mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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0e06f6c4fc
Closes findings P3-1 and P3-2 from the 2026-05-05 CLI/API/MCP↔GUI parity
audit (cowork/cli-gui-parity-audit-2026-05-05/RESULTS.md). Both findings
flagged hidden defaults that the CLI was sending without exposing them
to operators: `force=false` baked into every renew payload, and a silent
fallback to `reason="unspecified"` whenever --reason was omitted.
P3-1 — promote --force on `certs renew` (full end-to-end plumbing)
The pre-2026-05-05 CLI sent `{"force": false}` in the renew body. The
API handler never decoded it — a textbook "lying field" per the
operator's CLAUDE.md "complete path, not the easy path" rule: the body
field stored a value, claimed to do something, and silently did nothing
because the wire never reached the consumer. Adding a --force flag that
also went unread would have created another lying field.
This commit takes the complete path:
service.CertificateService.TriggerRenewal grew a `force bool` parameter
(internal/service/certificate.go). When force=true, the
RenewalInProgress block is overridden so operators can recover stuck
in-flight renewals where a previous job hung without releasing the
status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal blockers regardless
of force — those are semantic dead-ends that --force should not paper
over (archived = decommissioned, expired = issue a new cert instead of
renewing a dead one).
handler.CertificateHandler.TriggerRenewal parses force from
?force=true (or ?force=1) query param, OR {"force": true} JSON body,
whichever the client picks. Defaults to false. Passes through to the
service.
internal/cli/client.go::RenewCertificate(id, force bool) sends
?force=true on the URL when --force is set. The historical hardcoded
`{"force": false}` body is gone — no more lying field.
cmd/cli/main.go dispatches `certs renew <id> [--force]` (ID-first
flag-second convention matches the existing `agents retire <id>
[--force]`).
P3-2 — require --reason on `certs revoke` (Option A: strict refusal)
The pre-2026-05-05 CLI dropped to `--reason unspecified` whenever the
operator omitted the flag. Compliance reporting (RFC 5280 §5.3.1, PCI-
DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312) relies on the reason code being meaningful;
silent fallback defeats the audit trail because every revocation looks
identical.
cmd/cli/main.go dispatch refuses to send when --reason is empty,
prints the canonical RFC 5280 §5.3.1 reason-code menu, and exits
non-zero.
internal/cli/client.go exposes ValidRevokeReasons() returning the
canonical camelCase list (unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold,
removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aaCompromise) and
NormalizeRevokeReason() that accepts both camelCase and snake_case
inputs and normalises to the canonical wire form. Off-list reasons
are rejected at dispatch with the menu re-printed.
Test pins:
internal/cli/client_test.go::TestClient_RenewCertificate_ForceFlag —
--force=true sends ?force=true with empty body; --force=false sends
no query and no body.
internal/cli/client_test.go::TestNormalizeRevokeReason +
TestValidRevokeReasons — canonical-camelCase + snake_case + reject-
off-enum behaviour.
cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go::TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RequiresReason +
TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RejectsUnknownReason +
TestHandleCerts_Renew_ForceFlag — dispatch-layer pins for the same
contracts.
internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
ForceQueryParam — query-param passthrough (no-flag, force=true,
force=1, force=false) flows through to the service-layer parameter.
internal/service/certificate_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
ForceOverridesInProgress — force=false preserves the
RenewalInProgress block; force=true clears it.
Existing TestTriggerRenewal_Archived extended to assert force=true
still blocks Archived (terminal-state guarantee).
Docs: docs/reference/cli.md updated with the --force example for renew
and the strict --reason semantics for revoke (including snake_case
input acceptance).
Acceptance gate (verified):
- go build ./cmd/server/... ./cmd/agent/... ./cmd/cli/...
./cmd/mcp-server/... clean.
- go vet ./... clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./... pass repo-wide.
- bash scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh clean
(router 178, OpenAPI 144, exceptions 36 — unchanged; we add
parameter parsing, not routes).
