mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-09 21:28:53 +00:00
23c593089d
CodeQL alert #11 (go/email-injection, CWE-640 / OWASP Content Spoofing)
flagged the wc.Write(message) sink at internal/connector/notifier/email/
email.go:208 because attacker-controllable fields flow into the email
body unchecked.
Threat model:
Headers (From, To, Subject) were already protected by
validation.ValidateHeaderValue (CWE-113 SMTP header injection,
closed in commit 3853b74). The remaining gap was the body.
An attacker controls multiple fields that surface to the body of
alert/event notifications:
- alert.Subject, alert.Message
- event.Subject, event.Body, *event.CertificateID
- alert.Metadata + event.Metadata key/value pairs
These can carry CR/LF (forged 'Reply-To: attacker@evil.com' inside
the body that recipients skim), NUL bytes (RFC 5321 4.5.2 violation
that some MTAs truncate at), bidi-override Unicode (visually-
spoofable URLs), zero-width / invisible Unicode (phishing), or
malformed UTF-8 (Go emits U+FFFD which becomes a glyph in mail
clients).
The HTML email path (digest service) already uses html/template
upstream and is safe via contextual auto-escape. This commit
closes the plaintext path.
Fix:
internal/validation/headers.go gains SanitizeEmailBodyValue —
a sanitizer that NEVER errors (the right contract for body
content; over-eager rejection drops operator notifications) and
scrubs:
- NUL bytes (stripped entirely)
- bare CR / LF (replaced with space — single fields should never
carry their own line breaks; the surrounding template handles
legitimate CRLFs)
- C0 control chars < 0x20 except TAB
- DEL (0x7F) + C1 control chars (0x80-0x9F)
- U+FFFD (defense in depth: malformed UTF-8 -> Go emits this;
strip so attacker-planted invalid bytes don't survive as an
arbitrary glyph)
- Bidi-override Unicode (U+202A..U+202E, U+2066..U+2069)
- Zero-width / invisible Unicode (U+200B..U+200D, U+2060..U+2063,
U+FEFF, U+180E)
- Catch-all unicode.IsControl for anything not enumerated above
Codepoint table uses numeric ranges rather than rune-literal switch
cases — Go source rejects literal invisible characters (BOM U+FEFF)
mid-file, so the table compares against numeric values.
internal/connector/notifier/email/email.go applies the sanitizer
at every interpolation site:
- formatAlertBody: alert.ID/Type/Severity/Subject/Message
(CreatedAt is time.Time -> RFC3339, structural, not sanitized)
- formatEventBody: event.ID/Type/Subject/Body, *CertificateID
(CreatedAt structural, not sanitized)
- formatMetadata: both keys and values
The sendEmail / formatEmailMessage call sites continue to validate
headers (From / To / Subject) via the existing ValidateHeaderValue
fail-closed gate; the new sanitizer is body-side only.
Tests (internal/validation/headers_test.go):
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_PreservesSafeInput
Pin: ordinary ASCII, UTF-8 multibyte (résumé / 日本語 / مرحبا),
tabs, common cert DNs, URLs all flow through unchanged.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_StripsControlChars
Table-driven across NUL, bare LF/CR, CRLF, BEL, backspace, DEL,
C1 (U+0080 / U+009F), U+FFFD, TAB-preserve.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_StripsBidiOverride
7 attacker payloads (RLO, LRO, LRI, zero-width space, ZWNJ, BOM,
MVS) — each must produce a non-identity output.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_ContentSpoofingScenario
The CodeQL example case: 'alert\r\nReply-To: attacker@evil.com\r\n
Click https://evil.example.com/reset' — verify NO CR/LF survives.
Verified locally:
gofmt: clean.
go vet ./...: exit 0.
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/validation/...: ok 0.374s
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/email/...: ok 0.186s
Reference: https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/security/code-scanning/11
Closes CodeQL alert #11 (go/email-injection).
