mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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9c1d446e40
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.
We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.
The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.
Files changed:
Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
authenticating-gateway pattern.
Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
(two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
guard against future re-introduction),
TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
cover the api-key happy path.
Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.
Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
walkthrough.
Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.
Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
(map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
(Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.
Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.
Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'
config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.
Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
§2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
1212 lines
42 KiB
Go
1212 lines
42 KiB
Go
package config
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import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/pem"
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"log/slog"
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"math/big"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// clearCertctlEnv unsets all CERTCTL_* environment variables to ensure test isolation.
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func clearCertctlEnv(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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for _, env := range os.Environ() {
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for i := 0; i < len(env); i++ {
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if env[i] == '=' {
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key := env[:i]
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if len(key) > 7 && key[:8] == "CERTCTL_" {
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t.Setenv(key, "")
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os.Unsetenv(key)
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}
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// setMinimalValidEnv sets the minimum env vars needed for Load() to succeed (Validate passes).
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//
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// HTTPS-everywhere milestone (§2.1 + §3 locked decisions): the control plane
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// is TLS-only and Validate() refuses to pass without a readable cert/key pair
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// on disk. setMinimalValidEnv therefore materializes a throwaway ECDSA P-256
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// self-signed pair in t.TempDir() and points the two TLS env vars at it so
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// every Load-based test inherits a valid HTTPS posture without each caller
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// having to spell out cert generation. The temp dir is cleaned up by
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// testing.T at end-of-test.
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func setMinimalValidEnv(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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// api-key auth requires a secret
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret-key")
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// HTTPS-only control plane requires a real cert/key pair on disk.
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certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
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}
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// generateTestTLSPair writes an ECDSA P-256 self-signed certificate + private
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// key pair to files inside t.TempDir() and returns the paths. Same shape used
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// by cmd/server/tls_test.go — this duplicates the generator rather than
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// importing it so the config package tests stay independent of cmd/server.
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func generateTestTLSPair(t *testing.T) (certPath, keyPath string) {
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t.Helper()
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key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
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}
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tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
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SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "certctl-config-test"},
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NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
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NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
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KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
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ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("x509.CreateCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath = filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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keyPath = filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
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certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
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if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write cert: %v", err)
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}
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keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("x509.MarshalECPrivateKey: %v", err)
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}
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keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
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if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write key: %v", err)
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}
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return certPath, keyPath
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}
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// validServerConfig returns a ServerConfig with Port=8080 plus a freshly
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// minted TLS cert/key pair on disk, so Validate() passes the HTTPS-only
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// preflight (cert empty → stat → tls.LoadX509KeyPair round-trip). Every
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// struct-based Validate test uses this so they fail for the reason they
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// claim to test, not for a missing TLS pair.
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func validServerConfig(t *testing.T) ServerConfig {
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t.Helper()
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certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
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return ServerConfig{
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Port: 8080,
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TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: keyPath},
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}
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}
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func TestLoad_DefaultValues(t *testing.T) {
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clearCertctlEnv(t)
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setMinimalValidEnv(t)
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cfg, err := Load()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
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}
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// Server defaults
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if cfg.Server.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("Server.Host = %q, want %q", cfg.Server.Host, "127.0.0.1")
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}
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if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
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t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want %d", cfg.Server.Port, 8080)
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}
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if cfg.Server.MaxBodySize != 1024*1024 {