- gofmt -l clean.
899 lines
32 KiB
Go
899 lines
32 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/ratelimit"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
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)
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// CertificateService defines the service interface for certificate operations.
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type CertificateService interface {
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ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, status, environment, ownerID, teamID, issuerID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int64, error)
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ListCertificatesWithFilter(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error)
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GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
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CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
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UpdateCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error)
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ArchiveCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) error
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GetCertificateVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateVersion, int64, error)
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TriggerRenewal(ctx context.Context, certID string, actor string, force bool) error
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TriggerDeployment(ctx context.Context, certID string, targetID string, actor string) error
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RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error
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GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error)
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GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error)
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GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error)
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// GetOCSPResponseWithNonce is the nonce-aware variant added in
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// production hardening II Phase 1. When nonce is non-nil, the
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// responder echoes it in the response per RFC 6960 §4.4.1. A nil
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// nonce produces a response without the nonce extension.
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GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error)
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GetCertificateDeployments(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, error)
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}
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// CertificateHandler handles HTTP requests for certificate operations.
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type CertificateHandler struct {
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svc CertificateService
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ocspLimiter *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter // production hardening II Phase 3 — per-source-IP cap on OCSP
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}
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// NewCertificateHandler creates a new CertificateHandler with a service dependency.
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func NewCertificateHandler(svc CertificateService) CertificateHandler {
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return CertificateHandler{svc: svc}
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}
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// SetOCSPRateLimiter wires the per-source-IP OCSP rate limiter.
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// Production hardening II Phase 3. Default cap (when set in
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// cmd/server/main.go): 1000 req/min/IP. Setting to nil disables the
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// limit; the limiter's own NewSlidingWindowLimiter(maxN<=0, ...)
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// also produces a no-op limiter, so the env-var-zero case is safe.
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func (h *CertificateHandler) SetOCSPRateLimiter(l *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter) {
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h.ocspLimiter = l
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}
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// ListCertificates lists certificates with optional filtering.
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// GET /api/v1/certificates?status=Active&environment=prod&owner_id=...&team_id=...&issuer_id=...&agent_id=...&profile_id=...&expires_before=...&expires_after=...&created_after=...&updated_after=...&sort=notAfter&sort_desc=false&cursor=...&page=1&per_page=50&fields=id,commonName,status
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func (h CertificateHandler) ListCertificates(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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// Parse query parameters
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query := r.URL.Query()
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// Basic filters
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filter := &repository.CertificateFilter{
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Status: query.Get("status"),
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Environment: query.Get("environment"),
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OwnerID: query.Get("owner_id"),
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TeamID: query.Get("team_id"),
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IssuerID: query.Get("issuer_id"),
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AgentID: query.Get("agent_id"),
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ProfileID: query.Get("profile_id"),
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}
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// Time-range filters
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if eb := query.Get("expires_before"); eb != "" {
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if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, eb); err == nil {
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filter.ExpiresBefore = &t
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}
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}
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if ea := query.Get("expires_after"); ea != "" {
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if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ea); err == nil {
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filter.ExpiresAfter = &t
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}
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}
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if ca := query.Get("created_after"); ca != "" {
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if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ca); err == nil {
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filter.CreatedAfter = &t
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}
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}
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if ua := query.Get("updated_after"); ua != "" {
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if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, ua); err == nil {
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filter.UpdatedAfter = &t
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}
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}
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// Sorting
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if sort := query.Get("sort"); sort != "" {
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// Handle sort direction prefix
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if strings.HasPrefix(sort, "-") {
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filter.Sort = sort[1:]
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filter.SortDesc = true
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} else {
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filter.Sort = sort
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filter.SortDesc = query.Get("sort_desc") == "true"
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}
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}
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// Cursor-based pagination
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filter.Cursor = query.Get("cursor")
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// Page-based pagination
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page := 1
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perPage := 50
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if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
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page = parsed
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}
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}
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if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
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perPage = parsed
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}
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}
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if ps := query.Get("page_size"); ps != "" {
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(ps); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
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filter.PageSize = parsed
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}
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}
