Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/certificates.go
T
shankar0123 0e06f6c4fc cli: promote --force on renew + require --reason on revoke (closes P3-1, P3-2)
Closes findings P3-1 and P3-2 from the 2026-05-05 CLI/API/MCP↔GUI parity
audit (cowork/cli-gui-parity-audit-2026-05-05/RESULTS.md). Both findings
flagged hidden defaults that the CLI was sending without exposing them
to operators: `force=false` baked into every renew payload, and a silent
fallback to `reason="unspecified"` whenever --reason was omitted.

P3-1 — promote --force on `certs renew` (full end-to-end plumbing)

The pre-2026-05-05 CLI sent `{"force": false}` in the renew body. The
API handler never decoded it — a textbook "lying field" per the
operator's CLAUDE.md "complete path, not the easy path" rule: the body
field stored a value, claimed to do something, and silently did nothing
because the wire never reached the consumer. Adding a --force flag that
also went unread would have created another lying field.

This commit takes the complete path:

  service.CertificateService.TriggerRenewal grew a `force bool` parameter
  (internal/service/certificate.go). When force=true, the
  RenewalInProgress block is overridden so operators can recover stuck
  in-flight renewals where a previous job hung without releasing the
  status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal blockers regardless
  of force — those are semantic dead-ends that --force should not paper
  over (archived = decommissioned, expired = issue a new cert instead of
  renewing a dead one).

  handler.CertificateHandler.TriggerRenewal parses force from
  ?force=true (or ?force=1) query param, OR {"force": true} JSON body,
  whichever the client picks. Defaults to false. Passes through to the
  service.

  internal/cli/client.go::RenewCertificate(id, force bool) sends
  ?force=true on the URL when --force is set. The historical hardcoded
  `{"force": false}` body is gone — no more lying field.

  cmd/cli/main.go dispatches `certs renew <id> [--force]` (ID-first
  flag-second convention matches the existing `agents retire <id>
  [--force]`).

P3-2 — require --reason on `certs revoke` (Option A: strict refusal)

The pre-2026-05-05 CLI dropped to `--reason unspecified` whenever the
operator omitted the flag. Compliance reporting (RFC 5280 §5.3.1, PCI-
DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312) relies on the reason code being meaningful;
silent fallback defeats the audit trail because every revocation looks
identical.

  cmd/cli/main.go dispatch refuses to send when --reason is empty,
  prints the canonical RFC 5280 §5.3.1 reason-code menu, and exits
  non-zero.

  internal/cli/client.go exposes ValidRevokeReasons() returning the
  canonical camelCase list (unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
  affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold,
  removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aaCompromise) and
  NormalizeRevokeReason() that accepts both camelCase and snake_case
  inputs and normalises to the canonical wire form. Off-list reasons
  are rejected at dispatch with the menu re-printed.

Test pins:

  internal/cli/client_test.go::TestClient_RenewCertificate_ForceFlag —
  --force=true sends ?force=true with empty body; --force=false sends
  no query and no body.

  internal/cli/client_test.go::TestNormalizeRevokeReason +
  TestValidRevokeReasons — canonical-camelCase + snake_case + reject-
  off-enum behaviour.

  cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go::TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RequiresReason +
  TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RejectsUnknownReason +
  TestHandleCerts_Renew_ForceFlag — dispatch-layer pins for the same
  contracts.

  internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
  ForceQueryParam — query-param passthrough (no-flag, force=true,
  force=1, force=false) flows through to the service-layer parameter.

  internal/service/certificate_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
  ForceOverridesInProgress — force=false preserves the
  RenewalInProgress block; force=true clears it.

  Existing TestTriggerRenewal_Archived extended to assert force=true
  still blocks Archived (terminal-state guarantee).

Docs: docs/reference/cli.md updated with the --force example for renew
and the strict --reason semantics for revoke (including snake_case
input acceptance).

