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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
114 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
114 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
// Package auth holds the RBAC service layer: PermissionService,
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// RoleService, ActorRoleService, and the Authorizer primitive that
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// Phase 3 middleware (auth.RequirePermission) calls on every gated
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// request.
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//
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// All mutating operations record an audit event via the existing
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// AuditService.RecordEvent path. Bundle 1 Phase 8 introduces an
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// `event_category` parameter and back-fills the existing callers; until
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// then auth-related events go in with the default category.
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//
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// Privilege-escalation guard: every mutation that affects role
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// assignment requires the caller to hold `auth.role.assign` (or the
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// equivalent role-level permission) on the target role. The system
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// pathway (bootstrap, migrations, scheduler) bypasses this check via
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// AsSystemCaller(), which records `actor=system, actorType=System` in
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// the audit row so the bypass is observable.
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package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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)
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// Sentinel errors for the service layer. Handler / middleware code
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// branches via errors.Is and maps to HTTP status codes.
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var (
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// ErrForbidden is returned when the caller lacks the required
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// permission for the operation. Maps to HTTP 403.
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ErrForbidden = errors.New("auth: caller lacks required permission")
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// ErrUnauthenticated is returned when the request has no actor in
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// context (no Bearer, no session). Phase 3 RequirePermission emits
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// this; handler code typically returns 401.
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ErrUnauthenticated = errors.New("auth: no actor in context")
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// ErrInvalidPermission is returned when a Create / AddPermission
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// references a permission name not in the canonical catalogue.
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// Maps to HTTP 400.
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ErrInvalidPermission = errors.New("auth: permission not in canonical catalogue")
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// ErrSelfRoleAssignment guards privilege escalation: a caller
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// without `auth.role.assign` on a role cannot grant that role
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// (including to themselves). Maps to HTTP 403.
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ErrSelfRoleAssignment = errors.New("auth: caller lacks auth.role.assign on target role")
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)
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// AuditService is the audit-recording dependency the service layer
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// expects. Mirrors the existing service.AuditService interface so
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// Bundle 1 doesn't introduce a parallel concept. Bundle 1 Phase 8
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// adds RecordEventWithCategory; the auth service uses the
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// categorized variant exclusively (event_category=auth) so the
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// auditor role can filter to authentication / authorization events.
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type AuditService interface {
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RecordEvent(
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ctx context.Context,
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actor string,
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actorType domain.ActorType,
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action, resourceType, resourceID string,
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details map[string]interface{},
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) error
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RecordEventWithCategory(
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ctx context.Context,
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actor string,
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actorType domain.ActorType,
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action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string,
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details map[string]interface{},
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) error
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}
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// Caller describes the actor performing a service operation. Bundle 1
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// Phase 3 populates this from the auth-middleware context (ActorIDKey,
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// ActorTypeKey). Bootstrap, migrations, and scheduler-initiated work
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// pass AsSystemCaller() to bypass the permission check while still
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// recording an audit row.
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type Caller struct {
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ActorID string
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ActorType domain.ActorType
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TenantID string
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// IsSystem skips the privilege-escalation guard. Reserved for
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// bootstrap / migration / scheduler paths.
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IsSystem bool
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}
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// AsSystemCaller returns a Caller that bypasses RBAC checks. Used by
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// the migration backfill, bootstrap path, scheduler-initiated grants,
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// and tests that need to seed state without simulating an admin.
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func AsSystemCaller() *Caller {
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return &Caller{
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ActorID: "system",
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ActorType: domain.ActorTypeSystem,
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TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
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IsSystem: true,
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}
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}
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// CallerFromContext is a helper that builds a Caller from auth context
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// values. Phase 3 middleware populates the keys; tests can use the
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// internal/auth.WithActor / WithAdmin helpers to build contexts.
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//
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// Returns nil + ErrUnauthenticated when no actor is present.
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func CallerFromContext(ctx context.Context) (*Caller, error) {
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// Avoid coupling internal/service/auth to internal/auth at the
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// type level: read the keys via package-public helpers exposed by
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// internal/auth (ActorID, ActorType, TenantID). Phase 3 wires
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// these up. For Phase 2, rely on the explicit Caller arg passed
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// by handler / test code instead — direct context-key reads can
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// land in Phase 3 alongside the middleware.
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return nil, ErrUnauthenticated
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}
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