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5204f1b5fd
break-glass admin (Argon2id, lockout, default-OFF, surface-invisibility)
Phase 7 — OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Decision 3):
- Optional AdminBootstrapHook closure on *oidc.Service. When wired,
HandleCallback consults the hook AFTER group resolution + user
upsert and BEFORE the empty-mapping fail-closed check. Hook
receives (providerID, groups, userID); returns grantAdmin=true
when the user matches CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS AND no
admin exists yet in the tenant.
- cmd/server/main.go wires the hook as a closure that:
* Filters by CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID (if configured).
* Probes AdminExists via authActorRoleRepo (admin-already-exists
silently returns false; bootstrap mode is one-shot per tenant).
* Walks group intersection.
* On match: grants r-admin via authActorRoleRepo.Grant + emits
the bootstrap.oidc_first_admin audit row with
event_category=auth + INFO log.
- Coexists with the Bundle 1 env-var-token bootstrap. Both paths
can be configured; first match wins (admin-existence probe
short-circuits the second).
- HandleCallback's empty-mapping fail-closed check moved AFTER the
hook so a fresh deployment with zero group_role_mappings can
still mint the first admin.
- 5 tests in service_test.go: hook grants admin on match, hook
returns false preserves empty-mapping fail-closed, admin-already-
exists silently falls through to normal mapping, hook-error wraps
+ bubbles, idempotent when admin is already in the mapped role set.
Phase 7.5 — Break-glass admin (Decision 4, default-OFF):
Migration 000038 ships:
- breakglass_credentials table — at-most-one-credential-per-actor
(UNIQUE(actor_id)), Argon2id PHC-format password_hash, lockout
state machine (failure_count, locked_until, last_failure_at).
FK CASCADE on users(id) so deleting a user atomically removes
their credential.
- Two new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.breakglass.admin — set/rotate/unlock/remove credentials.
auth.breakglass.login — actor uses break-glass to log in.
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep.
internal/auth/breakglass/service.go (~580 LOC):
- Service.Enabled() reflects CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED.
- SetPassword: Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params (m=64MiB, t=3, p=4,
salt=16 random bytes, output=32 bytes); per-password random salt;
PHC-format hash output. Min 12 / max 256 byte input.
- Authenticate: constant-time-compare via subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
on every code path. Identical 401 + identical timing across the
wrong-password / locked-account / non-existent-actor paths so an
attacker cannot probe whether a given actor has break-glass
configured. Non-existent-actor + locked-account paths run a
verifyDummy() Argon2id pass for timing parity. Lockout state
machine: failure_count++ on every wrong attempt; threshold (default
5) trips locked_until = NOW() + duration (default 15m). Successful
Authenticate resets the counter. Reset-window: failures aged out
after CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL (default 1h)
auto-reset on next attempt.
- Unlock + RemoveCredential: admin-only (auth.breakglass.admin
gated at the router via rbacGate). Audit rows on every operation.
- All public methods refuse to act when Enabled()==false (returns
ErrDisabled; the handler maps to HTTP 404 — surface invisibility).
internal/repository/postgres/breakglass.go ships the 5-method
postgres impl with atomic single-statement IncrementFailure (so
concurrent racing wrong-password attempts can't observe an
intermediate state and slip past the threshold) and idempotent
ResetFailureCount.
internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go ships the 4-endpoint HTTP
surface:
- POST /auth/breakglass/login (auth-exempt; 5/min rate-limited per
source IP via the existing rate limiter; returns 404 when
disabled). On success sets the post-login session cookie + CSRF
cookie via SessionService.Create + 204. On any failure:
uniform 401 + identical timing (the service has already audited
the specific failure category).
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials (auth.breakglass.admin)
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
(auth.breakglass.admin)
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
(auth.breakglass.admin)
Admin endpoints share the surface-invisibility property: when
CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false, every admin endpoint also returns
404 (not 403) so probing via the admin surface gets the same signal
as probing the login endpoint.
Tests (internal/auth/breakglass/service_test.go):
All 8 Phase 7.5 spec-mandated negative cases:
1. Service.Enabled()==false → all ops return ErrDisabled.
2. Wrong password → ErrInvalidCredentials, failure_count++,
audit row with event_category=auth.
3. Failure_count exceeds threshold → locked, subsequent attempts
(including with the CORRECT password) return identical-shape
401 while the lockout window holds.
4. Lockout window expires → next attempt with correct password
succeeds + resets the counter.
5. Password < 12 bytes (or > 256 bytes) → ErrWeakPassword.
6. Password leak hygiene — the service has zero slog calls; the
audit-row map literal never includes the password plaintext.
7. Argon2id hash never appears in logs OR API responses — pinned
by `json:"-"` tag on BreakglassCredential.PasswordHash + a
belt-and-braces json.Marshal probe asserting the hash bytes
never appear in the marshaled output.
8. Constant-time-compare verified via timing-statistical test —
wrong-password vs no-credential paths take statistically
indistinguishable time (within 5x ratio). The verifyDummy()
hash compute on the no-credential + locked paths is what
keeps timing parity; absent that, an attacker could side-
channel "actor doesn't have a credential" via timing.
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: SetPassword first-time vs rotate,
no-caller-id rejection, no-target-id rejection, RNG failure surface,
Authenticate happy-path mints session, no-credential audit row,
session-mint-failure surface, FailureResetInterval recycle, Unlock
+ RemoveCredential happy paths, hash-format unit tests (round-trip,
mismatch, malformed/wrong-version/bad-base64 formats), nil-audit +
nil-session pass-through.