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t.Errorf("Server.MaxBodySize = %d, want %d", cfg.Server.MaxBodySize, 1024*1024)
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}
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// Auth defaults
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if cfg.Auth.Type != "api-key" {
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t.Errorf("Auth.Type = %q, want %q", cfg.Auth.Type, "api-key")
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}
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// Keygen defaults
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if cfg.Keygen.Mode != "agent" {
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t.Errorf("Keygen.Mode = %q, want %q", cfg.Keygen.Mode, "agent")
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}
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// RateLimit defaults
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if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != true {
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t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
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}
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if cfg.RateLimit.RPS != 50 {
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t.Errorf("RateLimit.RPS = %f, want 50", cfg.RateLimit.RPS)
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}
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if cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize != 100 {
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t.Errorf("RateLimit.BurstSize = %d, want 100", cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize)
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}
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// Log defaults
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if cfg.Log.Level != "info" {
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t.Errorf("Log.Level = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Level, "info")
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}
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if cfg.Log.Format != "json" {
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t.Errorf("Log.Format = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Format, "json")
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}
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// Scheduler defaults
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if cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval != 1*time.Hour {
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t.Errorf("Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval = %v, want 1h", cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval)
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}
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if cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval != 30*time.Second {
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t.Errorf("Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval = %v, want 30s", cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval)
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}
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// ACME defaults
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if cfg.ACME.ChallengeType != "http-01" {
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t.Errorf("ACME.ChallengeType = %q, want %q", cfg.ACME.ChallengeType, "http-01")
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}
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// Vault defaults
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if cfg.Vault.Mount != "pki" {
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t.Errorf("Vault.Mount = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Mount, "pki")
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}
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if cfg.Vault.TTL != "8760h" {
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t.Errorf("Vault.TTL = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.TTL, "8760h")
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}
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// EST defaults
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if cfg.EST.Enabled != false {
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t.Errorf("EST.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.EST.Enabled)
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}
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if cfg.EST.IssuerID != "iss-local" {
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t.Errorf("EST.IssuerID = %q, want %q", cfg.EST.IssuerID, "iss-local")
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}
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// Verification defaults
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if cfg.Verification.Enabled != true {
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t.Errorf("Verification.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.Verification.Enabled)
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}
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// Digest defaults
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if cfg.Digest.Enabled != false {
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t.Errorf("Digest.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.Digest.Enabled)
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}
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if cfg.Digest.Interval != 24*time.Hour {
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t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 24h", cfg.Digest.Interval)
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}
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// Database defaults
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if cfg.Database.URL != "postgres://localhost/certctl" {
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t.Errorf("Database.URL = %q, want default", cfg.Database.URL)
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}
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if cfg.Database.MaxConnections != 25 {
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t.Errorf("Database.MaxConnections = %d, want 25", cfg.Database.MaxConnections)
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}
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}
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func TestLoad_AllEnvVarsSet(t *testing.T) {
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clearCertctlEnv(t)
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// HTTPS-only control plane: Load() → Validate() refuses an empty cert path.
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// Materialize a throwaway ECDSA P-256 pair and point the two TLS env vars
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// at it before setting every other CERTCTL_* var this test cares about.
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certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", "0.0.0.0")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "9090")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE", "2097152")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "my-secret")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", "false")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS", "100")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", "200")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://a.com,https://b.com")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE", "server")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL", "debug")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_LOG_FORMAT", "text")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL", "postgres://user:pass@db:5432/certctl")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS", "50")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_RENEWAL_CHECK_INTERVAL", "2h")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_JOB_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL", "1m")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_AGENT_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL", "5m")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_NOTIFICATION_PROCESS_INTERVAL", "2m")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_ADDR", "https://vault:8200")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_TOKEN", "hvs.test")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_MOUNT", "pki-int")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_ROLE", "web")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_TTL", "720h")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_ACME_CHALLENGE_TYPE", "dns-01")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_ENABLED", "true")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "true")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-acme")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_ENABLED", "true")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_INTERVAL", "12h")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_RECIPIENTS", "alice@co.com,bob@co.com")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_HOST", "smtp.example.com")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_PORT", "465")