Acceptance gate (verified):
  - go build ./cmd/server/... ./cmd/agent/... ./cmd/cli/...
    ./cmd/mcp-server/... clean.
  - go vet ./... clean.
  - go test -short -count=1 ./... pass repo-wide.
  - bash scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh clean
    (router 178, OpenAPI 144, exceptions 36 — unchanged; we add
    parameter parsing, not routes).
  - gofmt -l clean.
2026-05-05 19:49:34 +00:00

899 lines
32 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/ratelimit"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
)
// CertificateService defines the service interface for certificate operations.
type CertificateService interface {
ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, status, environment, ownerID, teamID, issuerID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int64, error)
ListCertificatesWithFilter(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error)
GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
UpdateCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
ArchiveCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) error
GetCertificateVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateVersion, int64, error)
TriggerRenewal(ctx context.Context, certID string, actor string, force bool) error
TriggerDeployment(ctx context.Context, certID string, targetID string, actor string) error
RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error
GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error)
GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error)
GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error)
// GetOCSPResponseWithNonce is the nonce-aware variant added in
// production hardening II Phase 1. When nonce is non-nil, the
// responder echoes it in the response per RFC 6960 §4.4.1. A nil
// nonce produces a response without the nonce extension.
GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error)
GetCertificateDeployments(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, error)
}
// CertificateHandler handles HTTP requests for certificate operations.
type CertificateHandler struct {
svc CertificateService
ocspLimiter *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter // production hardening II Phase 3 — per-source-IP cap on OCSP
}
// NewCertificateHandler creates a new CertificateHandler with a service dependency.
func NewCertificateHandler(svc CertificateService) CertificateHandler {
return CertificateHandler{svc: svc}
}
// SetOCSPRateLimiter wires the per-source-IP OCSP rate limiter.
// Production hardening II Phase 3. Default cap (when set in
// cmd/server/main.go): 1000 req/min/IP. Setting to nil disables the
// limit; the limiter's own NewSlidingWindowLimiter(maxN<=0, ...)
// also produces a no-op limiter, so the env-var-zero case is safe.
func (h *CertificateHandler) SetOCSPRateLimiter(l *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter) {
h.ocspLimiter = l
}
// ListCertificates lists certificates with optional filtering.
// GET /api/v1/certificates?status=Active&environment=prod&owner_id=...&team_id=...&issuer_id=...&agent_id=...&profile_id=...&expires_before=...&expires_after=...&created_after=...&updated_after=...&sort=notAfter&sort_desc=false&cursor=...&page=1&per_page=50&fields=id,commonName,status
func (h CertificateHandler) ListCertificates(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Parse query parameters
query := r.URL.Query()
// Basic filters
filter := &repository.CertificateFilter{
Status: query.Get("status"),
Environment: query.Get("environment"),
OwnerID: query.Get("owner_id"),
TeamID: query.Get("team_id"),
IssuerID: query.Get("issuer_id"),
AgentID: query.Get("agent_id"),
ProfileID: query.Get("profile_id"),
}
// Time-range filters
if eb := query.Get("expires_before"); eb != "" {
if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, eb); err == nil {
filter.ExpiresBefore = &t
}
}
if ea := query.Get("expires_after"); ea != "" {
if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ea); err == nil {
filter.ExpiresAfter = &t
}
}
if ca := query.Get("created_after"); ca != "" {
if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ca); err == nil {
filter.CreatedAfter = &t
}
}
if ua := query.Get("updated_after"); ua != "" {
if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ua); err == nil {
filter.UpdatedAfter = &t
}
}
// Sorting
if sort := query.Get("sort"); sort != "" {
// Handle sort direction prefix
if strings.HasPrefix(sort, "-") {
filter.Sort = sort[1:]
filter.SortDesc = true
} else {
filter.Sort = sort
filter.SortDesc = query.Get("sort_desc") == "true"
}
}
// Cursor-based pagination
filter.Cursor = query.Get("cursor")
// Page-based pagination
page := 1
perPage := 50
if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
page = parsed
}
}
if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
perPage = parsed
}
}
if ps := query.Get("page_size"); ps != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(ps); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
filter.PageSize = parsed
}
}
filter.Page = page
filter.PerPage = perPage
// Sparse fields
if fieldsStr := query.Get("fields"); fieldsStr != "" {
filter.Fields = strings.Split(fieldsStr, ",")
}
certs, total, err := h.svc.ListCertificatesWithFilter(r.Context(), filter)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to list certificates", requestID)
return
}
// Apply sparse field filtering if requested
var responseData interface{} = certs
if len(filter.Fields) > 0 {
responseData = filterFields(certs, filter.Fields)
}
// Return cursor-based or page-based response depending on which pagination is used
if filter.Cursor != "" {
// Compute next cursor from last result
nextCursor := ""
if len(certs) > 0 {
lastCert := certs[len(certs)-1]
nextCursor = encodeCursor(lastCert.CreatedAt, lastCert.ID)
}
pageSize := filter.PageSize
if pageSize == 0 {
pageSize = filter.PerPage
}
response := CursorPagedResponse{
Data: responseData,
Total: int64(total),
NextCursor: nextCursor,
PageSize: pageSize,
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
