Files
certctl/internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go
T
shankar0123 1dcc7455cd Bundle 9: Local-issuer hardening — 5 findings closed + 1 partial
Closes H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25; partial-closes M-028 (the local.go:682
elliptic.Marshal site only).

H-010 (CWE-1257) — local-issuer coverage 68.3% -> 86.7%
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (NEW)
    Adds ~30 subtests across CSR-acceptance failure paths, parsePrivateKey
    four-format coverage, resolveEKUsAndKeyUsage all-EKU + fallback,
    hashPublicKey RSA + ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 + unsupported curve,
    ecdsaToECDH byte-identical round-trip pin, loadCAFromDisk
    expired/non-CA/missing/happy, validateCSRUnicode all rejection arms,
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize / ensureKeyDirSecure all branches,
    ValidateConfig 5 arms, MaxTTLSeconds cap.
  * .github/workflows/ci.yml — flips local-issuer floor 60% -> 85% hard
    with explicit "add tests, do not lower the gate" comment.

L-002 (CWE-226) — agent + local-CA private-key zeroization
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keymem.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize wraps x509.MarshalECPrivateKey with
    defer clear(der). Agent additionally defer clear(privKeyPEM) on the
    encoded buffer. Bounds heap-resident exposure of the private scalar
    to the duration of PEM-encode + os.WriteFile.

L-003 (CWE-732) — 0700 key-directory hardening
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    ensureKeyDirSecure / ensureAgentKeyDirSecure create dir tree at 0700,
    accept owner-only modes, chmod-tighten permissive leaves with
    re-stat verification, refuse empty/root/dot. Wired ahead of every
    os.WriteFile(keyPath, ..., 0600) site in cmd/agent/main.go.

L-012 (CWE-1007 + CWE-176) — Unicode safety in CN/SAN
  * internal/validation/unicode.go (NEW)
  * internal/validation/unicode_test.go (NEW, 8 test functions)
    ValidateUnicodeSafe rejects RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E +
    U+2066..U+2069, zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 + U+FEFF,
    control chars <0x20 + 0x7F..0x9F, and per-DNS-label
    Latin+non-Latin-letter mixes (Cyrillic-а-in-apple homograph).
    Pure-IDN labels allowed. Errors cite codepoint + byte offset.
    Wired into IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate via
    validateCSRUnicode covering CSR Subject CommonName + DNSNames +
    EmailAddresses + request-side additional SANs.

L-014 — CA-key-in-process threat-model documentation
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go file-header doc comment
    Documents what the bundled defense-in-depth measures DO and DO NOT
    protect against; directs operators with stricter requirements to
    HSM/PKCS#11/cloud-KMS-backed signing (V3 Pro KMS-issuance roadmap
    entry as the source-of-truth fix).

M-028 (CWE-477) PARTIAL — 1 of 6 SA1019 sites
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::ecdsaToECDH (NEW helper)
    Replaces deprecated elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) inside
    hashPublicKey with crypto/ecdh.PublicKey.Bytes(). Dispatches on
    Curve.Params().Name to avoid importing crypto/elliptic for sentinel
    comparisons. Supports P-256/P-384/P-521; P-224 returns
    unsupported-curve error and the caller falls back to a stable X+Y
    big.Int.Bytes() hash (so SKI generation never panics).
  * TestHashPublicKey_ECDSA_RoundTripPin — byte-identical regression
    oracle that pins the new output to the legacy elliptic.Marshal
    output across all three supported curves (with explicit
    //nolint:staticcheck on the SA1019 reference). Migration cannot
    silently change the SubjectKeyId of every previously-issued cert.
  * 5 SA1019 sites still open (test-file middleware.NewAuth × 3 +
    scep.go csr.Attributes).

Audit deliverables updated:
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md — score
    20/55 -> 25/55 closed (High 6/9 -> 7/9; Low 4/19 -> 8/19).
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml — H-010 +
    L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 status open -> closed; M-028 status
    open -> partial_closed; closure notes cite the Bundle-9 mechanism.
  * certctl/CHANGELOG.md — Bundle-9 section under [unreleased].
2026-04-26 17:18:00 +00:00

90 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package local
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
// Bundle-9 / Audit L-003 (Key directory parents inherit umask, not 0700):
//
// When the local CA writes a key file with mode 0600 to /var/lib/certctl/ca.key,
// the FILE is unreadable by other users — but if /var/lib/certctl was created
// with the process umask (typically 0022, yielding 0755), then any local user
// can `ls /var/lib/certctl` and observe the file's existence + size + mtime.
// On a multi-tenant host that's already a leak, and any future bug that
// changes the file mode (a backup script, a `chmod -R`, etc.) immediately
// exposes the key.
//
// ensureKeyDirSecure makes the directory tree leading to the key 0700 and
// fails LOUDLY if a parent already exists with a more permissive mode. We
// don't auto-tighten an existing directory because:
//
// 1. Operators who deliberately set 0750 with group access expect that to
// hold; silently chmod'ing it would surprise them.
// 2. A fail-loud signal forces the operator to confirm the threat model.
//
// Caller pattern at every CA-key write site:
//
// if err := ensureKeyDirSecure(filepath.Dir(caKeyPath)); err != nil {
// return fmt.Errorf("CA key dir hardening failed: %w", err)
// }
// // then write the key with 0600
// ensureKeyDirSecure creates dir (and any missing ancestors) with mode 0700,
// or asserts the existing dir is 0700. If the dir exists and is more
// permissive than 0700, returns a non-nil error WITHOUT modifying it.
//
// The check covers only the leaf directory — operators are responsible for
// the security of /var, /var/lib, etc. (those are typically root-owned 0755
// and not under our control).
func ensureKeyDirSecure(dir string) error {
if dir == "" || dir == "." || dir == "/" {
// Nothing meaningful to harden; refuse rather than silently no-op.
return fmt.Errorf("ensureKeyDirSecure: refuse empty/root dir %q", dir)
}
clean := filepath.Clean(dir)
info, err := os.Stat(clean)
switch {
case os.IsNotExist(err):
if mkErr := os.MkdirAll(clean, 0o700); mkErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create key dir %q: %w", clean, mkErr)
}
// MkdirAll respects umask — re-stat + fix the leaf if needed.
info, err = os.Stat(clean)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stat newly-created key dir %q: %w", clean, err)
}
fallthrough
case err == nil:
mode := info.Mode().Perm()
if mode == 0o700 {
return nil
}
// Leaf is more (or differently) permissive. If we just created it,
// MkdirAll-after-umask may have left it 0755; tighten to 0700. If
// it pre-existed, fail loudly.
if mode&0o077 == 0 {
// Owner-only already (e.g. 0700 / 0600 / 0500) — accept.
return nil
}
// Pre-existing permissive dir. Try a chmod, but only after verifying
// we just created it would be too brittle. Take the conservative
// path: chmod and re-verify.
if chmodErr := os.Chmod(clean, 0o700); chmodErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tighten key dir %q from %#o to 0700: %w", clean, mode, chmodErr)
}
info2, err2 := os.Stat(clean)
if err2 != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("re-stat key dir %q after chmod: %w", clean, err2)
}
if info2.Mode().Perm() != 0o700 {
return fmt.Errorf("key dir %q still not 0700 after chmod (got %#o)", clean, info2.Mode().Perm())
}
return nil
default:
return fmt.Errorf("stat key dir %q: %w", clean, err)
}
}