Files
certctl/internal/service/revocation_svc.go
T
shankar0123 7cb453a336 chore(fmt): repo-wide gofmt -w sweep — close drift surfaced by ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4
Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit 0f205a8) surfaced 111 files
with accumulated gofmt drift across cmd/, internal/, and deploy/test/.

Each file's diff is gofmt-standard: whitespace adjustments, intra-
group import sorting (alphabetical by import path within blank-line-
separated groups), and struct-tag column alignment. No semantic
changes — verified via 'git diff --ignore-all-space' which shows only
the line-position deltas from import reordering.

The gate stays in place after this commit. Going forward it catches
gofmt drift at PR time.
2026-04-30 22:33:57 +00:00

202 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// RevocationSvc provides revocation-related business logic.
// It handles certificate revocation, revocation notifications, and issuer coordination.
type RevocationSvc struct {
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository
auditService *AuditService
notificationSvc *NotificationService
issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
// ocspCacheInvalidator — production hardening II Phase 2 load-
// bearing security wire. After a successful revocation, the
// service MUST invalidate the OCSP response cache for this
// (issuer, serial) so the next OCSP fetch returns the revoked
// status (not the stale "good" cached blob).
ocspCacheInvalidator OCSPCacheInvalidator
}
// OCSPCacheInvalidator is the minimum surface RevocationSvc needs
// from the OCSP cache. The cache service implements this interface;
// the indirection keeps RevocationSvc from depending on the cache
// type and lets tests inject a fake invalidator.
type OCSPCacheInvalidator interface {
InvalidateOnRevoke(ctx context.Context, issuerID, serialHex string) error
}
// SetOCSPCacheInvalidator wires the OCSP cache for invalidate-on-
// revoke. Production hardening II Phase 2.
func (s *RevocationSvc) SetOCSPCacheInvalidator(c OCSPCacheInvalidator) {
s.ocspCacheInvalidator = c
}
// NewRevocationSvc creates a new revocation service.
func NewRevocationSvc(
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository,
auditService *AuditService,
) *RevocationSvc {
return &RevocationSvc{
certRepo: certRepo,
revocationRepo: revocationRepo,
auditService: auditService,
}
}
// SetNotificationService sets the notification service for revocation alerts.
func (s *RevocationSvc) SetNotificationService(svc *NotificationService) {
s.notificationSvc = svc
}
// SetIssuerRegistry sets the issuer registry for issuer-level revocation.
func (s *RevocationSvc) SetIssuerRegistry(registry *IssuerRegistry) {
s.issuerRegistry = registry
}
// RevokeCertificateWithActor performs revocation with actor tracking.
// Steps:
// 1. Validate the certificate exists and is revocable
// 2. Get the latest certificate version (for serial number)
// 3. Update certificate status to Revoked
// 4. Record revocation in certificate_revocations table
// 5. Notify the issuer connector (best-effort)
// 6. Record audit event
// 7. Send revocation notification
func (s *RevocationSvc) RevokeCertificateWithActor(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error {
// 1. Validate certificate exists and is revocable
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
}
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusRevoked {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate is already revoked")
}
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot revoke archived certificate")
}
// Validate reason code
if reason == "" {
reason = string(domain.RevocationReasonUnspecified)
}
if !domain.IsValidRevocationReason(reason) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid revocation reason: %s", reason)
}
// 2. Get latest certificate version for serial number
version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate version: %w", err)
}
// 3. Update certificate status to Revoked
now := time.Now()
cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusRevoked
cert.RevokedAt = &now
cert.RevocationReason = reason
cert.UpdatedAt = now
if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate status: %w", err)
}
// 4. Record revocation in certificate_revocations table (for CRL generation)
if s.revocationRepo != nil {
revocation := &domain.CertificateRevocation{
ID: generateID("rev"),
CertificateID: certID,
SerialNumber: version.SerialNumber,
Reason: reason,
RevokedBy: actor,
RevokedAt: now,
IssuerID: cert.IssuerID,
CreatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.revocationRepo.Create(ctx, revocation); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record revocation for CRL", "error", err, "certificate_id", certID)
// Don't fail the overall revocation — the cert status is already updated
}
}
// 5. Notify the issuer connector (best-effort)
if s.issuerRegistry != nil {
if issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(cert.IssuerID); ok {
if err := issuerConn.RevokeCertificate(ctx, version.SerialNumber, reason); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to notify issuer of revocation",
"error", err,
"issuer_id", cert.IssuerID,
"serial", version.SerialNumber)
// Best-effort — don't fail the overall revocation
} else if s.revocationRepo != nil {
// Mark issuer as notified
revocations, _ := s.revocationRepo.ListByCertificate(ctx, certID)
for _, rev := range revocations {
if rev.SerialNumber == version.SerialNumber {
_ = s.revocationRepo.MarkIssuerNotified(ctx, rev.ID)
}
}
}
}
}
// 5.5. Invalidate the OCSP response cache for this (issuer, serial)
// so the next OCSP fetch returns the revoked status (not the stale
// "good" cached blob). Production hardening II Phase 2 LOAD-BEARING
// security wire — without this, a revoked cert keeps returning
// "good" until the next ocspCacheRefreshLoop tick.
//
// Failure is logged and swallowed: the revocation row is committed,
// the CRL will reflect the revocation on the next regen, and the
// admin can manually nuke the cache row if necessary. Failing the
// caller's revoke on cache-failure would leave the operator's
// intent unachieved (cert appears not-revoked); failing-soft +
// logging is the right tradeoff.
if s.ocspCacheInvalidator != nil {
if err := s.ocspCacheInvalidator.InvalidateOnRevoke(ctx, cert.IssuerID, version.SerialNumber); err != nil {
slog.Warn("failed to invalidate OCSP response cache after revocation (revocation still committed)",
"error", err,
"issuer_id", cert.IssuerID,
"serial", version.SerialNumber,
"certificate_id", certID)
}
}
// 6. Record audit event
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"certificate_revoked", "certificate", certID,
map[string]interface{}{
"common_name": cert.CommonName,
"serial": version.SerialNumber,
"reason": reason,
}); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
// 7. Send revocation notification
if s.notificationSvc != nil {
if err := s.notificationSvc.SendRevocationNotification(ctx, cert, reason); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to send revocation notification", "error", err, "certificate_id", certID)
}
}
return nil
}
// GetRevokedCertificates returns all revoked certificate records (for CRL generation).
func (s *RevocationSvc) GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
if s.revocationRepo == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
}
return s.revocationRepo.ListAll(ctx)
}