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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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36840ddd01
Bundle 5 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). 13-finding
security audit pass across the auth / OIDC / MCP / API / browser-
security surface. Five real closures shipped in code, two false-as-
stated findings annotated with the existing implementation, three
operator-decision items documented for v3 follow-up, three doc-only
fixes (auth architecture narrative aligned with shipped OIDC).
Source findings closed (code):
S1 break-glass /auth/breakglass/login lacked the documented
5/min per-source-IP rate limit; handler now owns its own
SlidingWindowLimiter wired at startup. Doc claim turns true.
R6 OIDC test_discovery JWKS probe ran on http.DefaultClient;
now uses an http.Client whose transport wraps
validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. JWKS URI can no longer
pivot into reserved-address ranges via DNS rebinding.
R7 Slack + Teams notifiers built http.Client without the SSRF
dial-time guard. Both New() constructors now install
validation.SafeHTTPDialContext; webhook URLs (operator-
configured via dynamic-config GUI) cannot dial 169.254.x or
in-cluster reserved ranges. Test seam: newForTest bypasses
the guard for httptest's 127.0.0.1 binds, mirroring the
existing internal/connector/notifier/webhook pattern.
RT-L2 CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true now emits a prominent
logger.Warn at server boot. Pre-Bundle-5 the knob silently
disabled ACME directory TLS verification.
Source findings closed (doc):
finding 1 + HIGH-5 Architecture doc claimed no in-process JWT/
OIDC/mTLS/SAML and pointed everyone at the
authenticating-gateway pattern. Auth Bundle 2
(commit dea5053) shipped native OIDC + sessions +
break-glass. New §"In-process authentication surface"
table (api-key / oidc / none) supersedes the old framing;
"Authenticating-gateway pattern (SAML, mTLS-as-auth,
LDAP)" section retained for protocols certctl still
doesn't ship natively.
Source findings verified false (existing implementation):
S4 OIDC email-domain allowlist — `email_domain_test.go`
already pins the strict-equality semantics (subdomain not
auto-accepted, multi-entry no-match path, empty allowlist
accepts all by-design per RFC 9700 §4.1.1).
SEC-L1 CSP / HSTS / referrer-policy headers — already shipped at
internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go and wired at
cmd/server/main.go L2003+L2027+L2115.
Operator-decision / deferred (tracked in bundle-5 closure doc):
S3 CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED parsing is wired, end-to-end
validation is partial. Operator decides: complete the
named-key middleware path or deprecate the syntax.
S5 Audit-middleware best-effort for read paths;
security-critical writes use WithinTx. Operator decides
per-path escalation.
S8 MCP threat model — the binary is a thin protocol bridge,
no privileges of its own; every tool call carries
CERTCTL_API_KEY and is auth'd + RBAC-gated server-side.
Optional CERTCTL_MCP_READ_ONLY gate tracked as v3.
SEC-H1 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1/2/4 already closed on master;
CRIT-3/5 status against the spec folder is operator-
workstation-validation-only. Documented for follow-up.
SEC-L2 WebAuthn / FIDO2 / step-up — already documented in
docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md "Threats Bundle 2 does
NOT close". v3 work item per CLAUDE.md decision 12.
Full per-finding rationale + receipts at
docs/operator/security-bundle-5-audit-closure.md.
Verification:
gofmt -l # clean
go vet ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/auth/oidc
./internal/api/handler ./cmd/server # clean
go build ./cmd/server [...] # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/api/handler
./internal/auth/oidc ./internal/config # PASS
# (slack 0.028s + teams
# 0.023s + handler 11.0s;
# newForTest seam keeps
# httptest tests green)
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-5 S1 R6 R7 RT-L2 finding-1 HIGH-5
Audit-Verifies-False: S4 SEC-L1
Audit-Defers: S3 S5 S8 SEC-H1 SEC-L2
136 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
136 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package slack
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
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)
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// slackClientTimeout bounds every outbound Slack webhook request and
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// its resolution/dial phase. Shared by the transport dialer (SSRF
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// guard) and the http.Client so DNS rebinding and the read/write
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// budget land on the same time horizon.
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const slackClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second
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// Config holds configuration for the Slack notifier.
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type Config struct {
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// WebhookURL is the Slack incoming webhook URL.
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WebhookURL string `json:"webhook_url"`
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// ChannelOverride optionally overrides the webhook's default channel.
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ChannelOverride string `json:"channel,omitempty"`
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// Username optionally sets the bot display name.
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Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
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// IconEmoji optionally sets the bot icon (e.g., ":lock:").
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IconEmoji string `json:"icon_emoji,omitempty"`
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}
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// Notifier sends notifications to Slack via incoming webhooks.
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type Notifier struct {
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config Config
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httpClient *http.Client
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}
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// New creates a new Slack notifier.
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//
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// Bundle 5 closure (audit R7): the HTTP transport now wraps
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// validation.SafeHTTPDialContext so outbound webhook calls cannot be
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// pointed at reserved-address ranges (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254,
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// in-cluster ::1 / 127.0.0.1 / 10.0.0.0/8 / 172.16.0.0/12 /
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// 192.168.0.0/16, IPv6 link-local fe80::/10) via DNS rebinding or
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// operator-supplied raw IPs. Webhook URLs are operator-configured but
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// flow through the dynamic-config GUI (issuers + targets) which
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// untrusted-actor edits can reach with the right RBAC scope; without
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// the dial-time guard, a notifier config update would be an SSRF
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// pivot into instance metadata services. Mirrors the
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// internal/connector/notifier/webhook hardening pattern.
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func New(config Config) *Notifier {
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transport := &http.Transport{
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DialContext: validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(slackClientTimeout),
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MaxIdleConns: 10,
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IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
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ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
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}
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return &Notifier{
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config: config,
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httpClient: &http.Client{
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Timeout: slackClientTimeout,
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Transport: transport,
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},
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}
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}
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// newForTest is the test-only constructor that bypasses the
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// SafeHTTPDialContext guard so unit tests using httptest.NewServer
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// (which binds to 127.0.0.1) can exercise the rest of the notifier
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// path. The exported `New` is the only production constructor and
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// installs the dial-time SSRF guard unconditionally. Mirrors the
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// internal/connector/notifier/webhook seam (newForTest there).
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func newForTest(config Config) *Notifier {
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return &Notifier{
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config: config,
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httpClient: &http.Client{
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Timeout: slackClientTimeout,
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},
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}
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}
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// Channel returns the channel identifier.
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func (n *Notifier) Channel() string {
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return "Slack"
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}
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// Send delivers a notification to Slack via webhook.
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func (n *Notifier) Send(ctx context.Context, recipient string, subject string, body string) error {
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payload := slackMessage{
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Text: fmt.Sprintf("*%s*\n%s", subject, body),
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}
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if n.config.ChannelOverride != "" {
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payload.Channel = n.config.ChannelOverride
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}
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if n.config.Username != "" {
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payload.Username = n.config.Username
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}
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if n.config.IconEmoji != "" {
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payload.IconEmoji = n.config.IconEmoji
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}
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jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(payload)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("slack: failed to marshal payload: %w", err)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, n.config.WebhookURL, bytes.NewReader(jsonBytes))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("slack: failed to create request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := n.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("slack: request failed: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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return fmt.Errorf("slack: webhook returned HTTP %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
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}
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return nil
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}
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type slackMessage struct {
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Text string `json:"text"`
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Channel string `json:"channel,omitempty"`
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Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
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IconEmoji string `json:"icon_emoji,omitempty"`
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}
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