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entries: make([]entry, 0, len(seed)),
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}
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for _, nk := range seed {
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out.entries = append(out.entries, entry{
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hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
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name: nk.Name,
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admin: nk.Admin,
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})
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}
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return out
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}
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// LookupByHash implements KeyStore.
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func (s *MutableKeyStore) LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool) {
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s.mu.RLock()
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defer s.mu.RUnlock()
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for i := range s.entries {
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hash), []byte(s.entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
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e := s.entries[i]
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return NamedAPIKey{Name: e.name, Admin: e.admin}, true
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}
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}
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return NamedAPIKey{}, false
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}
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// Add registers a new key with the store. The plaintext key is hashed
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// once and stored alongside the name + admin flag. Idempotent on
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// duplicate hashes (an existing entry for the same hash is replaced
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// in-place so re-running the bootstrap loader on startup is safe).
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func (s *MutableKeyStore) Add(key NamedAPIKey) {
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s.AddHashed(key.Name, HashAPIKey(key.Key), key.Admin)
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}
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// AddHashed registers a key whose SHA-256 hash is already computed.
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// Used by the api_keys boot loader (the DB stores the hash, not the
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// plaintext, so the loader has no plaintext to re-hash).
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func (s *MutableKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hashHex string, admin bool) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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for i := range s.entries {
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if s.entries[i].hash == hashHex {
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s.entries[i].name = name
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s.entries[i].admin = admin
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return
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}
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}
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s.entries = append(s.entries, entry{hash: hashHex, name: name, admin: admin})
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}
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// Len reports the current entry count. Test helper.
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func (s *MutableKeyStore) Len() int {
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s.mu.RLock()
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defer s.mu.RUnlock()
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return len(s.entries)
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}
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