Files
certctl/docs/operator/database-tls.md
T
shankar0123 d809874fa1 docs: retire compliance subtree + sweep framework name-drops from prose
Per operator decision the framework-mapping docs are gone. They
were aspirational (no audit, no certification, no validated
mapping); keeping them around was misleading.

Files deleted (1,883 lines):
- docs/compliance/index.md
- docs/compliance/soc2.md
- docs/compliance/pci-dss.md
- docs/compliance/nist-sp-800-57.md

Hyperlinks removed:
- README.md: 'Auditor / compliance' row in the doc table; the
  '(compliance mapping included)' parenthetical in the
  positioning paragraph
- docs/README.md: the '## Compliance' section table; the
  'Auditor / compliance team' reading-order-by-role row

Prose name-drops swept across 24 files:
- README.md: 'FedRAMP boundary CAs / financial-services policy
  CAs' → '4-level boundary CAs / 3-level policy CAs';
  'Compliance-grade for PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High,
  SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA' → cut entirely
- getting-started/{quickstart,concepts,examples,why-certctl,
  advanced-demo}.md: 'compliance' → 'audit' / 'policy';
  'PCI-DSS / SOC 2 / NIST SP 800-57' framework lists cut;
  ''pci': 'true'' tag example → ''environment': 'production''
- migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md: 'compliance rules' →
  'policy rules'
- operator/approval-workflow.md: 'Compliance customers (PCI-DSS
  Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA)' →
  'Operators'; entire 'Compliance control mapping' table
  (PCI-DSS §6.4.5 / NIST SP 800-53 SA-15 / SOC 2 Type II CC6.1
  / HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)) deleted; 'compliance contract' →
  'two-person-integrity contract'; 'compliance auditors' →
  'reviewers'
- operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md: 'PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5'
  audit-reference → CWE-326 (kept); 'PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5
  attestation' section retitled to 'TLS posture summary' and
  rewritten without framework framing; 'PCI-DSS, NIST, and
  major browsers will eventually deprecate TLS 1.2' →
  'Major browsers and OS vendors will eventually deprecate
  TLS 1.2'
- operator/database-tls.md: PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5 audit-ref →
  CWE-319 only; 'PCI-DSS scope' → 'sensitive data'; PCI-DSS
  Req 4 v4.0 prose footing → cut
- operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI
  procurement-team deliverable' → 'on-call deliverable';
  'compliance auditors' → 'reviewers'
- reference/connectors/{acme,aws-acm,azure-kv,globalsign,
  local-ca,openssl,ssh,index}.md: 'compliance reporting
  (PCI-DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312)' → 'audit reporting';
  'Compliance environments (PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP High,
  HIPAA)' → 'Regulated environments'; 'compliance audits' →
  'audit'; 'FedRAMP boundary CA' pattern names →
  '4-level boundary CA' (technically descriptive)
- reference/protocols/est.md: 'compliance-hook seam' →
  'device-state hook seam'; 'compliance gating' → 'device-state
  gating'; 'est_compliance_failed' → 'est_device_state_failed'
- reference/protocols/scep-intune.md: 'Optional compliance
  check' → 'Optional device-state check'; failure-counter
  'compliance_failed' → 'device_state_failed'; 'Conditional
  Access compliance gating' → 'Conditional Access
  device-state gating'
- reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md: 'FedRAMP boundary-CA
  deployments where the regulator requires...' →
  'Boundary-CA deployments where you want separation of policy
  and issuing authorities'; pattern A retitled '4-level FedRAMP
  boundary CA' → '4-level boundary CA'
- reference/architecture.md: broken Related-docs link to
  compliance.md removed; the rest of that block had stale
  pre-Phase-2 paths (quickstart.md, demo-advanced.md,
  connectors.md, openapi.md, testing-guide.md, test-env.md) —
  retargeted to current locations
- reference/deployment-model.md: 'SOC 2 evidence-report
  generator' → 'Audit-evidence report generator'
- reference/vendor-matrix.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI auditors paste this
  into evidence packs' → 'reviewers paste this into
  vendor-evaluation packs'
- contributor/qa-test-suite.md: 'compliance exist' coverage
  description cut; 'Compliance (PCI / SOC2 / HIPAA-relevant)'
  risk-class label → 'Audit-relevant'

What was kept:
- CWE references (legitimate technical pointers)
- Microsoft API/feature names that happen to use 'compliance'
  literally ('Microsoft Graph compliance API',
  'device-compliance validators' — these are MS product names,
  not framework name-drops)
- 'NIST PQC' on the landing page (Post-Quantum Cryptography is
  the actual NIST standard family, not a compliance framework)

Verified: zero hyperlinks into docs/compliance/ remain. All 24
ci-guards/*.sh pass locally. qa-doc-seed-count.sh clean.
Net diff: 26 files / -1,883 deletions in compliance/ + -32 net
across the prose sweep.

Companion edits in cowork/ (CLAUDE.md doc-tree summary +
WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md retirement note) land separately.
2026-05-05 05:26:44 +00:00

5.2 KiB

Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption

Last reviewed: 2026-05-05

Audit reference: Bundle B / M-018. CWE-319 (Cleartext transmission of sensitive information).

certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL selects the transport-encryption posture. Pre-Bundle-B all the bundled deployment artifacts (Helm chart, docker-compose) hard-coded sslmode=disable. Bundle B exposes that as an operator-facing knob with a documented default and explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world deployment shapes.

Quick reference

Deployment shape Default sslmode When to change
Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster disable When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload handles sensitive data.
Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) not auto-set Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle.
docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge disable Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden.
docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres not auto-set Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full.

sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is: disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full. verify-ca is the floor for sensitive-data transport; verify-full is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds hostname validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).

Helm chart (Bundle B)

Bundle B adds two values under postgresql.tls:

postgresql:
  tls:
    mode: disable          # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
    caSecretRef: ""        # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)

The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL). For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string — the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.

Example: external RDS with verify-full

postgresql:
  enabled: false   # Disable bundled Postgres

server:
  env:
    CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
      postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full

# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
  - name: rds-ca
    secret:
      secretName: rds-ca-bundle  # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...

extraVolumeMounts:
  - name: rds-ca
    mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
    readOnly: true

# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
  env:
    PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt

docker-compose (development / demo)

The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:

export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up

Verification

For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:

# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"

# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...

If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.

What this does NOT cover

  • Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (pg_hba.conf + ssl=on); it is independent of certctl's CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL.
  • Backup transportpg_dump / pg_basebackup honor the same sslmode parameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned.
  • Encryption at restsslmode is a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.

Reverting

If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata — audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify TLS in any scoped environment.