mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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43075a1b5c
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status counters + reload-trust endpoint. Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation: - internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the original plaintext byte-for-byte). - ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in- memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey- Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm / ErrServerKeygenDisabled. - ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2 multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth even if the route was registered). - New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen + /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml + openapi-parity guard updated. Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation: - New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration 000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6 follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it). - domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-* EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985 PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID. - ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU / attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take down the entire endpoint. Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust: - internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12 named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape + ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust() SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter. - Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at every success/failure leg. - internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim: Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added to AdminGatedHandlers). - New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/ est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard reproduced clean. - cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per- profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() + HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up. - Per-profile counter isolation regression test (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time pointer-identity check. Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean (excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build — disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/ service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1 already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED). Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases 8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation / docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
76 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
76 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 7.3 — per-profile counter
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// isolation regression test. Mirrors the SCEP equivalent at
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// internal/api/handler/scep_profile_counter_isolation_test.go.
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//
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// Why this test exists: the future-bug class it guards against is a
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// cmd/server/main.go refactor that constructs a SINGLE shared
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// *estCounterTab and injects it into every per-profile ESTService —
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// that would compile cleanly, pass every existing route-level test,
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// and silently inflate one profile's counters with another's traffic.
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func TestESTService_PerProfileCountersIsolated(t *testing.T) {
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silent := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError + 10}))
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// Two services with separate issuers + counter tabs. NewESTService
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// allocates a fresh estCounterTab per instance (Phase 7.1 contract);
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// this test pins that contract.
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corpSvc := NewESTService("iss-corp", &mockIssuerConnector{}, nil, silent)
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iotSvc := NewESTService("iss-iot", &mockIssuerConnector{Err: errors.New("issuer down")}, nil, silent)
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ctx := context.Background()
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// CORP: drive 3 successful enrollments. Each ticks
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// success_simpleenroll on CORP's tab; IOT's tab MUST stay zero
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// for that label.
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for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device-corp.example.com", []string{"device-corp.example.com"})
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if _, err := corpSvc.SimpleEnroll(ctx, csrPEM); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("corp enroll #%d: %v", i, err)
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}
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}
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// IOT: drive 2 enrollments. Each fails issuance (mock returns err
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// from IssueCertificate); each ticks issuer_error on IOT's tab.
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for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device-iot.example.com", []string{"device-iot.example.com"})
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if _, err := iotSvc.SimpleEnroll(ctx, csrPEM); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("iot enroll #%d: expected issuer error", i)
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}
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}
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// CORP snapshot: success=3, issuer_error=0.
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corpSnap := corpSvc.Stats(time.Now()).Counters
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if got := corpSnap[estCounterSuccessSimpleEnroll]; got != 3 {
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t.Errorf("corp success_simpleenroll = %d, want 3", got)
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}
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if got := corpSnap[estCounterIssuerError]; got != 0 {
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t.Errorf("corp issuer_error = %d, want 0 (no IOT bleed)", got)
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}
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// IOT snapshot: success=0, issuer_error=2.
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iotSnap := iotSvc.Stats(time.Now()).Counters
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if got := iotSnap[estCounterSuccessSimpleEnroll]; got != 0 {
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t.Errorf("iot success_simpleenroll = %d, want 0 (no CORP bleed)", got)
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}
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if got := iotSnap[estCounterIssuerError]; got != 2 {
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t.Errorf("iot issuer_error = %d, want 2", got)
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}
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// Sanity: the two services' counter tabs MUST be distinct *estCounterTab
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// pointers. If a future refactor introduces a shared tab, this assertion
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// catches it before the snapshot bleed becomes silent.
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if corpSvc.counters == iotSvc.counters {
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t.Fatal("corp + iot share the same *estCounterTab — per-profile isolation broken")
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}
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}
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