Files
certctl/internal/auth/oidc/logging_test.go
T
shankar0123 2a1a0b347c harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.

WHAT.

Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.

WHY.

Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.

HOW.

Migration:
  migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
    ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
      ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip   TEXT,
      ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent  TEXT;
  Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
  side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
  values for the leg in question.

Domain:
  internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
    UserAgent fields.

Repository:
  internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
    via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
    Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.

Service:
  internal/auth/oidc/service.go
    - PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
      userAgent) as positions 5–6.
    - PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
      as positions 5–6.
    - HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
      threaded to the store.
    - HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
      between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
      preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
      values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
      proxy compat).
    - New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
    - SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
      for main.go config wiring.

Adapter:
  internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
    fields through to the repo row.

Handler:
  internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
    - OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
    - LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
      and passes to the service.
    - classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
      sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
      audit categories.

Config:
  internal/config/config.go
    + AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
      env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
    + AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
      env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
  cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
    from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.

Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues  (rolling-
    deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
    (operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)

Mechanical fan-out:
  - stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
  - All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
    bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
    integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
    auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
    new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
    semantics.

VERIFY.

- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
  ./internal/config/...                                       PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/...            PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/...          PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/...               PASS

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
      cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
      RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
2026-05-10 23:18:23 +00:00

184 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package oidc
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// =============================================================================
// Token-leak hygiene: no secret value (ID token, access token, refresh
// token, authorization code, PKCE verifier, state, nonce, signing key
// material) appears in any log line at any level.
//
// Methodology mirrors Bundle 1's
// internal/auth/bootstrap/service_test.go::TestService_TokenLeakHygiene:
// redirect slog.Default to a buffer, run the OIDC service paths,
// grep-assert the secret string never appears in any captured line.
//
// This is the load-bearing invariant for Phase 3's "tokens never
// logged" contract. Every secret-bearing path that enters the
// service.go code MUST flow through write-once-to-response patterns;
// adding a `slog.Info("got token", "value", token)` somewhere would
// fail this test immediately.
// =============================================================================
// captureLogger swaps the slog.Default with one that writes to the
// returned buffer. The returned restore func re-installs the original
// logger; callers must defer it.
func captureLogger(t *testing.T) (*bytes.Buffer, func()) {
t.Helper()
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
original := slog.Default()
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Writer(buf), &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
})))
return buf, func() { slog.SetDefault(original) }
}
// TestLoggingHygiene_HandleAuthRequest_LeaksNothing exercises the full
// HandleAuthRequest path against a mock IdP and asserts that the
// generated state, nonce, PKCE verifier, and pre-login cookie never
// appear in any captured log line.
func TestLoggingHygiene_HandleAuthRequest_LeaksNothing(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, _ := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-leak-1")
buf, restore := captureLogger(t)
defer restore()
authURL, cookieValue, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-leak-1", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleAuthRequest: %v", err)
}
// Extract state from the authURL query so we can grep-assert.
parts := strings.Split(authURL, "state=")
if len(parts) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("authURL missing state param: %q", authURL)
}
stateValue := strings.SplitN(parts[1], "&", 2)[0]
captured := buf.String()
for _, secret := range []string{stateValue, cookieValue} {
if secret == "" {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(captured, secret) {
t.Errorf("secret value %q appeared in log output:\n%s", secret, captured)
}
}
}
// TestLoggingHygiene_HandleCallback_LeaksNothing runs the full callback
// flow (against the mock IdP) and grep-asserts the captured log buffer
// has no occurrence of the access token, the ID token, the
// authorization code, or the PKCE verifier.
func TestLoggingHygiene_HandleCallback_LeaksNothing(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-leak-2")
// Pre-login row with a known verifier we can grep for after.
verifier := "test-verifier-do-not-leak-aaaaaaaaaaaaa"
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-leak-2", "the-state", "test-nonce-fixed", verifier, "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
buf, restore := captureLogger(t)
defer restore()
authCode := "secret-auth-code-do-not-leak"
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, authCode, "the-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
captured := buf.String()
// Direct secrets that flow through HandleCallback's parameter list.
for _, secret := range []string{
authCode,
verifier,
"test-access-token",
idp.receivedCode,
idp.receivedVerifier,
} {
if secret == "" {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(captured, secret) {
t.Errorf("secret value %q appeared in log output:\n%s", secret, captured)
}
}
// The session cookie + CSRF token are returned by the mint stub;
// in production they're set on the response, not logged. Pin that
// we never logged them.
for _, secret := range []string{res.CookieValue, res.CSRFToken} {
if secret == "" {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(captured, secret) {
t.Errorf("session secret %q appeared in log output:\n%s", secret, captured)
}
}
}
// TestLoggingHygiene_AlgPinningDoesNotLogAlg is a defense-in-depth pin:
// when isDisallowedAlg rejects a token, the alg name might land in an
// error returned to the handler — but the service.go MUST NOT log the
// alg value itself (an attacker could probe to discover allow-list
// composition). The handler maps to a uniform 400; alg detail lives
// only in audit rows the operator owns.
func TestLoggingHygiene_AlgRejectionDoesNotLogAlg(t *testing.T) {
buf, restore := captureLogger(t)
defer restore()
// Direct call to the helper; this exercises the deny-list match.
_, _ = isDisallowedAlg("eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.body.sig")
captured := buf.String()
if strings.Contains(captured, "HS256") {
t.Errorf("alg value HS256 appeared in log output (defense-in-depth violation):\n%s", captured)
}
}
// TestLoggingHygiene_ProviderLoadDoesNotLogClientSecret pins that
// even on getOrLoad failures, the decrypted client_secret bytes never
// land in a log line. Decryption happens before verifier construction;
// any error path that flows through must not surface the plaintext.
func TestLoggingHygiene_ProviderLoadDoesNotLogClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// Use a provider with a recognizable plaintext "secret" (no encryption
// key set, so decryptClientSecret returns the bytes as-is).
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-leak-secret")
prov.ClientSecretEncrypted = []byte("client-secret-plaintext-do-not-leak-xxxxx")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
svc := NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov},
&stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}},
newStubUsers(),
&stubSessions{},
pl,
"",
)
buf, restore := captureLogger(t)
defer restore()
if _, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-leak-secret"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getOrLoad: %v", err)
}
captured := buf.String()
if strings.Contains(captured, "client-secret-plaintext-do-not-leak") {
t.Errorf("client secret plaintext appeared in log output:\n%s", captured)
}
}