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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
48 lines
2.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
48 lines
2.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- Bundle 1 Phase 6 (bootstrap path): runtime-minted operator API keys.
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--
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-- Pre-Bundle-1 the only operator API keys lived in CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED
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-- (env-var config; static at boot). The bootstrap endpoint
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-- POST /v1/auth/bootstrap mints the first admin key without requiring
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-- the operator to know the env-var format up front; that key has to
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-- survive a process restart and authenticate against the auth
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-- middleware's keystore on subsequent requests, which means it lives
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-- here.
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--
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-- Storage rules: ONLY the SHA-256 hash of the key value is stored
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-- (key_hash). The plaintext key value is returned to the operator in
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-- the bootstrap HTTP response body once and never persisted. Lost?
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-- Mint a new admin key via the regular RBAC API and revoke the old
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-- one — the api_keys row is the source of truth for "this name +
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-- hash authenticates", so revoking it via the RBAC API removes the
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-- row and the next request lookup fails 401.
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--
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-- Idempotent: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, indexes IF NOT EXISTS.
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BEGIN;
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_keys (
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id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- prefix `ak-`
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name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, -- operator-visible name; matches actor_roles.actor_id
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key_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, -- SHA-256 hex of the plaintext key
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tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 't-default'
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REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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-- Admin is a denormalized hint replicated from the actor's
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-- standing role grant so the auth middleware can populate
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-- AdminKey context without joining actor_roles on every request.
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-- Source of truth remains actor_roles; this column is rebuilt by
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-- the boot loader from "actor holds r-admin?" queries.
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admin BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
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created_by TEXT NOT NULL, -- actor_id of the creator; "bootstrap" for the first one
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
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-- Decoration columns for forward-compat: bundle 2 will add
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-- expiry + last_used + rotation tracking. Reserved as nullable
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-- now so the migration in Bundle 2 doesn't reshape the table.
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expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
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last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_api_keys_tenant_id ON api_keys(tenant_id);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_api_keys_created_by ON api_keys(created_by);
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COMMIT;
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