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filter.Page = page
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filter.PerPage = perPage
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// Sparse fields
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if fieldsStr := query.Get("fields"); fieldsStr != "" {
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filter.Fields = strings.Split(fieldsStr, ",")
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}
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certs, total, err := h.svc.ListCertificatesWithFilter(r.Context(), filter)
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if err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to list certificates", requestID)
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return
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}
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// Apply sparse field filtering if requested
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var responseData interface{} = certs
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if len(filter.Fields) > 0 {
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responseData = filterFields(certs, filter.Fields)
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}
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// Return cursor-based or page-based response depending on which pagination is used
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if filter.Cursor != "" {
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// Compute next cursor from last result
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nextCursor := ""
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if len(certs) > 0 {
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lastCert := certs[len(certs)-1]
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nextCursor = encodeCursor(lastCert.CreatedAt, lastCert.ID)
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}
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pageSize := filter.PageSize
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if pageSize == 0 {
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pageSize = filter.PerPage
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}
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response := CursorPagedResponse{
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Data: responseData,
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Total: int64(total),
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NextCursor: nextCursor,
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PageSize: pageSize,
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
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} else {
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response := PagedResponse{
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Data: responseData,
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Total: int64(total),
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Page: page,
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PerPage: perPage,
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
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}
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}
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// GetCertificate retrieves a single certificate by ID.
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// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}
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func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
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if id == "" {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
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return
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}
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cert, err := h.svc.GetCertificate(r.Context(), id)
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if err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
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return
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, cert)
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}
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// CreateCertificate creates a new certificate.
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// POST /api/v1/certificates
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func (h CertificateHandler) CreateCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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var cert domain.ManagedCertificate
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&cert); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
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return
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}
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// Validate required fields
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if err := ValidateRequired("common_name", cert.CommonName); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateCommonName(cert.CommonName); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateRequired("owner_id", cert.OwnerID); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateRequired("team_id", cert.TeamID); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateRequired("issuer_id", cert.IssuerID); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateRequired("name", cert.Name); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := ValidateRequired("renewal_policy_id", cert.RenewalPolicyID); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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created, err := h.svc.CreateCertificate(r.Context(), cert)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to create certificate", "error", err, "request_id", requestID, "common_name", cert.CommonName, "name", cert.Name)
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to create certificate", requestID)
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return
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusCreated, created)
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}
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// UpdateCertificate updates an existing certificate.
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// PUT /api/v1/certificates/{id}
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func (h CertificateHandler) UpdateCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
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parts := strings.Split(id, "/")
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if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] == "" {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
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return
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}
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id = parts[0]
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var cert domain.ManagedCertificate
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&cert); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
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return
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}
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// Validate required fields (if provided)
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if cert.CommonName != "" {
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if err := ValidateCommonName(cert.CommonName); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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}
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if cert.OwnerID != "" {
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if err := ValidateStringLength("owner_id", cert.OwnerID, 255); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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}
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if cert.TeamID != "" {
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if err := ValidateStringLength("team_id", cert.TeamID, 255); err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
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return
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}
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}
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updated, err := h.svc.UpdateCertificate(r.Context(), id, cert)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
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return
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}
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slog.Error("UpdateCertificate failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update certificate", requestID)
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return
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, updated)
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}
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// ArchiveCertificate archives a certificate (soft delete).
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// DELETE /api/v1/certificates/{id}
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func (h CertificateHandler) ArchiveCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodDelete {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
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if id == "" {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
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return
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}
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if err := h.svc.ArchiveCertificate(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
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return
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}
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to archive certificate", requestID)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// GetCertificateVersions retrieves version history for a certificate.