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t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS", "noreply@co.com")
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cfg, err := Load()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
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}
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|
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if cfg.Server.Host != "0.0.0.0" {
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t.Errorf("Server.Host = %q, want %q", cfg.Server.Host, "0.0.0.0")
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}
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|
if cfg.Server.Port != 9090 {
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|
t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want 9090", cfg.Server.Port)
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|
}
|
|
if cfg.Server.MaxBodySize != 2097152 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Server.MaxBodySize = %d, want 2097152", cfg.Server.MaxBodySize)
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|
}
|
|
if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != false {
|
|
t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.RateLimit.RPS != 100 {
|
|
t.Errorf("RateLimit.RPS = %f, want 100", cfg.RateLimit.RPS)
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}
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if cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize != 200 {
|
|
t.Errorf("RateLimit.BurstSize = %d, want 200", cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize)
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|
}
|
|
if len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins has %d items, want 2", len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins))
|
|
} else {
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if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[0] != "https://a.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[0] = %q, want %q", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[0], "https://a.com")
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|
}
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if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] != "https://b.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] = %q, want %q", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1], "https://b.com")
|
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}
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Keygen.Mode != "server" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Keygen.Mode = %q, want %q", cfg.Keygen.Mode, "server")
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}
|
|
if cfg.Log.Level != "debug" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Log.Level = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Level, "debug")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Log.Format != "text" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Log.Format = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Format, "text")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Database.MaxConnections != 50 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Database.MaxConnections = %d, want 50", cfg.Database.MaxConnections)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval != 2*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval = %v, want 2h", cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval != 1*time.Minute {
|
|
t.Errorf("Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval = %v, want 1m", cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Vault.Addr != "https://vault:8200" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Vault.Addr = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Addr, "https://vault:8200")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Vault.Mount != "pki-int" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Vault.Mount = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Mount, "pki-int")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.ACME.ChallengeType != "dns-01" {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACME.ChallengeType = %q, want %q", cfg.ACME.ChallengeType, "dns-01")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.ACME.ARIEnabled != true {
|
|
t.Errorf("ACME.ARIEnabled = %v, want true", cfg.ACME.ARIEnabled)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.EST.Enabled != true {
|
|
t.Errorf("EST.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.EST.Enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.EST.IssuerID != "iss-acme" {
|
|
t.Errorf("EST.IssuerID = %q, want %q", cfg.EST.IssuerID, "iss-acme")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Digest.Enabled != true {
|
|
t.Errorf("Digest.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.Digest.Enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Digest.Interval != 12*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 12h", cfg.Digest.Interval)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(cfg.Digest.Recipients) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Digest.Recipients has %d items, want 2", len(cfg.Digest.Recipients))
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Notifiers.SMTPHost != "smtp.example.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("Notifiers.SMTPHost = %q, want %q", cfg.Notifiers.SMTPHost, "smtp.example.com")
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Notifiers.SMTPPort != 465 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Notifiers.SMTPPort = %d, want 465", cfg.Notifiers.SMTPPort)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoad_InvalidIntEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "notanint")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Falls back to default
|
|
if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want 8080 (default fallback)", cfg.Server.Port)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoad_InvalidDurationEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_INTERVAL", "notaduration")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Digest.Interval != 24*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 24h (default fallback)", cfg.Digest.Interval)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoad_InvalidBoolEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", "notabool")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// getEnvBool only matches "true", "1", "yes" — anything else is false
|
|
if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != false {
|
|
t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want false for invalid bool", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoad_CommaSeparatedList(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://a.com, https://b.com , https://c.com")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins) != 3 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("CORS.AllowedOrigins has %d items, want 3", len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins))
|
|
}
|
|
// trimSpace should handle spaces around items
|
|
if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] != "https://b.com" {
|
|
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] = %q, want %q (trimmed)", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1], "https://b.com")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_ValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
|
|
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
|
|
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for valid config: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_AuthTypeNone(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "none", Secret: ""},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
|
|
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
|
|
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for auth type 'none': %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_InvalidAuthType(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "oauth", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for unsupported auth type 'oauth'")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_MissingSecret(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: ""},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error when api-key auth has empty secret")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated locks down the G-1 fix: pre-G-1
|
|
// `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` was accepted by the validator (the bare error
|
|
// path was the empty-secret one previously). Post-G-1 the literal "jwt"
|
|
// value is rejected with a dedicated diagnostic regardless of whether
|
|
// Secret is set, because there is no JWT middleware in the binary —
|
|
// operators who need JWT/OIDC must front certctl with an authenticating
|
|
// gateway.