} else {
response := PagedResponse{
Data: responseData,
Total: int64(total),
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
}
// GetCertificate retrieves a single certificate by ID.
// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}
func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
if id == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
cert, err := h.svc.GetCertificate(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, cert)
}
// CreateCertificate creates a new certificate.
// POST /api/v1/certificates
func (h CertificateHandler) CreateCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
var cert domain.ManagedCertificate
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&cert); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
// Validate required fields
if err := ValidateRequired("common_name", cert.CommonName); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateCommonName(cert.CommonName); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateRequired("owner_id", cert.OwnerID); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateRequired("team_id", cert.TeamID); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateRequired("issuer_id", cert.IssuerID); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateRequired("name", cert.Name); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
if err := ValidateRequired("renewal_policy_id", cert.RenewalPolicyID); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
created, err := h.svc.CreateCertificate(r.Context(), cert)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to create certificate", "error", err, "request_id", requestID, "common_name", cert.CommonName, "name", cert.Name)
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to create certificate", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusCreated, created)
}
// UpdateCertificate updates an existing certificate.
// PUT /api/v1/certificates/{id}
func (h CertificateHandler) UpdateCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(id, "/")
if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
id = parts[0]
var cert domain.ManagedCertificate
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&cert); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
// Validate required fields (if provided)
if cert.CommonName != "" {
if err := ValidateCommonName(cert.CommonName); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
}
if cert.OwnerID != "" {
if err := ValidateStringLength("owner_id", cert.OwnerID, 255); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
}
if cert.TeamID != "" {
if err := ValidateStringLength("team_id", cert.TeamID, 255); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
}
updated, err := h.svc.UpdateCertificate(r.Context(), id, cert)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
slog.Error("UpdateCertificate failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update certificate", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, updated)
}
// ArchiveCertificate archives a certificate (soft delete).
// DELETE /api/v1/certificates/{id}
func (h CertificateHandler) ArchiveCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodDelete {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
if id == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
if err := h.svc.ArchiveCertificate(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to archive certificate", requestID)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// GetCertificateVersions retrieves version history for a certificate.
// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions
func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateVersions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
certID := parts[0]
page := 1
perPage := 50
query := r.URL.Query()
if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
page = parsed
}
}
if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
perPage = parsed
}
}
versions, total, err := h.svc.GetCertificateVersions(r.Context(), certID, page, perPage)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
slog.Error("GetCertificateVersions failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err.Error())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get certificate versions", requestID)
return
}
response := PagedResponse{
Data: versions,
Total: total,
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
// TriggerRenewal triggers manual renewal for a certificate.
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew
func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerRenewal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
certID := parts[0]
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
// 2026-05-05 parity-defaults-cleanup (P3-1): operators can opt into
// forcing a renewal when the cert is stuck in RenewalInProgress (a
// previous job hung without releasing the status flag). Accepted as
// either ?force=true query param OR {"force": true} JSON body so CLI
// + GUI clients can pick whichever flow fits their idiom.
force := false
if fv := r.URL.Query().Get("force"); fv == "true" || fv == "1" {
force = true
}
if !force && r.ContentLength > 0 && r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
var body struct {
Force bool `json:"force,omitempty"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err == nil {
force = body.Force
}
}
if err := h.svc.TriggerRenewal(r.Context(), certID, actor, force); err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot renew") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already in progress") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger renewal", requestID)
return
}
response := map[string]string{
"status": "renewal_triggered",
}
JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, response)
}
// TriggerDeployment triggers deployment of a certificate to targets.
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy
func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerDeployment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
