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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
166 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
166 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package postgres
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// AuditRepository implements repository.AuditRepository
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type AuditRepository struct {
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db *sql.DB
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}
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// NewAuditRepository creates a new AuditRepository
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func NewAuditRepository(db *sql.DB) *AuditRepository {
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return &AuditRepository{db: db}
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}
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// Create stores a new audit event using the repository's package-level
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// *sql.DB. Use CreateWithTx when the audit event must be atomic with
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// another database operation in a service-layer transaction.
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func (r *AuditRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, event *domain.AuditEvent) error {
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return r.CreateWithTx(ctx, r.db, event)
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}
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// CreateWithTx stores a new audit event using the supplied Querier.
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// Pass *sql.Tx (typically from postgres.WithinTx) to participate in a
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// caller's transaction; pass *sql.DB or call Create for stand-alone
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// inserts. The SQL and side-effect contract is identical to Create —
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// CreateWithTx is the load-bearing path that closes the audit's
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// atomicity blocker (audit row must be transactional with the
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// operation that triggered it).
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func (r *AuditRepository) CreateWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, event *domain.AuditEvent) error {
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if event.ID == "" {
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event.ID = uuid.New().String()
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}
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// Bundle 1 Phase 8: empty EventCategory defaults to
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// cert_lifecycle (matches the migration's DEFAULT clause + the
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// DB CHECK constraint). The boundary catches callers that
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// haven't yet been migrated to the categorized API.
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if event.EventCategory == "" {
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event.EventCategory = domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle
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}
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err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO audit_events (
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id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp, event_category
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) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9)
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RETURNING id
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`, event.ID, event.Actor, event.ActorType, event.Action, event.ResourceType,
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event.ResourceID, event.Details, event.Timestamp, event.EventCategory).Scan(&event.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create audit event: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// List returns audit events matching the filter criteria
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func (r *AuditRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilter) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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if filter == nil {
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filter = &repository.AuditFilter{}
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}
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// Set defaults
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if filter.Page < 1 {
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filter.Page = 1
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}
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if filter.PerPage == 0 || filter.PerPage > 500 {
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filter.PerPage = 50
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}
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// Build WHERE clause
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var whereConditions []string
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var args []interface{}
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argCount := 1
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if filter.Actor != "" {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("actor = $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.Actor)
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argCount++
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}
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if filter.ActorType != "" {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("actor_type = $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.ActorType)
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argCount++
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}
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if filter.ResourceType != "" {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("resource_type = $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.ResourceType)
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argCount++
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}
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if filter.ResourceID != "" {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("resource_id = $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.ResourceID)
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argCount++
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}
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if !filter.From.IsZero() {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("timestamp >= $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.From)
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argCount++
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}
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if !filter.To.IsZero() {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("timestamp <= $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.To)
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argCount++
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}
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if filter.EventCategory != "" {
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whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("event_category = $%d", argCount))
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args = append(args, filter.EventCategory)
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argCount++
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}
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whereClause := ""
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if len(whereConditions) > 0 {
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whereClause = "WHERE " + strings.Join(whereConditions, " AND ")
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}
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// Get total count
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countQuery := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_events %s", whereClause)
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var total int
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if err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, countQuery, args...).Scan(&total); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to count audit events: %w", err)
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}
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// Get paginated results
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offset := (filter.Page - 1) * filter.PerPage
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query := fmt.Sprintf(`
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SELECT id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp, event_category
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FROM audit_events
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%s
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ORDER BY timestamp DESC
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LIMIT $%d OFFSET $%d
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`, whereClause, argCount, argCount+1)
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args = append(args, filter.PerPage, offset)
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, args...)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query audit events: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var events []*domain.AuditEvent
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for rows.Next() {
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var event domain.AuditEvent
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if err := rows.Scan(&event.ID, &event.Actor, &event.ActorType, &event.Action,
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&event.ResourceType, &event.ResourceID, &event.Details, &event.Timestamp, &event.EventCategory); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan audit event: %w", err)
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}
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events = append(events, &event)
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error iterating audit event rows: %w", err)
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}
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return events, nil
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}
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