|
|
//
|
|
// Two table rows pin the contract: missing-secret cannot paper over the
|
|
// rejection (the dedicated error fires first, before the secret check),
|
|
// and a populated secret also cannot paper over it. Both paths must
|
|
// hit the dedicated G-1 diagnostic, not the generic "invalid auth
|
|
// type" or "auth secret is required".
|
|
func TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
secret string
|
|
}{
|
|
{"jwt rejected (no secret)", ""},
|
|
{"jwt rejected (with secret — operator can't paper over)", "anything"},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "jwt", Secret: tc.secret},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected dedicated G-1 rejection")
|
|
}
|
|
const wantSubstr = "CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no longer accepted"
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), wantSubstr) {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v\nwant substring %q (the dedicated G-1 diagnostic)", err, wantSubstr)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT is a property-level guard against
|
|
// a future PR silently re-introducing "jwt" into the allowed set. If
|
|
// someone adds JWT back to ValidAuthTypes(), this test fails immediately
|
|
// with a pointer at the audit finding. The matching CI grep guardrail
|
|
// in .github/workflows/ci.yml provides a secondary check at build time.
|
|
func TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
for _, at := range ValidAuthTypes() {
|
|
if at == "jwt" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("jwt is in ValidAuthTypes — silent auth downgrade regressed (G-1)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None pins the current allowed set.
|
|
// If a future change adds a new auth type, this test must be updated
|
|
// alongside the validator and the helm-chart `validateAuthType` helper —
|
|
// keeping all three surfaces in sync.
|
|
func TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
got := ValidAuthTypes()
|
|
if len(got) != 2 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidAuthTypes() returned %d entries, want 2: %v", len(got), got)
|
|
}
|
|
want := map[AuthType]bool{AuthTypeAPIKey: true, AuthTypeNone: true}
|
|
for _, at := range got {
|
|
if !want[at] {
|
|
t.Errorf("unexpected auth type in ValidAuthTypes: %q", at)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType ensures that values outside the
|
|
// allowed set (other than the special-cased "jwt") still surface the
|
|
// generic "invalid auth type" error. Pins that the dedicated G-1
|
|
// rejection didn't accidentally swallow non-jwt typos.
|
|
func TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
for _, badType := range []string{"", "garbage", "oidc", "mtls", "API-KEY"} {
|
|
t.Run("type="+badType, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: badType, Secret: "x"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Validate(type=%q) returned nil; expected invalid-auth-type rejection", badType)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid auth type") {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate(type=%q) = %v; want \"invalid auth type\" error", badType, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "G-1 silent auth") {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate(type=%q) = %v; should not hit the dedicated G-1 path for non-jwt values", badType, err)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// G-1 (P1): no need to add `TestValidate_NoneAuth_AcceptsEmptySecret` or
|
|
// `TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_RequiresSecret` here — the pre-existing tests
|
|
// `TestValidate_AuthTypeNone` (above) and `TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_MissingSecret`
|
|
// (above) already cover those paths. Documented for the next reader: the
|
|
// G-1 fix flipped jwt off but did not disturb either the
|
|
// none-bypasses-secret or the api-key-requires-secret behavior.
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_InvalidKeygenMode(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "hybrid"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for unsupported keygen mode 'hybrid'")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_InvalidPort(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
port int
|
|
}{
|
|
{"zero", 0},
|
|
{"negative", -1},
|
|
{"too high", 65536},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{Port: tt.port},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() should return error for port %d", tt.port)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_TLSCertPathEmpty pins the first of the HTTPS-only fail-loud
|
|
// gates in Validate(): an empty CertPath must produce the operator-facing
|
|
// "server TLS cert path is required" error. Per §2.1 + §3 locked decisions,
|
|
// there is no plaintext HTTP fallback — missing TLS config is a hard startup
|
|
// refusal, not a warning.
|
|
func TestValidate_TLSCertPathEmpty(t *testing.T) {
|
|
_, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{
|
|
Port: 8080,
|
|
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: "", KeyPath: keyPath},
|
|
},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for empty TLS cert path")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert path is required") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert path is required")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_TLSKeyPathEmpty pins the second HTTPS-only gate: empty KeyPath
|
|
// must produce the "server TLS key path is required" error. Runs with a valid
|
|
// CertPath so the cert-empty gate (which fires first) is cleanly bypassed —
|
|
// proves the key-empty gate is actually reached.