certID := parts[0]
// Optional: parse request body for specific target ID
var req struct {
TargetID string `json:"target_id,omitempty"`
}
if r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
// Log but don't fail - targetID is optional
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
}
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.TriggerDeployment(r.Context(), certID, req.TargetID, actor); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger deployment", requestID)
return
}
response := map[string]string{
"status": "deployment_triggered",
}
JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, response)
}
// RevokeCertificate revokes a certificate with an optional reason code.
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
func (h CertificateHandler) RevokeCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
certID := parts[0]
// Parse optional reason from request body
var req struct {
Reason string `json:"reason"`
}
if r.Body != nil && r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
}
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.RevokeCertificate(r.Context(), certID, req.Reason, actor); err != nil {
// Distinguish between client errors and server errors
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already revoked") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot revoke") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "invalid revocation reason") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to fetch") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to get") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to revoke certificate", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "revoked"})
}
// GetDERCRL returns a DER-encoded X.509 CRL signed by the specified issuer.
// GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
//
// RFC 5280 § 5. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace so
// relying parties (browsers, OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars) can fetch the CRL
// without presenting certctl API credentials.
func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
return
}
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/crl/")
if issuerID == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID is required", requestID)
return
}
derBytes, err := h.svc.GenerateDERCRL(r.Context(), issuerID)
if err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate CRL", requestID)
return
}
// Production hardening II Phase 4: HTTP caching headers per RFC 7232.
// CDNs and reverse proxies in front of certctl can serve repeated
// CRL fetches from their edge caches (saves both bandwidth + the
// per-request DB read on certctl's side).
//
// ETag is the SHA-256 of the DER body, weak-form (W/) per RFC 7232
// §2.3 because the body bytes are the canonical identity but two
// different generation runs of the same revocation set could produce
// byte-identical CRLs (deterministic builder) — weak ETag covers
// the future case where signature randomness leaks into the bytes.
etagBytes := sha256.Sum256(derBytes)
etag := fmt.Sprintf("W/\"%x\"", etagBytes[:16]) // first 16 bytes of SHA-256 — sufficient ID space
w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
// If-None-Match short-circuits to 304 Not Modified. RFC 7232 §3.2.
// We compare the raw header against our ETag literal; a missing
// header simply produces no match and falls through.
if match := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); match != "" && match == etag {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
// Cache-Control max-age derived from the CRL's nextUpdate window.
// We don't have the parsed CRL handy here (the service returns raw
// DER), so derive a conservative TTL from the current scheduler
// regen interval — relying parties that respect max-age won't
// re-fetch within that window. Floor at 60s so we never advertise
// max-age=0 even on degenerate test cases.
const crlCacheControlSeconds = 3600 // 1h matches default CRL regen cadence
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-crl")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%d, must-revalidate", crlCacheControlSeconds))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(derBytes)
}
// ocspSourceIP extracts the source IP from the request for the
// per-IP rate limiter. Production hardening II Phase 3.
//
// Strategy: net.SplitHostPort on RemoteAddr; on parse failure fall
// back to the bare RemoteAddr string. We deliberately do NOT honor
// X-Forwarded-For here because OCSP is publicly reachable and
// untrusted intermediaries could spoof the header to bypass the
// limit. Operators behind a trusted reverse proxy should configure
// the proxy to pass through the original IP via the standard
// transport (rewriting RemoteAddr at the proxy boundary).
func ocspSourceIP(r *http.Request) string {
if r == nil {
return ""
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// applyOCSPRateLimit enforces the per-source-IP cap. Returns true when
// the request was rejected (handler should stop). Returns false to
// continue processing. Production hardening II Phase 3.
func (h CertificateHandler) applyOCSPRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
if h.ocspLimiter == nil {
return false
}
ip := ocspSourceIP(r)
if err := h.ocspLimiter.Allow(ip, time.Now()); err != nil {
// Rate-limited: respond with the canonical OCSP "tryLater"
// status (status 3 per RFC 6960 §2.3) plus an HTTP-level
// Retry-After hint. ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse is
// status 6 (unauthorized); we use that here too because
// x/crypto/ocsp doesn't ship a TryLater pre-built blob and
// rolling our own DER for one rejection path adds a
// fragility surface for no relying-party benefit
// (everything that retries an OCSP failure retries on any
// non-good status, not specifically TryLater).
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write(ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse)
return true
}
return false
}
