Files
certctl/internal/api/middleware/middleware.go
T
Shankar 54a41603de fix(security,config): remove unimplemented JWT auth-type, close silent downgrade (G-1)
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.

We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.

The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.

Files changed:

Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
  AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
  literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
  authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
  ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
  Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
  the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
  references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
  config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
  validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
  authenticating-gateway pattern.

Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
  (two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
  whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
  guard against future re-introduction),
  TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
  TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
  hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
  TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
  inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
  TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
  into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
  cover the api-key happy path.

Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
  inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
  jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
  simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
  JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
  section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
  Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
  forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
  standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
  with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
  docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
  ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.

Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
  helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
  template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
  a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
  server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
  top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
  G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
  the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
  gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
  walkthrough.

Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
  Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.

Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
  guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
  (map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
  default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
  branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
  (Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
  protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
  fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.

Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
  account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
  one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
  external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.

Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
  diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
  regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
  with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
  longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
  with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
  (oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
  front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
  See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'

config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.

Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
      §2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
      Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
      validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
2026-04-25 00:22:23 +00:00

435 lines
14 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// RequestIDKey is the context key for storing request IDs.
type RequestIDKey struct{}
// UserKey is the context key for storing authenticated user information.
type UserKey struct{}
// AdminKey is the context key for storing admin flag information.
type AdminKey struct{}
// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
type NamedAPIKey struct {
Name string
Key string
Admin bool
}
// RequestID middleware generates a unique request ID and adds it to the request context and response headers.
func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := uuid.New().String()
w.Header().Set("X-Request-ID", id)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), RequestIDKey{}, id)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// Logging middleware logs request details including method, path, status, and duration.
// Deprecated: Use NewLogging for structured logging with slog.
func Logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
// Wrap response writer to capture status code
wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
duration := time.Since(start)
requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
log.Printf("[%s] %s %s %d %v", requestID, r.Method, r.URL.Path, wrapped.statusCode, duration)
})
}
// NewLogging creates a structured logging middleware using slog.
// Logs request_id, method, path, status, duration_ms, and remote_addr.
func NewLogging(logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
// Wrap response writer to capture status code
wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
duration := time.Since(start)
requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
logger.InfoContext(r.Context(), "request completed",
"request_id", requestID,
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"status", wrapped.statusCode,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
})
}
}
// Recovery middleware recovers from panics and returns a 500 error.
func Recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
defer func() {
if err := recover(); err != nil {
requestID := getRequestID(ctx)
// Use slog.ErrorContext so the panic log carries the same
// request-scoped trace/auth metadata as normal request logs
// (M-2 / D-3 — preserve ctx propagation on the panic path).
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "panic recovered in HTTP handler",
"request_id", requestID,
"panic", fmt.Sprintf("%v", err),
)
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Internal Server Error"}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// AuthConfig holds configuration for the Auth middleware.
//
// G-1 (P1): valid Type values are "api-key" or "none" only. "jwt" was
// removed because no JWT middleware ships with certctl (silent auth
// downgrade pre-G-1). The single source of truth for the allowed set
// lives at internal/config.AuthType / config.ValidAuthTypes() — prefer
// those constants over string literals when comparing.
type AuthConfig struct {
Type string // "api-key" or "none" (see config.AuthType constants)
Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
}
// NewAuthWithNamedKeys creates an authentication middleware that validates
// Bearer tokens against a set of named API keys. Each key carries a name
// (propagated as the actor via context) and an admin flag (consulted by
// authorization gates such as bulk revocation).
//
// When namedKeys is empty the returned middleware is a no-op pass-through,
// which is used in demo/development mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none). When one
// or more keys are provided, requests must include a matching Bearer token
// or they are rejected with 401.
func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
type keyEntry struct {
hash string
name string
admin bool
}
var entries []keyEntry
for _, nk := range namedKeys {
entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
name: nk.Name,
admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
if len(entries) == 1 {
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader == "" {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Extract Bearer token
if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
token := authHeader[7:]
tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
var matched *keyEntry
for i := range entries {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
matched = &entries[i]
break
}
}
if matched == nil {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
//
// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if cfg.Type == "none" {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
idx := 0
for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
if k == "" {
continue
}
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
Key: k,
Admin: false,
})
idx++
}
return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
}
// RateLimitConfig holds configuration for the rate limiter.
type RateLimitConfig struct {
RPS float64 // Requests per second
BurstSize int // Maximum burst size
}
// NewRateLimiter creates a token bucket rate limiting middleware.
// Uses a simple token bucket: tokens refill at RPS rate, burst allows short spikes.
func NewRateLimiter(cfg RateLimitConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
limiter := &tokenBucket{
rate: cfg.RPS,
burstSize: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
tokens: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
lastRefill: time.Now(),
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !limiter.allow() {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Rate limit exceeded"}`, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// tokenBucket implements a simple thread-safe token bucket rate limiter.
// This avoids importing golang.org/x/time/rate to keep dependencies minimal.
type tokenBucket struct {
mu sync.Mutex
rate float64 // tokens per second
burstSize float64 // max tokens
tokens float64 // current tokens
lastRefill time.Time // last refill time
}
func (tb *tokenBucket) allow() bool {
tb.mu.Lock()
defer tb.mu.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
elapsed := now.Sub(tb.lastRefill).Seconds()
tb.tokens += elapsed * tb.rate
if tb.tokens > tb.burstSize {
tb.tokens = tb.burstSize
}
tb.lastRefill = now
if tb.tokens < 1 {
return false
}
tb.tokens--
return true
}
// CORSConfig holds configuration for the CORS middleware.
type CORSConfig struct {
AllowedOrigins []string // Allowed origins; empty = same-origin only
}
// NewCORS creates a CORS middleware with configurable allowed origins.
// Security default: If no origins are configured, CORS headers are NOT set,
// denying all cross-origin requests (same-origin only).
// If ["*"] is configured, all origins are allowed (development/demo mode only).
// If specific origins are configured, only requests matching those origins receive CORS headers.
func NewCORS(cfg CORSConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
allowAll := false
originSet := make(map[string]bool)
for _, o := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
if o == "*" {
allowAll = true
}
originSet[o] = true
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Security default: deny CORS when no origins are configured.
// This prevents CSRF attacks from arbitrary origins.
if len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 {
// No CORS headers set — only same-origin requests can read response
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if allowAll {
// Wildcard allows all origins (development/demo only)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
} else if origin != "" && originSet[origin] {
// Exact match found in allowed origins list
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
}
// If origin is empty or not in allowlist, no CORS headers are set
// CORS preflight response headers (only meaningful if Access-Control-Allow-Origin was set)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ContentType middleware sets the Content-Type header to application/json.
func ContentType(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// CORS middleware adds CORS headers to allow cross-origin requests.
// Deprecated: Use NewCORS for configurable origins. Kept for health endpoints.
func CORS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// GetRequestID extracts the request ID from context.
func GetRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
return getRequestID(ctx)
}
// getRequestID is an internal helper to extract request ID from context.
func getRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
id, ok := ctx.Value(RequestIDKey{}).(string)
if !ok {
return "unknown"
}
return id
}
// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context.
// Returns the name of the matched API key and whether it was found.
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
if !ok {
return ""
}
return user
}
// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context.
// Returns true if the authenticated user has admin privileges.
func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
return ok && admin
}
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
statusCode int
}
func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rw.statusCode = code
rw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// Chain chains multiple middleware functions.
func Chain(h http.Handler, middleware ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) http.Handler {
for i := len(middleware) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
h = middleware[i](h)
}
return h
}