|
|
func TestValidate_TLSKeyPathEmpty(t *testing.T) {
|
|
certPath, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{
|
|
Port: 8080,
|
|
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: ""},
|
|
},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for empty TLS key path")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS key path is required") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS key path is required")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_TLSCertFileMissing pins the os.Stat gate on the cert path. A
|
|
// non-existent path must surface "server TLS cert file unreadable" so the
|
|
// operator sees the bad path in the error (file=%q) instead of a deferred
|
|
// ListenAndServeTLS panic after the scheduler has already fanned out.
|
|
func TestValidate_TLSCertFileMissing(t *testing.T) {
|
|
_, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
missingCert := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist.pem")
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{
|
|
Port: 8080,
|
|
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: missingCert, KeyPath: keyPath},
|
|
},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for missing TLS cert file")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert file unreadable") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert file unreadable")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_TLSKeyFileMissing pins the os.Stat gate on the key path. Uses a
|
|
// valid CertPath so the cert-missing gate does not pre-empt; proves the key
|
|
// gate is reached and reports the bad key path.
|
|
func TestValidate_TLSKeyFileMissing(t *testing.T) {
|
|
certPath, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
missingKey := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist.key")
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{
|
|
Port: 8080,
|
|
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: missingKey},
|
|
},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for missing TLS key file")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS key file unreadable") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS key file unreadable")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestValidate_TLSMismatchedPair pins the tls.LoadX509KeyPair gate — the
|
|
// classic "you shipped the wrong private key" footgun. Generates two
|
|
// independent ECDSA pairs and crosses them (pair1 cert + pair2 key). Both
|
|
// files exist and parse as PEM, so os.Stat passes; only the cryptographic
|
|
// round-trip inside LoadX509KeyPair catches the mismatch.
|
|
func TestValidate_TLSMismatchedPair(t *testing.T) {
|
|
certPath1, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
_, keyPath2 := generateTestTLSPair(t)
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: ServerConfig{
|
|
Port: 8080,
|
|
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath1, KeyPath: keyPath2},
|
|
},
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for mismatched TLS cert/key pair")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert/key pair invalid") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert/key pair invalid")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_EmptyDatabaseURL(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for empty database URL")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_InvalidLogLevel(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "verbose", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for invalid log level 'verbose'")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_InvalidLogFormat(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "yaml"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for invalid log format 'yaml'")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_SchedulerIntervalTooSmall(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
cfg SchedulerConfig
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
"renewal interval below 1 minute",
|
|
SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"job processor below 1 second",
|
|
SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"agent health below 1 second",
|
|
SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"notification below 1 second",
|
|
SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: tt.cfg,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() should return error for %s", tt.name)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidate_DatabaseMaxConnectionsZero(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 0},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("Validate() should return error for max_connections=0")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGetLogLevel_AllLevels(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
level string
|
|
expected slog.Level
|
|
}{
|
|
{"debug", slog.LevelDebug},
|
|
{"info", slog.LevelInfo},
|
|
{"warn", slog.LevelWarn},
|
|
{"error", slog.LevelError},
|
|
{"unknown", slog.LevelInfo}, // default fallback
|
|
{"", slog.LevelInfo}, // empty string
|
|
{"DEBUG", slog.LevelInfo}, // case-sensitive, no match → default
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.level, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cfg := &Config{Log: LogConfig{Level: tt.level}}
|
|
got := cfg.GetLogLevel()
|
|
if got != tt.expected {
|
|
t.Errorf("GetLogLevel() for %q = %v, want %v", tt.level, got, tt.expected)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test helper functions
|
|
func TestSplitComma(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
input string
|
|
expected []string
|
|
}{
|
|
{"a,b,c", []string{"a", "b", "c"}},
|
|
{"single", []string{"single"}},
|
|
{"", []string{""}},
|
|
{",", []string{"", ""}},
|
|
{"a,,c", []string{"a", "", "c"}},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
got := splitComma(tt.input)
|
|
if len(got) != len(tt.expected) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("splitComma(%q) returned %d items, want %d", tt.input, len(got), len(tt.expected))
