Files
certctl/internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas_failure_test.go
T
shankar0123 75097909e9
2026-05-05 18:18:29 +00:00

383 lines
15 KiB
Go

package googlecas_test
// Top-10 fix #4 of the 2026-05-03 issuer-coverage audit. GoogleCAS
// is typically the first-deployed issuer in GCP-anchored enterprise
// pilots — diligence reviews dig hard into IAM-error / cloud-error
// coverage. Pre-fix, googlecas_test.go covered the happy path plus a
// generic ServerError + InvalidResponse pair, but did not pin
// behaviour against the distinct operator-actionable error classes
// (PermissionDenied vs CAPoolNotFound vs OAuth2 token-refresh
// failure) that real production traffic surfaces.
//
// Adapter shape: googlecas.go uses stdlib net/http + crypto/rsa
// directly — there is NO Google Cloud Go SDK dependency. CAS errors
// arrive as JSON in the HTTP response body, with the canonical Google
// API error envelope:
//
// {"error":{"code":403,"message":"...","status":"PERMISSION_DENIED"}}
//
// The connector decodes that body via extractAPIError and wraps the
// resulting message into the surfaced error. Because there is no SDK
// typed-error value to errors.As against (per the spec's "use what
// exists today" rule), each test below pins:
//
// 1. error non-nil,
// 2. operator-actionable substring present in the surfaced message
// (resource path, missing-pool name, "token" vs "credential",
// "503" / UNAVAILABLE for the retryable class),
// 3. the SDK-level status string ("PERMISSION_DENIED",
// "NOT_FOUND", "UNAVAILABLE") survives through the wrap chain so
// upstream classification logic can branch on it.
//
// Test-only commit. No production code changes.
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/issuer/googlecas"
)
// failureTestLogger returns a debug-level slog logger writing to
// stdout. Mirrors the per-test logger in googlecas_test.go to keep
// failure logs grep-friendly when a test regresses.
func failureTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}))
}
// TestGoogleCAS_Issue_PermissionDenied_OperatorActionableError pins
// the surfaced contract when the GCP service-account caller lacks
// privateca.certificates.create on the configured CA pool. Real
// traffic returns a 403 with the canonical PERMISSION_DENIED
// envelope; the surfaced error must (a) preserve the IAM resource
// path the operator needs to fix the binding, and (b) preserve the
// PERMISSION_DENIED status string so upstream classification can
// recognise the IAM-error class.
func TestGoogleCAS_Issue_PermissionDenied_OperatorActionableError(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
credPath := createTestCredentialsFile(t)
const resourcePath = "projects/test-project/locations/us-central1/caPools/test-pool"
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/token":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"test-token","expires_in":3600,"token_type":"Bearer"}`))
case strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/certificates"):
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"error":{"code":403,"message":"Permission 'privateca.certificates.create' denied on resource '%s' (or it may not exist).","status":"PERMISSION_DENIED"}}`, resourcePath)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &googlecas.Config{
Project: "test-project",
Location: "us-central1",
CAPool: "test-pool",
Credentials: credPath,
TTL: "8760h",
BaseURL: srv.URL,
TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
}
c := googlecas.New(cfg, failureTestLogger())
_, csrPEM := generateTestCSR(t, "app.example.com")
_, err := c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
CommonName: "app.example.com",
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from PERMISSION_DENIED, got nil")
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "PERMISSION_DENIED") {
t.Errorf("status string PERMISSION_DENIED missing from surfaced error; got: %s", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, resourcePath) {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must name the IAM resource path %q; got: %s", resourcePath, msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "Permission") && !strings.Contains(msg, "permission") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must mention 'permission'; got: %s", msg)
}
}
// TestGoogleCAS_Issue_CAPoolNotFound_NamesTheMissingPool pins the
// surfaced contract when the configured CA pool does not exist (e.g.