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// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions
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func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateVersions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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|
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// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions
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path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
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parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
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if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
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return
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}
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certID := parts[0]
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page := 1
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perPage := 50
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query := r.URL.Query()
|
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if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
|
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
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page = parsed
|
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}
|
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}
|
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if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
|
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
|
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perPage = parsed
|
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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versions, total, err := h.svc.GetCertificateVersions(r.Context(), certID, page, perPage)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
|
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
slog.Error("GetCertificateVersions failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err.Error())
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get certificate versions", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response := PagedResponse{
|
|
Data: versions,
|
|
Total: total,
|
|
Page: page,
|
|
PerPage: perPage,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TriggerRenewal triggers manual renewal for a certificate.
|
|
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerRenewal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
|
|
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
|
|
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
certID := parts[0]
|
|
|
|
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// 2026-05-05 parity-defaults-cleanup (P3-1): operators can opt into
|
|
// forcing a renewal when the cert is stuck in RenewalInProgress (a
|
|
// previous job hung without releasing the status flag). Accepted as
|
|
// either ?force=true query param OR {"force": true} JSON body so CLI
|
|
// + GUI clients can pick whichever flow fits their idiom.
|
|
force := false
|
|
if fv := r.URL.Query().Get("force"); fv == "true" || fv == "1" {
|
|
force = true
|
|
}
|
|
if !force && r.ContentLength > 0 && r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
|
|
var body struct {
|
|
Force bool `json:"force,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err == nil {
|
|
force = body.Force
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := h.svc.TriggerRenewal(r.Context(), certID, actor, force); err != nil {
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot renew") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already in progress") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger renewal", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response := map[string]string{
|
|
"status": "renewal_triggered",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, response)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TriggerDeployment triggers deployment of a certificate to targets.
|
|
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerDeployment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
|
|
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
|
|
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
certID := parts[0]
|
|
|
|
// Optional: parse request body for specific target ID
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
TargetID string `json:"target_id,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
if r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
// Log but don't fail - targetID is optional
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
if err := h.svc.TriggerDeployment(r.Context(), certID, req.TargetID, actor); err != nil {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger deployment", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response := map[string]string{
|
|
"status": "deployment_triggered",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, response)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeCertificate revokes a certificate with an optional reason code.
|
|
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) RevokeCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
|
|
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
|
|
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
certID := parts[0]
|
|
|
|
// Parse optional reason from request body
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
Reason string `json:"reason"`
|
|
}
|
|
if r.Body != nil && r.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "application/json" {
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
if err := h.svc.RevokeCertificate(r.Context(), certID, req.Reason, actor); err != nil {
|
|
// Distinguish between client errors and server errors
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already revoked") ||
|
|
strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot revoke") ||
|
|
strings.Contains(errMsg, "invalid revocation reason") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to fetch") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to get") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to revoke certificate", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "revoked"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetDERCRL returns a DER-encoded X.509 CRL signed by the specified issuer.
|
|
// GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
|
|
//
|
|
// RFC 5280 § 5. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace so
|
|
// relying parties (browsers, OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars) can fetch the CRL
|
|
// without presenting certctl API credentials.
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
|
|
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/crl/")
|
|
if issuerID == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
derBytes, err := h.svc.GenerateDERCRL(r.Context(), issuerID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate CRL", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Production hardening II Phase 4: HTTP caching headers per RFC 7232.
|
|
// CDNs and reverse proxies in front of certctl can serve repeated
|
|
// CRL fetches from their edge caches (saves both bandwidth + the
|
|
// per-request DB read on certctl's side).
|
|
//
|
|
// ETag is the SHA-256 of the DER body, weak-form (W/) per RFC 7232
|
|
// §2.3 because the body bytes are the canonical identity but two
|
|
// different generation runs of the same revocation set could produce
|
|
// byte-identical CRLs (deterministic builder) — weak ETag covers
|
|
// the future case where signature randomness leaks into the bytes.