|
|
}
|
|
for i, v := range got {
|
|
if v != tt.expected[i] {
|
|
t.Errorf("splitComma(%q)[%d] = %q, want %q", tt.input, i, v, tt.expected[i])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTrimSpace(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
input string
|
|
expected string
|
|
}{
|
|
{" hello ", "hello"},
|
|
{"hello", "hello"},
|
|
{"\thello\t", "hello"},
|
|
{" ", ""},
|
|
{"", ""},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
got := trimSpace(tt.input)
|
|
if got != tt.expected {
|
|
t.Errorf("trimSpace(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.expected)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGetEnvFloat(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TEST_FLOAT", "3.14")
|
|
got := getEnvFloat("TEST_FLOAT", 0)
|
|
if got != 3.14 {
|
|
t.Errorf("getEnvFloat = %f, want 3.14", got)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Invalid float falls back to default
|
|
t.Setenv("TEST_FLOAT_BAD", "notafloat")
|
|
got = getEnvFloat("TEST_FLOAT_BAD", 99.9)
|
|
if got != 99.9 {
|
|
t.Errorf("getEnvFloat for invalid = %f, want 99.9", got)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGetEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
value string
|
|
expected bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{"true", true},
|
|
{"1", true},
|
|
{"yes", true},
|
|
{"false", false},
|
|
{"0", false},
|
|
{"no", false},
|
|
{"anything", false},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.value, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TEST_BOOL", tt.value)
|
|
got := getEnvBool("TEST_BOOL", false)
|
|
if got != tt.expected {
|
|
t.Errorf("getEnvBool(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.value, got, tt.expected)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// I-003: Job timeout reaper configuration tests
|
|
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutDefaults(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
// Explicitly unset the three I-003 env vars to exercise the default path.
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL", "")
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT", "")
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT", "")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval != 10*time.Minute {
|
|
t.Errorf("JobTimeoutInterval = %v, want 10m", cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout != 24*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("AwaitingCSRTimeout = %v, want 24h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout != 168*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("AwaitingApprovalTimeout = %v, want 168h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutEnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
|
|
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
|
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL", "15m")
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT", "48h")
|
|
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT", "336h")
|
|
|
|
cfg, err := Load()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval != 15*time.Minute {
|
|
t.Errorf("JobTimeoutInterval = %v, want 15m", cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout != 48*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("AwaitingCSRTimeout = %v, want 48h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout)
|
|
}
|
|
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout != 336*time.Hour {
|
|
t.Errorf("AwaitingApprovalTimeout = %v, want 336h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutValidation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
field string
|
|
value time.Duration
|
|
wantErrMsg string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
"JobTimeoutInterval too small",
|
|
"JobTimeoutInterval",
|
|
500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
"job timeout interval must be at least 1 second",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"AwaitingCSRTimeout too small",
|
|
"AwaitingCSRTimeout",
|
|
500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
"awaiting CSR timeout must be at least 1 second",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"AwaitingApprovalTimeout too small",
|
|
"AwaitingApprovalTimeout",
|
|
500 * time.Millisecond,
|
|
"awaiting approval timeout must be at least 1 second",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Start from a fully valid config so the I-003 timeout checks
|
|
// are the only potential failure point.
|
|
cfg := &Config{
|
|
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
|
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
|
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
|
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
|
|
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
|
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
|
|
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
JobProcessorInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
|
|
RetryInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
|
|
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
|
|
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
|
|
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Override the specific field under test
|
|
switch tt.field {
|
|
case "JobTimeoutInterval":
|
|
cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval = tt.value
|
|
case "AwaitingCSRTimeout":
|
|
cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout = tt.value
|
|
case "AwaitingApprovalTimeout":
|
|
cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout = tt.value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := cfg.Validate()
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Validate() = nil, want error containing %q", tt.wantErrMsg)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrMsg) {
|
|
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want to contain %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErrMsg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|