Files
certctl/internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder_test.go
T
shankar0123 43075a1b5c EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 5-7: end-to-end serverkeygen
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status
counters + reload-trust endpoint.

Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation:
- internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the
  existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1
  v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test
  (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the
  original plaintext byte-for-byte).
- ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client
  CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile
  algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in-
  memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing
  issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a
  synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey
  → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM
  + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey-
  Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm /
  ErrServerKeygenDisabled.
- ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2
  multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile
  SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth
  even if the route was registered).
- New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen +
  /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml +
  openapi-parity guard updated.

Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation:
- New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration
  000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also
  lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6
  follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service
  layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it).
- domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-*
  EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985
  PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID.
- ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a
  profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU /
  attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take
  down the entire endpoint.

Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust:
- internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12
  named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape +
  ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust()
  SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter.
- Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at
  every success/failure leg.
- internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim:
  Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both
  endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added
  to AdminGatedHandlers).
- New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/
  est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard
  reproduced clean.
- cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per-
  profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() +
  HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the
  trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up.
- Per-profile counter isolation regression test
  (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves
  a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time
  pointer-identity check.

Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across
cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/
service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green
for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced
locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1
already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED).

Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases
8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation /
docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
2026-04-29 23:57:45 +00:00

172 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

package pkcs7
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"math/big"
"testing"
"time"
)
// freshRSARecipient produces a self-signed RSA-2048 cert + matching key
// usable as both EnvelopedData recipient (BUILDER input) and EnvelopedData
// decryptor (Decrypt input). RSA-2048 is the minimum the parser supports
// for keyTrans.
func freshRSARecipient(t *testing.T) (*x509.Certificate, *rsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "envelopeddata-builder-test"},
Issuer: pkix.Name{CommonName: "envelopeddata-builder-test-issuer"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate: %v", err)
}
return cert, key
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
cert, key := freshRSARecipient(t)
plaintext := []byte("the eagle has landed at coordinate 47.6062N 122.3321W; key zeroize at exit")
wire, err := BuildEnvelopedData(plaintext, cert, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
if len(wire) == 0 {
t.Fatal("empty wire bytes")
}
parsed, err := ParseEnvelopedData(wire)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
got, err := parsed.Decrypt(key, cert)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrypt: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(got, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("round-trip mismatch:\n got = %q\nwant = %q", got, plaintext)
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_AlgorithmIsAES256CBC(t *testing.T) {
cert, _ := freshRSARecipient(t)
wire, err := BuildEnvelopedData([]byte("alg-id pin"), cert, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
parsed, err := ParseEnvelopedData(wire)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
if !parsed.ContentEncryptionAlg.Algorithm.Equal(OIDAES256CBC) {
t.Errorf("alg = %v, want OIDAES256CBC %v", parsed.ContentEncryptionAlg.Algorithm, OIDAES256CBC)
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_RecipientMatchesIssuerAndSerial(t *testing.T) {
cert, _ := freshRSARecipient(t)
wire, err := BuildEnvelopedData([]byte("rid pin"), cert, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
parsed, err := ParseEnvelopedData(wire)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
if len(parsed.RecipientInfos) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("recipient count = %d, want 1", len(parsed.RecipientInfos))
}
rid := parsed.RecipientInfos[0].IssuerAndSerial
if !bytes.Equal(rid.IssuerRaw.FullBytes, cert.RawIssuer) {
t.Errorf("issuer mismatch:\n got = %x\nwant = %x", rid.IssuerRaw.FullBytes, cert.RawIssuer)
}
if rid.SerialNumber == nil || rid.SerialNumber.Cmp(cert.SerialNumber) != 0 {
t.Errorf("serial mismatch: got %v, want %v", rid.SerialNumber, cert.SerialNumber)
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_RejectsNonRSARecipient(t *testing.T) {
// EnvelopedData keyTrans requires RSA per the parser's contract; ECDSA
// recipient certs MUST be rejected at build time so an operator never
// ships a serverkeygen response that no client can decrypt.
ecKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(99),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "ecdsa-recipient-reject-test"},
Issuer: pkix.Name{CommonName: "ecdsa-recipient-reject-test-issuer"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &ecKey.PublicKey, ecKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate: %v", err)
}
if _, err := BuildEnvelopedData([]byte("test"), cert, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for non-RSA recipient cert")
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_RejectsEmptyPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
cert, _ := freshRSARecipient(t)
_, err := BuildEnvelopedData(nil, cert, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for empty plaintext")
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_RejectsNilCert(t *testing.T) {
_, err := BuildEnvelopedData([]byte("x"), nil, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for nil recipient cert")
}
}
func TestBuildEnvelopedData_LargePlaintextRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
// PKCS#7 padding + AES-256-CBC works for arbitrary plaintext lengths.
// Pin the contract for a 4KiB-aligned key blob (typical PKCS#8 RSA-2048
// is ~1.2KB; ECDSA P-384 is ~250B).
cert, key := freshRSARecipient(t)
big := bytes.Repeat([]byte("ABCDEFGH"), 512) // 4 KiB
wire, err := BuildEnvelopedData(big, cert, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
parsed, err := ParseEnvelopedData(wire)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
got, err := parsed.Decrypt(key, cert)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrypt: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(got, big) {
t.Errorf("4KiB round-trip mismatch")
}
}