465 lines
14 KiB
Go
465 lines
14 KiB
Go
package email
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/tls"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/smtp"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/notifier"
|
|
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Config represents the email notifier configuration.
|
|
type Config struct {
|
|
SMTPHost string `json:"smtp_host"`
|
|
SMTPPort int `json:"smtp_port"`
|
|
Username string `json:"username"`
|
|
Password string `json:"password"`
|
|
FromAddress string `json:"from_address"`
|
|
UseTLS bool `json:"tls"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Connector implements the notifier.Connector interface for email notifications.
|
|
// It sends alert and event notifications via SMTP.
|
|
type Connector struct {
|
|
config *Config
|
|
logger *slog.Logger
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// New creates a new email notifier with the given configuration and logger.
|
|
func New(config *Config, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
|
|
return &Connector{
|
|
config: config,
|
|
logger: logger,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateConfig checks that the SMTP server is reachable and credentials are valid.
|
|
// It attempts to connect to the SMTP server to verify connectivity.
|
|
func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var cfg Config
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid email config: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.SMTPHost == "" || cfg.SMTPPort == 0 || cfg.FromAddress == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("email smtp_host, smtp_port, and from_address are required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("validating email configuration",
|
|
"smtp_host", cfg.SMTPHost,
|
|
"smtp_port", cfg.SMTPPort)
|
|
|
|
// Test SMTP connectivity with timeout
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort(cfg.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(cfg.SMTPPort))
|
|
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 10*time.Second)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to reach SMTP server %s: %w", addr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
c.config = &cfg
|
|
c.logger.Info("email configuration validated")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SendAlert sends an alert notification via SMTP.
|
|
// It formats the alert as an email message and sends it to the recipient.
|
|
func (c *Connector) SendAlert(ctx context.Context, alert notifier.Alert) error {
|
|
c.logger.Info("sending email alert",
|
|
"alert_id", alert.ID,
|
|
"severity", alert.Severity,
|
|
"recipient", alert.Recipient)
|
|
|
|
// Format email subject and body
|
|
subject := fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s", strings.ToUpper(alert.Severity), alert.Subject)
|
|
body := c.formatAlertBody(alert)
|
|
|
|
// Send email
|
|
if err := c.sendEmail(ctx, alert.Recipient, subject, body); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to send alert email",
|
|
"alert_id", alert.ID,
|
|
"error", err)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send alert email: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("alert email sent successfully",
|
|
"alert_id", alert.ID,
|
|
"recipient", alert.Recipient)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SendEvent sends an event notification via SMTP.
|
|
// It formats the event as an email message and sends it to the recipient.
|
|
func (c *Connector) SendEvent(ctx context.Context, event notifier.Event) error {
|
|
c.logger.Info("sending email event",
|
|
"event_id", event.ID,
|
|
"event_type", event.Type,
|
|
"recipient", event.Recipient)
|
|
|
|
// Format email subject and body
|
|
subject := fmt.Sprintf("[Event] %s", event.Subject)
|
|
body := c.formatEventBody(event)
|
|
|
|
// Send email
|
|
if err := c.sendEmail(ctx, event.Recipient, subject, body); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to send event email",
|
|
"event_id", event.ID,
|
|
"error", err)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send event email: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("event email sent successfully",
|
|
"event_id", event.ID,
|
|
"recipient", event.Recipient)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendEmail sends an email message using the configured SMTP server.
|
|
// It handles both TLS and plain authentication modes.
|
|
//
|
|
// Header values (From, To, Subject) are validated up-front to reject CR, LF,
|
|
// and NUL characters. This blocks SMTP header injection (CWE-113) and also
|
|
// prevents injection into the SMTP envelope commands MAIL FROM and RCPT TO,
|
|
// since net/smtp does not sanitize those inputs itself.
