Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md. Server - cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback), preflightServerTLS validation - cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe, watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading - tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight, callback behavior, SAN validation Config - CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required) - Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http:// URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md Agents, CLI, MCP - All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic - CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust - CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass (loud warning on startup) - install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines docker-compose - certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into deploy/test/certs/ on first boot - All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert Helm chart - Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required: - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied) - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration) - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production) - server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode - helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with a pointer to docs/tls.md CI - .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail). Integration tests - deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API over https://localhost:8443 - All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity) Documentation - New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload) - New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade warnings, fleet-roll sequencing) - CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47) - All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use https://localhost:8443 --cacert Verification - grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits - grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints - Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix).
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certctl for cert-manager Users
You run cert-manager inside Kubernetes and it works well for in-cluster certificates. But you also have VMs, bare-metal servers, network appliances, and legacy systems outside the cluster. cert-manager can't reach those. This guide shows how certctl complements cert-manager to give you unified certificate visibility and automation across your entire infrastructure.
Not a Replacement
cert-manager is the right tool for in-cluster certs. It's tightly integrated with Kubernetes:
- Native CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer)
- Automatic cert injection into Ingress and Service objects
- Controller-driven renewal within the cluster
certctl does not replace this. Instead, it extends your certificate management to everything outside Kubernetes: VMs, bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers, and legacy systems.
The Problem
Your setup:
- cert-manager: handles all certs in Kubernetes (TLS for Ingress, service-to-service, internal services)
- Everything else: NGINX/Apache on VMs, HAProxy load balancers on bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers with IIS — these are managed inconsistently. Maybe Certbot cron jobs, maybe manual renewal, maybe deprecated cert files sitting around.
Result:
- No unified visibility — you don't know when non-Kubernetes certs expire
- Renewal failures go unnoticed until the cert is already expired
- Audit trail fragmented across multiple tools
- Scaling to hundreds of machines becomes impossible
The Solution
Deploy certctl control plane once (Docker Compose, Kubernetes Helm chart, or self-hosted). Deploy agents on your VMs, bare metal, and network appliances. One dashboard shows:
- All cert-manager certs via discovery scanning (agents find cert-manager-issued certs copied to target machines, or scan the cluster directly)
- All certctl-managed certs issued by shared issuers (ACME, step-ca, Vault PKI (planned), private CA)
- Unified renewal and deployment across both worlds
- Single pane of glass with expiration timeline, renewal status, deployment verification, audit trail
How to Set Up
1. Install certctl Control Plane
Option A: Docker Compose (quickest for evaluation)
cd /opt/certctl
docker compose up -d
# Dashboard & API: https://localhost:8443 (self-signed cert — pin with --cacert ./deploy/test/certs/ca.crt)
Option B: Kubernetes (recommended for prod)
helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set auth.apiKey=YOUR_SECURE_KEY
2. Deploy Agents to Non-Kubernetes Infrastructure
On each VM, bare-metal server, or appliance (via proxy agent):
# Linux amd64
curl -sSL https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl/releases/download/v2.1.0/certctl-agent-linux-amd64 \
-o /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent
# Config
sudo tee /etc/certctl/agent.env > /dev/null <<EOF
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL=https://certctl-control-plane:8443
CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH=/etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt
CERTCTL_API_KEY=your-api-key
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS=/etc/nginx/certs,/etc/ssl,/etc/letsencrypt/live
CERTCTL_KEY_DIR=/var/lib/certctl/keys
EOF
sudo chmod 600 /etc/certctl/agent.env
# Start
sudo systemctl start certctl-agent
3. Enable Discovery Scanning
Agents scan configured directories and report back all existing certs. In the dashboard:
- Discovery page: all found certs grouped by agent
- Claim cert-manager certs to link them with Kubernetes metadata
- Dismiss obsolete certs
4. Configure Shared Issuers
Set up the same issuer certctl uses for non-Kubernetes certs:
- ACME (Let's Encrypt, for public certs)
- step-ca (Smallstep, for internal certs)
- Vault PKI (HashiCorp Vault, for enterprise PKI)
- Private CA (your own internal root CA)
No new CA infrastructure needed. If cert-manager already uses your CA, certctl points to the same one.
5. Create Policies for Non-Kubernetes Certs
Go to Policies → + New Policy to create enforcement rules:
- Name: e.g., "VM Certificate Policy"
- Type:
expiration_windoworkey_algorithm(enforce renewal thresholds or crypto requirements) - Severity:
high - Config: set your enforcement parameters
Certificates are linked to issuers and profiles when created or claimed from discovery. Policies add guardrails — enforcing key algorithm requirements, expiration windows, and other compliance rules across your fleet.
6. View Unified Inventory
Dashboard shows:
- Certificate status heatmap (all 1000 certs: cert-manager + certctl)
- Renewal job trends (both types)
- Expiration timeline (30/60/90 days)
- Agent fleet status (all infrastructure)
Certificates page filters by issuer (show me all ACME certs, or all step-ca certs):
- cert-manager certs discovered from Kubernetes nodes
- certctl-managed certs on VMs
- Network appliance certs auto-discovered
Shared Infrastructure
If cert-manager and certctl both use the same CA:
- ACME: cert-manager uses ClusterIssuer + certctl uses ACME connector → same Let's Encrypt account, transparent coexistence
- step-ca: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses step-ca connector → same provisioner, shared certificate inventory
- Vault PKI: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses Vault connector → same mount, same audit trail
No conflict. They just issue certs through the same CA. certctl's discovery scanning finds cert-manager-issued certs and shows them alongside certctl-managed ones.
Key Differences from cert-manager
| Feature | cert-manager | certctl |
|---|---|---|
| Target | In-cluster (Kubernetes) | Out-of-cluster (VMs, bare metal, appliances) |
| Configuration | CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer) | API + Dashboard (JSON REST) |
| Deployment | Injected into Secret objects, mounted by pods | Agent pulls work, deploys via target-specific API (file, service restart, proxy agent) |
| Renewal | Controller watches Certificate CRDs, triggers renewal when needed | Scheduler checks thresholds, agents poll for work |
| Audit | Kubernetes event log | Immutable append-only audit trail |
| Visibility | Per-namespace, per-resource | Fleet-wide, unified inventory |
Future Integration
On the roadmap (V4): cert-manager external issuer — certctl acts as a ClusterIssuer backend for Kubernetes. This would allow cert-manager to request certificates from certctl, which could issue them via any of its connectors (step-ca, Vault, private CA, etc.). Pure integration play; no breaking changes.
For now: cert-manager handles Kubernetes, certctl handles everything else. They coexist seamlessly.
Next Steps
- Run through the Quick Start for a 5-minute demo
- Try the Multi-Issuer example — manages public and internal certs from one dashboard
- Explore Architecture for deployment patterns
- Check the Helm Chart for production Kubernetes deployment