|
|
etagBytes := sha256.Sum256(derBytes)
|
|
etag := fmt.Sprintf("W/\"%x\"", etagBytes[:16]) // first 16 bytes of SHA-256 — sufficient ID space
|
|
w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
|
|
|
|
// If-None-Match short-circuits to 304 Not Modified. RFC 7232 §3.2.
|
|
// We compare the raw header against our ETag literal; a missing
|
|
// header simply produces no match and falls through.
|
|
if match := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); match != "" && match == etag {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Cache-Control max-age derived from the CRL's nextUpdate window.
|
|
// We don't have the parsed CRL handy here (the service returns raw
|
|
// DER), so derive a conservative TTL from the current scheduler
|
|
// regen interval — relying parties that respect max-age won't
|
|
// re-fetch within that window. Floor at 60s so we never advertise
|
|
// max-age=0 even on degenerate test cases.
|
|
const crlCacheControlSeconds = 3600 // 1h matches default CRL regen cadence
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-crl")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%d, must-revalidate", crlCacheControlSeconds))
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write(derBytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ocspSourceIP extracts the source IP from the request for the
|
|
// per-IP rate limiter. Production hardening II Phase 3.
|
|
//
|
|
// Strategy: net.SplitHostPort on RemoteAddr; on parse failure fall
|
|
// back to the bare RemoteAddr string. We deliberately do NOT honor
|
|
// X-Forwarded-For here because OCSP is publicly reachable and
|
|
// untrusted intermediaries could spoof the header to bypass the
|
|
// limit. Operators behind a trusted reverse proxy should configure
|
|
// the proxy to pass through the original IP via the standard
|
|
// transport (rewriting RemoteAddr at the proxy boundary).
|
|
func ocspSourceIP(r *http.Request) string {
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return r.RemoteAddr
|
|
}
|
|
return host
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyOCSPRateLimit enforces the per-source-IP cap. Returns true when
|
|
// the request was rejected (handler should stop). Returns false to
|
|
// continue processing. Production hardening II Phase 3.
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) applyOCSPRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
|
|
if h.ocspLimiter == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
ip := ocspSourceIP(r)
|
|
if err := h.ocspLimiter.Allow(ip, time.Now()); err != nil {
|
|
// Rate-limited: respond with the canonical OCSP "tryLater"
|
|
// status (status 3 per RFC 6960 §2.3) plus an HTTP-level
|
|
// Retry-After hint. ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse is
|
|
// status 6 (unauthorized); we use that here too because
|
|
// x/crypto/ocsp doesn't ship a TryLater pre-built blob and
|
|
// rolling our own DER for one rejection path adds a
|
|
// fragility surface for no relying-party benefit
|
|
// (everything that retries an OCSP failure retries on any
|
|
// non-good status, not specifically TryLater).
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
_, _ = w.Write(ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleOCSP processes OCSP requests.
|
|
// GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
|
|
//
|
|
// RFC 6960. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace. For
|
|
// simplicity we accept GET with path params rather than the binary POST body
|
|
// form — the response is a valid DER-encoded OCSP response either way.
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
|
|
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Production hardening II Phase 3: per-source-IP rate limit.
|
|
// When the cap is tripped, applyOCSPRateLimit writes the
|
|
// rate-limited OCSP response and returns true — handler stops.
|
|
if h.applyOCSPRateLimit(w, r) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract issuer_id and serial from path: /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/")
|
|
parts := strings.SplitN(path, "/", 2)
|
|
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" || parts[1] == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID and serial number are required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
issuerID := parts[0]
|
|
serialHex := parts[1]
|
|
|
|
derBytes, err := h.svc.GetOCSPResponse(r.Context(), issuerID, serialHex)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate OCSP response", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=3600")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write(derBytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleOCSPPost processes RFC 6960 §A.1.1 POST OCSP requests.
|
|
// POST /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}
|
|
//
|
|
// The body MUST be the binary DER-encoded OCSPRequest with content-type
|
|
// "application/ocsp-request". The response is the same DER-encoded
|
|
// OCSPResponse with content-type "application/ocsp-response" returned
|
|
// by the existing GET handler — only the input shape differs.
|
|
//
|
|
// POST is the standard transport for production OCSP clients (Firefox,
|
|
// OpenSSL `s_client -status`, cert-manager, Microsoft Intune device
|
|
// validators). The pre-existing GET form is kept for ad-hoc curl
|
|
// inspection + human-readable URL paths.
|
|
//
|
|
// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4.