// typo in CERTCTL_GOOGLE_CAS_CA_POOL, or the pool was deleted out
// from under certctl). Google CAS returns HTTP 404 with NOT_FOUND
// status; the surfaced error must name the missing pool resource so
// the operator can correct the config without grepping logs.
func TestGoogleCAS_Issue_CAPoolNotFound_NamesTheMissingPool(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
credPath := createTestCredentialsFile(t)
const missingPool = "projects/test-project/locations/us-central1/caPools/missing-pool"
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/token":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"test-token","expires_in":3600,"token_type":"Bearer"}`))
case strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/certificates"):
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"error":{"code":404,"message":"Resource '%s' was not found.","status":"NOT_FOUND"}}`, missingPool)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &googlecas.Config{
Project: "test-project",
Location: "us-central1",
CAPool: "missing-pool",
Credentials: credPath,
TTL: "8760h",
BaseURL: srv.URL,
TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
}
c := googlecas.New(cfg, failureTestLogger())
_, csrPEM := generateTestCSR(t, "app.example.com")
_, err := c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
CommonName: "app.example.com",
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from NOT_FOUND, got nil")
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "NOT_FOUND") {
t.Errorf("status string NOT_FOUND missing from surfaced error; got: %s", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, missingPool) {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must name the missing CA pool %q; got: %s", missingPool, msg)
}
}
// TestGoogleCAS_Issue_OAuth2TokenRefreshFailure_DistinguishedFromCAError
// pins the surfaced contract when the OAuth2 JWT-bearer exchange
// against oauth2.googleapis.com fails (e.g. service-account key has
// been disabled, JWT signature invalid, or token endpoint is reaching
// us through a misconfigured corp proxy). The surfaced error must
// mention "token" so an operator reading the log can immediately
// distinguish a credential failure from a CA-side error — the two
// are remediated very differently (rotate SA key vs. fix IAM
// binding).
func TestGoogleCAS_Issue_OAuth2TokenRefreshFailure_DistinguishedFromCAError(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
credPath := createTestCredentialsFile(t)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Tagged switch on r.URL.Path keeps staticcheck QF1002 happy
// (only equality cases against a single field). The other
// failure tests use mixed equality + strings.Contains so they
// stay on `switch { case ... }`.
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/token":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid_grant","error_description":"Invalid JWT Signature."}`))
default:
// We should never reach the CAS endpoint if the token
// exchange fails — assert that explicitly so a regression
// that swallows the token error and proceeds to the CAS
// call is caught by this test.
t.Errorf("CAS endpoint reached despite token-refresh failure — path=%s", r.URL.Path)
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &googlecas.Config{
Project: "test-project",
Location: "us-central1",
CAPool: "test-pool",
Credentials: credPath,
TTL: "8760h",
BaseURL: srv.URL,
TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
}
c := googlecas.New(cfg, failureTestLogger())
_, csrPEM := generateTestCSR(t, "app.example.com")
_, err := c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
CommonName: "app.example.com",
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from token-refresh failure, got nil")
}
msg := err.Error()
// The connector wraps the token failure as
// "failed to get access token: token exchange returned status 401: ..."
// so "token" should always be present. If a future refactor renames
// it to "credential", that is also acceptable — both let an
// operator distinguish from a CA-side error.
if !strings.Contains(msg, "token") && !strings.Contains(msg, "credential") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — token-refresh failure must mention 'token' or 'credential' so it is distinguishable from a CA-side error; got: %s", msg)
}
// Surfaced message should name the upstream HTTP status.
if !strings.Contains(msg, "401") {
t.Errorf("expected token-refresh status 401 to be preserved through wrap chain; got: %s", msg)
}
}
// TestGoogleCAS_Issue_RegionalAPIUnavailable_RetryableSurface pins
// the surfaced contract when a CAS regional endpoint returns 503
// UNAVAILABLE — typically a transient regional outage where the
// correct upstream behaviour is "retry with backoff" rather than
// "alert ops". The connector currently surfaces these to the caller
// without retrying internally (per spec's "no new retry logic" rule);
// the surfaced error must preserve the 503 / UNAVAILABLE markers so
// an upstream retry layer can recognise the retryable class.
