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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
229 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
229 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// AuditService provides business logic for recording and retrieving audit events.
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type AuditService struct {
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auditRepo repository.AuditRepository
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}
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// NewAuditService creates a new audit service.
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func NewAuditService(auditRepo repository.AuditRepository) *AuditService {
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return &AuditService{
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auditRepo: auditRepo,
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}
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}
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// RecordEvent records an audit event with actor, action, and resource information.
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//
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// Bundle-6 / Audit H-008 + M-022 / CWE-532: every details map flows through
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// RedactDetailsForAudit BEFORE marshaling. The redactor scrubs credential
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// keys (api_key, password, token, *_pem, eab_secret, ...) and PII keys
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// (email, phone, ssn, name, address, ip_address, ...) and surfaces a
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// `redacted_keys` array so operators can audit the redactor itself during
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// a compliance review. See internal/service/audit_redact.go.
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func (s *AuditService) RecordEvent(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action string, resourceType string, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
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return s.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, actorType, action, "", resourceType, resourceID, details)
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}
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// RecordEventWithCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant
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// of RecordEvent. eventCategory is one of
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// domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth,
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// domain.EventCategoryConfig — empty defaults to cert_lifecycle in
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// the persistence layer + DB CHECK constraint.
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//
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// Existing 90+ call sites that don't yet pass a category route
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// through the legacy RecordEvent and inherit the cert_lifecycle
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// default; new callers (auth handlers, bootstrap, config-mutation
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// handlers) call this method directly with their explicit category.
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// Both paths share the same redaction + marshaling contract.
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func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithCategory(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
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redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
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detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
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if err != nil {
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detailsJSON = []byte("{}")
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}
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event := &domain.AuditEvent{
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ID: generateID("audit"),
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Timestamp: time.Now(),
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Actor: actor,
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ActorType: actorType,
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Action: action,
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ResourceType: resourceType,
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ResourceID: resourceID,
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Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
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EventCategory: eventCategory,
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}
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if err := s.auditRepo.Create(ctx, event); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RecordEventWithTx records an audit event using the supplied repository.Querier.
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//
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// Pass *sql.Tx (typically obtained from postgres.WithinTx) to participate in
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// a caller's transaction so the audit row is atomic with the operation that
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// triggered it. Closes the #3 acquisition-readiness blocker from the
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// 2026-05-01 issuer coverage audit (audit row not transactional with the
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// operation it audits).
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//
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// Same redaction + marshalling contract as RecordEvent; only the database
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// handle changes.
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func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action string, resourceType string, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
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redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
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detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
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if err != nil {
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detailsJSON = []byte("{}")
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}
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event := &domain.AuditEvent{
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ID: generateID("audit"),
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Timestamp: time.Now(),
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Actor: actor,
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ActorType: actorType,
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Action: action,
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ResourceType: resourceType,
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ResourceID: resourceID,
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Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
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}
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if err := s.auditRepo.CreateWithTx(ctx, q, event); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// List returns audit events matching filter criteria.
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func (s *AuditService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilter) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
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}
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return events, nil
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}
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// ListByResource returns all audit events for a specific resource.
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func (s *AuditService) ListByResource(ctx context.Context, resourceType string, resourceID string) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
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ResourceType: resourceType,
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ResourceID: resourceID,
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PerPage: 1000, // reasonable default for single resource
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}
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
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}
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return events, nil
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}
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// ListByActor returns all audit events for a specific actor.
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func (s *AuditService) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actor string) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
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Actor: actor,
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PerPage: 1000,
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}
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
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}
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return events, nil
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}
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// ListByAction returns all audit events for a specific action type.
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func (s *AuditService) ListByAction(ctx context.Context, action string, from, to time.Time) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
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From: from,
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To: to,
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PerPage: 1000,
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}
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
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}
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// Filter by action on client side (repository may not filter by action directly)
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var filtered []*domain.AuditEvent
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for _, e := range events {
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if e.Action == action {
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filtered = append(filtered, e)
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}
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}
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return filtered, nil
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}
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// ListAuditEvents returns paginated audit events (handler interface method).
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func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
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return s.ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx, "", page, perPage)
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}
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// ListAuditEventsByCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant.
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// Empty eventCategory disables the filter.
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func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
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if page < 1 {
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page = 1
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}
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if perPage < 1 {
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perPage = 50
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}
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filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
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EventCategory: eventCategory,
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Page: page,
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PerPage: perPage,
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}
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
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}
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// Convert pointers to values for the handler interface
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var result []domain.AuditEvent
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for _, e := range events {
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if e != nil {
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result = append(result, *e)
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}
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}
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// TODO: Get total count from repository
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total := int64(len(result))
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return result, total, nil
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}
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// GetAuditEvent returns a single audit event (handler interface method).
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func (s *AuditService) GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
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filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
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ResourceID: id,
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PerPage: 1,
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}
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events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get audit event: %w", err)
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}
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if len(events) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit event not found")
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}
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return events[0], nil
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}
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