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSPPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
|
|
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Production hardening II Phase 3: per-source-IP rate limit.
|
|
if h.applyOCSPRateLimit(w, r) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Be tolerant about Content-Type: RFC 6960 §A.1.1 says it MUST be
|
|
// "application/ocsp-request" but real-world clients sometimes omit
|
|
// the header or send it with a charset suffix. We require the
|
|
// substring "ocsp-request" rather than exact match — the actual
|
|
// validation happens in ocsp.ParseRequest below; a malformed body
|
|
// fails there with a 400.
|
|
ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type")
|
|
if ct != "" && !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(ct), "ocsp-request") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Content-Type must be application/ocsp-request, got %q", ct), requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Issuer ID from the path. The router pattern strips the leading
|
|
// /.well-known/pki/ocsp/ prefix; what remains is the bare issuer ID.
|
|
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/")
|
|
issuerID = strings.TrimSuffix(issuerID, "/")
|
|
if issuerID == "" || strings.Contains(issuerID, "/") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Body is already MaxBytesReader-capped by the body-size middleware.
|
|
// OCSPRequest bodies are tiny (~200 bytes for a single-cert query),
|
|
// so the default cap is comfortably above what any legitimate client
|
|
// will send.
|
|
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to read request body", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ocspReq, err := ocsp.ParseRequest(body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("Invalid OCSPRequest: %v", err), requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Production hardening II Phase 1: extract the optional RFC 6960
|
|
// §4.4.1 nonce extension from the request. golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp
|
|
// doesn't expose the request's extensions, so we walk the raw DER
|
|
// ourselves via service.ParseOCSPRequestNonce.
|
|
//
|
|
// Failure modes:
|
|
// - no nonce (most relying parties): nonce=nil, present=false,
|
|
// err=nil -> proceed without echoing.
|
|
// - well-formed nonce <= 32 bytes: nonce=bytes, present=true,
|
|
// err=nil -> plumb through GetOCSPResponseWithNonce.
|
|
// - malformed nonce (empty or > 32 bytes): err=ErrOCSPNonceMalformed
|
|
// -> respond with the OCSP "unauthorized" status (RFC 6960 §2.3
|
|
// status code 6) rather than echoing potentially-malicious bytes.
|
|
nonce, _, nonceErr := service.ParseOCSPRequestNonce(body)
|
|
if errors.Is(nonceErr, service.ErrOCSPNonceMalformed) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
// ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse is the canonical pre-built
|
|
// error response (status 6) per RFC 6960 §4.2.1.
|
|
w.Write(ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reuse the existing service path. The serial extracted from the
|
|
// parsed OCSPRequest is converted to hex (the on-disk format for
|
|
// certctl serials matches certificate.SerialNumber.Text(16)).
|
|
serialHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ocspReq.SerialNumber)
|
|
derBytes, err := h.svc.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(r.Context(), issuerID, serialHex, nonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate OCSP response", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/ocsp-response")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=3600")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write(derBytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCertificateDeployments retrieves all deployment targets for a certificate.
|
|
// GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments
|
|
func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateDeployments(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// Extract certificate ID from path /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments
|
|
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/certificates/")
|
|
parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
|
|
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Certificate ID is required", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
certID := parts[0]
|
|
|
|
deployments, err := h.svc.GetCertificateDeployments(r.Context(), certID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errMsg := err.Error()
|
|
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get deployments", requestID)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
|
|
"data": deployments,
|
|
"total": len(deployments),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|