// HandleOCSP processes OCSP requests.
// GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
//
// RFC 6960. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace. For
// simplicity we accept GET with path params rather than the binary POST body
// form — the response is a valid DER-encoded OCSP response either way.
func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
return
}
// Production hardening II Phase 3: per-source-IP rate limit.
// When the cap is tripped, applyOCSPRateLimit writes the
// rate-limited OCSP response and returns true — handler stops.
if h.applyOCSPRateLimit(w, r) {
return
}
// Extract issuer_id and serial from path: /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/")
parts := strings.SplitN(path, "/", 2)
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" || parts[1] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID and serial number are required", requestID)
return
}
issuerID := parts[0]
serialHex := parts[1]
derBytes, err := h.svc.GetOCSPResponse(r.Context(), issuerID, serialHex)
if err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate OCSP response", requestID)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=3600")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(derBytes)
}
// HandleOCSPPost processes RFC 6960 §A.1.1 POST OCSP requests.
// POST /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}
//
// The body MUST be the binary DER-encoded OCSPRequest with content-type
// "application/ocsp-request". The response is the same DER-encoded
// OCSPResponse with content-type "application/ocsp-response" returned
// by the existing GET handler — only the input shape differs.
//
// POST is the standard transport for production OCSP clients (Firefox,
// OpenSSL `s_client -status`, cert-manager, Microsoft Intune device
// validators). The pre-existing GET form is kept for ad-hoc curl
// inspection + human-readable URL paths.
//
// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4.
func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSPPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
return
}
// Production hardening II Phase 3: per-source-IP rate limit.
if h.applyOCSPRateLimit(w, r) {
return
}
// Be tolerant about Content-Type: RFC 6960 §A.1.1 says it MUST be
// "application/ocsp-request" but real-world clients sometimes omit
// the header or send it with a charset suffix. We require the
// substring "ocsp-request" rather than exact match — the actual
// validation happens in ocsp.ParseRequest below; a malformed body
// fails there with a 400.
ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if ct != "" && !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(ct), "ocsp-request") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType,
fmt.Sprintf("Content-Type must be application/ocsp-request, got %q", ct), requestID)
return
}
// Issuer ID from the path. The router pattern strips the leading
// /.well-known/pki/ocsp/ prefix; what remains is the bare issuer ID.
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/")
issuerID = strings.TrimSuffix(issuerID, "/")
if issuerID == "" || strings.Contains(issuerID, "/") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID is required", requestID)
return
}
// Body is already MaxBytesReader-capped by the body-size middleware.
// OCSPRequest bodies are tiny (~200 bytes for a single-cert query),
// so the default cap is comfortably above what any legitimate client
// will send.
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to read request body", requestID)
return
}
ocspReq, err := ocsp.ParseRequest(body)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
fmt.Sprintf("Invalid OCSPRequest: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
// Production hardening II Phase 1: extract the optional RFC 6960
// §4.4.1 nonce extension from the request. golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp
// doesn't expose the request's extensions, so we walk the raw DER
// ourselves via service.ParseOCSPRequestNonce.
//
// Failure modes:
// - no nonce (most relying parties): nonce=nil, present=false,
// err=nil -> proceed without echoing.
// - well-formed nonce <= 32 bytes: nonce=bytes, present=true,
// err=nil -> plumb through GetOCSPResponseWithNonce.
// - malformed nonce (empty or > 32 bytes): err=ErrOCSPNonceMalformed
// -> respond with the OCSP "unauthorized" status (RFC 6960 §2.3
// status code 6) rather than echoing potentially-malicious bytes.
nonce, _, nonceErr := service.ParseOCSPRequestNonce(body)
if errors.Is(nonceErr, service.ErrOCSPNonceMalformed) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
// ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse is the canonical pre-built
// error response (status 6) per RFC 6960 §4.2.1.
w.Write(ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse)
return
}
// Reuse the existing service path. The serial extracted from the
// parsed OCSPRequest is converted to hex (the on-disk format for
// certctl serials matches certificate.SerialNumber.Text(16)).
serialHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ocspReq.SerialNumber)
derBytes, err := h.svc.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(r.Context(), issuerID, serialHex, nonce)
if err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate OCSP response", requestID)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=3600")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(derBytes)
}
// GetCertificateDeployments retrieves all deployment targets for a certificate.
// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments
func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateDeployments(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
return
}
certID := parts[0]
deployments, err := h.svc.GetCertificateDeployments(r.Context(), certID)
if err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
return
}
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get deployments", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"data": deployments,
"total": len(deployments),
})
}