|
|
func (c *Connector) sendEmail(ctx context.Context, to, subject, body string) error {
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid sender: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid recipient: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid subject: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort(c.config.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(c.config.SMTPPort))
|
|
|
|
// Connect to SMTP server
|
|
var auth smtp.Auth
|
|
if c.config.Username != "" && c.config.Password != "" {
|
|
auth = smtp.PlainAuth("", c.config.Username, c.config.Password, c.config.SMTPHost)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var conn net.Conn
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
if c.config.UseTLS {
|
|
// Connect with TLS
|
|
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
|
|
ServerName: c.config.SMTPHost,
|
|
}
|
|
conn, err = tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsConfig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect via TLS: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Connect without TLS
|
|
conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", addr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
// Create SMTP client
|
|
client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, c.config.SMTPHost)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create SMTP client: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
|
|
// Authenticate if credentials provided
|
|
if auth != nil {
|
|
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("SMTP authentication failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send email
|
|
if err := client.Mail(c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set sender: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set recipient: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wc, err := client.Data()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get data writer: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer wc.Close()
|
|
|
|
// Format and write email headers and body. The format function
|
|
// re-validates header values as defense-in-depth; the early-return
|
|
// above should have already caught any injection attempt.
|
|
message, err := c.formatEmailMessage(c.config.FromAddress, to, subject, body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to format message: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := wc.Write(message); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write message: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := client.Quit(); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to quit SMTP: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendHTMLEmail sends an HTML email message using the configured SMTP server.
|
|
// Used by the digest service for rich HTML digest emails.
|
|
//
|
|
// Header values (From, To, Subject) are validated up-front to reject CR, LF,
|
|
// and NUL characters. This blocks SMTP header injection (CWE-113) and also
|
|
// prevents injection into the SMTP envelope commands MAIL FROM and RCPT TO,
|
|
// since net/smtp does not sanitize those inputs itself.
|
|
func (c *Connector) sendHTMLEmail(ctx context.Context, to, subject, htmlBody string) error {
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid sender: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid recipient: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid subject: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort(c.config.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(c.config.SMTPPort))
|
|
|
|
var auth smtp.Auth
|
|
if c.config.Username != "" && c.config.Password != "" {
|
|
auth = smtp.PlainAuth("", c.config.Username, c.config.Password, c.config.SMTPHost)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var conn net.Conn
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
if c.config.UseTLS {
|
|
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
|
|
ServerName: c.config.SMTPHost,
|
|
}
|
|
conn, err = tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsConfig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect via TLS: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", addr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, c.config.SMTPHost)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create SMTP client: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
|
|
if auth != nil {
|
|
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("SMTP authentication failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := client.Mail(c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set sender: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set recipient: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wc, err := client.Data()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get data writer: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer wc.Close()
|
|
|
|
// The format function re-validates header values as defense-in-depth;
|
|
// the early-return above should have already caught any injection attempt.
|
|
message, err := c.formatHTMLEmailMessage(c.config.FromAddress, to, subject, htmlBody)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to format message: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := wc.Write(message); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write message: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := client.Quit(); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to quit SMTP: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// formatEmailMessage formats an email message with standard headers.
|
|
// It rejects any header value containing CR, LF, or NUL bytes to prevent
|
|
// SMTP header injection (CWE-113). See internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue.
|
|
// The body is not validated — CR/LF in the body is legitimate content, and
|
|
// SMTP dot-stuffing / length framing are handled by net/smtp.
|
|
func (c *Connector) formatEmailMessage(from, to, subject, body string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", from); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
message := fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"From: %s\r\nTo: %s\r\nSubject: %s\r\nDate: %s\r\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\r\n\r\n%s",
|
|
from,
|
|
to,
|
|
subject,
|
|
time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123Z),
|
|
body,
|
|
)
|
|
return []byte(message), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// formatHTMLEmailMessage formats an HTML email message with MIME headers.
|
|
// It rejects any header value containing CR, LF, or NUL bytes to prevent
|
|
// SMTP header injection (CWE-113). See internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue.
|
|
// The HTML body is not validated at this layer — CR/LF in HTML content is
|
|
// legitimate, and SMTP dot-stuffing / length framing are handled by net/smtp.