func TestGoogleCAS_Issue_RegionalAPIUnavailable_RetryableSurface(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
credPath := createTestCredentialsFile(t)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/token":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"test-token","expires_in":3600,"token_type":"Bearer"}`))
case strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/certificates"):
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":{"code":503,"message":"The service is currently unavailable.","status":"UNAVAILABLE"}}`))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &googlecas.Config{
Project: "test-project",
Location: "us-central1",
CAPool: "test-pool",
Credentials: credPath,
TTL: "8760h",
BaseURL: srv.URL,
TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
}
c := googlecas.New(cfg, failureTestLogger())
_, csrPEM := generateTestCSR(t, "app.example.com")
_, err := c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
CommonName: "app.example.com",
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from 503 UNAVAILABLE, got nil")
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "503") {
t.Errorf("expected HTTP status 503 to be preserved through wrap chain; got: %s", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "UNAVAILABLE") {
t.Errorf("expected canonical UNAVAILABLE status string for upstream retry classification; got: %s", msg)
}
}
// TestGoogleCAS_Revoke_PermissionDenied_DoesNotSilentlySwallow pins
// the contract that PERMISSION_DENIED on a revoke call surfaces an
// error rather than being silently swallowed. The audit-row
// atomicity contract from Bundle G lives in service.RevocationSvc
// (which writes the local audit row inside the same DB tx as the
// adapter call); the adapter's only job here is "return non-nil so
// the service-layer wrapper rolls back". This test pins that
// contract.
//
// (We deliberately do NOT exercise the service-layer audit-row
// rollback here — that's an integration test owned by
// internal/service/revocation_svc_test.go. Mixing concerns would
// re-introduce the exact "lying field" footgun the project guidelines warn
// against. The adapter contract is the single thing under test.)
func TestGoogleCAS_Revoke_PermissionDenied_DoesNotSilentlySwallow(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
credPath := createTestCredentialsFile(t)
const certName = "projects/test-project/locations/us-central1/caPools/test-pool/certificates/cert-revoke-denied"
var revokeCalled bool
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/token":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"access_token":"test-token","expires_in":3600,"token_type":"Bearer"}`))
case strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, ":revoke"):
revokeCalled = true
// Decode the request body to confirm the revoke reason was
// actually serialised and sent — guards against a future
// regression that silently no-ops the revoke before the
// HTTP request.
var body map[string]interface{}
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
if _, ok := body["reason"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("revoke request body missing 'reason' field — adapter constructed an empty payload")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":{"code":403,"message":"Permission 'privateca.certificates.update' denied on certificate.","status":"PERMISSION_DENIED"}}`))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &googlecas.Config{
Project: "test-project",
Location: "us-central1",
CAPool: "test-pool",
Credentials: credPath,
TTL: "8760h",
BaseURL: srv.URL,
TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
}
c := googlecas.New(cfg, failureTestLogger())
reason := "keyCompromise"
err := c.RevokeCertificate(ctx, issuer.RevocationRequest{
Serial: certName,
Reason: &reason,
})
// CONTRACT 1: adapter does NOT silently swallow the failure.
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from revoke PERMISSION_DENIED — adapter must surface, not swallow")
}
// CONTRACT 2: adapter actually attempted the revoke before
// surfacing the error (regression guard against a future "fail
// fast before the HTTP call" change that would skip the
// short-circuit guarantee).
if !revokeCalled {
t.Error("revoke endpoint not reached — adapter short-circuited before sending the HTTP request")
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "PERMISSION_DENIED") {
t.Errorf("expected canonical PERMISSION_DENIED status string in surfaced error; got: %s", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "Permission") && !strings.Contains(msg, "permission") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — revoke error must mention 'permission'; got: %s", msg)
}
}