Coverage on internal/auth/breakglass/ at 91.5% per-statement (above
the Phase 7.5 spec ≥ 90% floor).
cmd/server/main.go wiring:
- Constructs breakglassRepo + breakglassService + breakglassHandler
after the OIDC service block.
- breakglassSessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create
to the breakglass.SessionMinter port.
- Logs WARN at boot when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=true (operator
visibility for the deliberate SSO-bypass).
internal/config/config.go gains:
- AuthConfig.BootstrapAdminGroups + BootstrapOIDCProviderID for
Phase 7 (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS comma-list +
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID).
- AuthConfig.Breakglass nested struct with 4 env vars
(CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED + LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD + LOCKOUT_DURATION
+ LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL).
Router wiring:
- 4 new breakglass routes registered when reg.AuthBreakglass != nil;
public login route via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt), 3 admin
routes via r.Register + rbacGate(auth.breakglass.admin).
- POST /auth/breakglass/login pinned in AuthExemptRouterRoutes
allowlist with Phase 7.5 justification.
- SpecParityExceptions extended with 4 new entries documenting
the Phase 7.5 deferral of full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows
(handler doc-block at the top of auth_breakglass.go is the
operator-facing reference).
Threat model (encoded in service.go + auth_breakglass.go doc-blocks
+ migration 000038 docstrings, to be promoted to docs/operator/auth-
threat-model.md in Phase 12):
- Break-glass is a deliberate bypass of the SSO security boundary.
An attacker who phishes the password OR finds it in a compromised
password manager bypasses MFA, OIDC, and every group-claim gate.
- Recommendation: keep CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false in steady-
state. Enable only during SSO-broken incidents. Disable after
recovery.
- WebAuthn pairing (v3 per Decision 12) is the load-bearing second
factor. Without it, break-glass is best treated as an emergency-
only path.
- Audit trail surfaces every break-glass action under
event_category=auth; the auditor role can monitor for unexpected
break-glass logins.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth/oidc (3.0s; new
Phase 7 hook tests integrated alongside the 21+ Phase 3 negatives),
internal/auth/breakglass (3.6s; 8 spec-mandated negatives + coverage
batch passing), internal/config + internal/domain/auth + internal/api/
router + internal/api/handler all green, no regressions in Bundle 1
packages.
78 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
78 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
// Package oidc — Auth Bundle 2 Phase 7 / OIDC bootstrap hook.
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//
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// Phase 7 ships the "first OIDC login matching CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS
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// becomes admin" recovery path. This is Decision 3's preferred bootstrap:
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// fresh deployments configure the OIDC provider + group mapping, and the
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// first user who logs in via OIDC + carries any of the configured
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// bootstrap admin groups is auto-granted r-admin. Subsequent logins fall
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// through to normal group→role mapping.
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//
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// The hook is OPTIONAL — when not wired, OIDC behaves byte-identically
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// to Phase 3. When wired, it runs after group resolution + user upsert
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// and BEFORE the empty-mapping fail-closed check, so a fresh deployment
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// with no group_role_mappings can still mint the first admin via the
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// bootstrap path. The hook itself is responsible for the AdminExists
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// probe (so admin-already-exists deployments fall through to normal
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// mapping).
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//
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// Audit + lockout semantics:
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//
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// - The hook emits the bootstrap.oidc_first_admin audit row with
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// event_category=auth on every successful first-admin grant.
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// - The hook is one-shot per process: once an admin exists in the
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// tenant, the AdminExists probe returns true and subsequent OIDC
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// logins skip the bootstrap path entirely.
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// - The hook NEVER grants admin to an actor whose groups don't match
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// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS. The intersection is constant-time-
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// length-irrelevant (it walks two slices); the relevant guarantee
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// is that no group string can be inferred from the hook's pass /
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// fail decision because the hook always emits the same audit row
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// shape.
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package oidc
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import "context"
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// AdminBootstrapHook is the optional closure HandleCallback consults
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// after group resolution + user upsert. The hook decides whether the
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// authenticating user should be auto-granted r-admin via the OIDC
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// first-admin bootstrap path.
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//
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// Parameters:
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// - providerID: the OIDCProvider id (so the hook can match against
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// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID).
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// - groups: the IdP-supplied group names (so the hook can match
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// against CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS).
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// - userID: the just-upserted users.id (so the hook can grant r-admin
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// via the ActorRoleRepository).
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//
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// Returns:
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// - grantAdmin: true => HandleCallback appends r-admin to the user's
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// resolved role IDs (idempotent; r-admin is appended only if not
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// already present from normal mapping).
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// - err: non-nil short-circuits HandleCallback with a wrapped error.
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// The hook should NOT return an error for the non-match case
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// (provider doesn't match / groups don't intersect / admin already
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// exists); those are silent skips returning grantAdmin=false.
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type AdminBootstrapHook func(ctx context.Context, providerID string, groups []string, userID string) (grantAdmin bool, err error)
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// SetAdminBootstrapHook wires the Phase 7 OIDC bootstrap hook.
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// cmd/server/main.go calls this after construction; tests stub it
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// inline. Nil resets to no-bootstrap-hook (the default).
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func (s *Service) SetAdminBootstrapHook(hook AdminBootstrapHook) {
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s.adminBootstrapHook = hook
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}
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// appendIfMissing returns ss with v appended IFF v is not already in
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// the slice. Used by HandleCallback to extend roleIDs with r-admin
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// idempotently when the bootstrap hook fires AND mappings.Map already
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// returned r-admin (an unlikely-but-possible config where the same
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// role is granted by both paths).
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func appendIfMissing(ss []string, v string) []string {
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for _, s := range ss {
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if s == v {
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return ss
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}
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}
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return append(ss, v)
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}
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