|
|
func (c *Connector) formatHTMLEmailMessage(from, to, subject, htmlBody string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", from); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
message := fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"From: %s\r\nTo: %s\r\nSubject: %s\r\nDate: %s\r\nMIME-Version: 1.0\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n\r\n%s",
|
|
from,
|
|
to,
|
|
subject,
|
|
time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123Z),
|
|
htmlBody,
|
|
)
|
|
return []byte(message), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// formatAlertBody formats an alert notification as email body text.
|
|
//
|
|
// CodeQL go/email-injection (CWE-640 / OWASP Content Spoofing) defense:
|
|
// every field interpolated into the body that may carry attacker-
|
|
// controlled content (alert.Subject, alert.Message, alert.Metadata
|
|
// values, alert.ID / Type / Severity which originate from the API
|
|
// surface) is routed through validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue before
|
|
// formatting. The sanitizer strips NUL bytes (RFC 5321 §4.5.2 violation),
|
|
// bare CR/LF within a single field (forged header-boundary attempts),
|
|
// bidi-override Unicode (visually-spoofable URLs), zero-width / invisible
|
|
// codepoints, and C0/C1 control chars. CreatedAt is a time.Time —
|
|
// formatted via RFC3339; not user-controllable so unsanitized.
|
|
//
|
|
// Header values (From, To, Subject) are protected separately by
|
|
// validation.ValidateHeaderValue at sendEmail entry (CWE-113 SMTP header
|
|
// injection — see commit 9e957c3).
|
|
func (c *Connector) formatAlertBody(alert notifier.Alert) string {
|
|
body := fmt.Sprintf(`
|
|
Certificate Alert Notification
|
|
================================
|
|
|
|
Alert ID: %s
|
|
Type: %s
|
|
Severity: %s
|
|
Created: %s
|
|
|
|
Subject: %s
|
|
|
|
Message:
|
|
%s
|
|
|
|
%s
|
|
`,
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(alert.ID),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(alert.Type),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(alert.Severity),
|
|
alert.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(alert.Subject),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(alert.Message),
|
|
c.formatMetadata(alert.Metadata),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return body
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// formatEventBody formats an event notification as email body text.
|
|
//
|
|
// Same CodeQL go/email-injection mitigation as formatAlertBody — every
|
|
// user-controllable interpolated field routes through
|
|
// validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue. CreatedAt is unsanitized (time.Time
|
|
// → RFC3339 is structural, not user-controllable).
|
|
func (c *Connector) formatEventBody(event notifier.Event) string {
|
|
certInfo := ""
|
|
if event.CertificateID != nil {
|
|
certInfo = fmt.Sprintf("Certificate ID: %s\n", validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(*event.CertificateID))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body := fmt.Sprintf(`
|
|
Certificate Event Notification
|
|
================================
|
|
|
|
Event ID: %s
|
|
Type: %s
|
|
Created: %s
|
|
|
|
%sSubject: %s
|
|
|
|
Body:
|
|
%s
|
|
|
|
%s
|
|
`,
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(event.ID),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(event.Type),
|
|
event.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
certInfo,
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(event.Subject),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(event.Body),
|
|
c.formatMetadata(event.Metadata),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return body
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// formatMetadata formats metadata as a readable string.
|
|
//
|
|
// Both keys and values can carry attacker-controlled content (cert
|
|
// subject DN fragments, discovered cert metadata, owner/team labels —
|
|
// all originate from API surfaces an attacker may influence). Both are
|
|
// routed through validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue. Closes the
|
|
// CodeQL go/email-injection finding alongside formatAlertBody +
|
|
// formatEventBody.
|
|
func (c *Connector) formatMetadata(metadata map[string]string) string {
|
|
if len(metadata) == 0 {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
metadataStr := "\nMetadata:\n"
|
|
for key, value := range metadata {
|
|
metadataStr += fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %s\n",
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(key),
|
|
validation.SanitizeEmailBodyValue(value),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return metadataStr
|
|
}
|