README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
+ break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).
Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
(RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
(API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.
No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
8.1 KiB
Configuration Reference
Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
Compact reference for CERTCTL_* environment variables consumed by
certctl-server and certctl-agent. Most operators don't need to
touch these — defaults are tuned for the common case. Reach for them
when the system's behaviour needs tuning beyond what's exposed in the
GUI / API.
This page enumerates the operator-tunable knobs that don't have a
dedicated home elsewhere. Connector-specific env vars are documented
on the per-connector pages under
docs/reference/connectors/. Protocol env
vars (ACME server, EST, SCEP) are documented under
docs/reference/protocols/. TLS env vars are
documented in docs/operator/tls.md.
Scheduler intervals
The scheduler runs N background loops; intervals are tunable for performance / contention tuning.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_AGENT_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL |
2m |
How often the agent-health loop scans for stale heartbeats and transitions agents to Unhealthy / Offline. |
CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_JOB_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL |
30s |
How often the job-processor loop dispatches Pending jobs to agents. |
CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_NOTIFICATION_PROCESS_INTERVAL |
1m |
How often the notification-dispatcher loop fans out queued alerts to channels. |
CERTCTL_SHORT_LIVED_EXPIRY_CHECK_INTERVAL |
5m |
How often the short-lived-expiry loop watches certs whose TTL is less than 1h for imminent expiry. |
For the full scheduler topology (14 loops, 9 always-on + 5 opt-in)
see architecture.md "Scheduler topology".
Job lifecycle
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT |
24h |
How long a job stays in AwaitingCSR before the scheduler marks it Failed (the agent never picked it up). |
Rate limiting
The control plane API is rate-limited by default; tune for high-volume environments (mass-rotation events, bulk imports).
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED |
true |
Master toggle. Disable only for trusted-network single-tenant deploys where the API is firewall-protected. |
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS |
0 (= use global default) |
Per-user requests-per-second cap. Zero opts each user into the global default in internal/api/middleware. |
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST |
0 (= use global default) |
Per-user token-bucket burst size. Same opt-in semantics. |
Audit trail
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_AUDIT_FLUSH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS |
30 |
How long the audit-event flush worker waits for the buffered batch to drain before forcing a flush at shutdown. |
Deploy verification
The deploy-hardening primitive wraps every cert deploy in atomic-write + post-verify + rollback. These env vars tune the post-deploy TLS verification phase.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_VERIFY_DEPLOYMENT |
true |
Master toggle for post-deploy TLS verify. Disable only for connectors / environments where the verify endpoint is not reachable from the agent. |
CERTCTL_VERIFY_DELAY |
2s |
How long to wait after the reload command completes before the first verify-handshake attempt (gives the daemon time to pick up new keys). |
CERTCTL_VERIFY_TIMEOUT |
10s |
Per-attempt TLS-handshake timeout. |
CERTCTL_DEPLOY_BACKUP_RETENTION |
3 |
How many .certctl-bak.<unix-nanos>.<ext> rollback snapshots to keep per target after a successful deploy. 0 uses the default of 3; -1 opts out of pruning entirely. |
For the full deploy contract see
deployment-model.md.
Database
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_DATABASE_MIGRATIONS_PATH |
./migrations |
Filesystem path to the *.up.sql / *.down.sql migration set. Override only when running certctl-server from a non-standard layout. |
Agent
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID |
(none — required) | The agent's unique ID, issued by POST /api/v1/agents/register and bundled into the agent's registration response. Pass via this env var when the agent runs as a systemd unit / container without the -agent-id CLI flag. |
Auth (RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass)
Configuration knobs for the RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass
auth surface. Full operator guidance lives in
operator/rbac.md,
operator/oidc-runbooks/, and
operator/auth-threat-model.md.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT |
false |
Bind every session cookie to the User-Agent header captured at login; mismatch -> 401. Defense in depth against stolen cookies on the same network. |
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL |
1h |
How often the scheduler's session-GC loop sweeps expired/revoked rows out of sessions. Trade-off: shorter = smaller table, more DB churn; longer = pile-up. |
CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS |
60 |
Back-channel logout iat freshness window. Tokens older or newer than this skew (in either direction) are rejected. |
CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA |
false |
Reject the OIDC callback if the User-Agent at callback differs from the UA captured at pre-login. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 defense-in-depth. |
CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP |
false |
Same as _UA but for client IP. Set carefully — corporate networks with carrier-grade NAT can change apparent IP mid-flow. |
CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK |
false |
Operator acknowledgement that demo mode is intentional in this deploy. Required when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none to allow server startup; safety net against demo-mode-in-production leakage. |
CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES |
(empty) | Comma-separated list of trusted-proxy CIDRs (e.g. 10.0.0.0/8,192.0.2.1). XFF is consulted for client-IP derivation only when the immediate peer sits in this allowlist. |
CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES_COUNT |
(synthesised) | Read-only counter exposed by /api/v1/auth/runtime-config; mirrors len(CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES). Not operator-settable; documented here so the G-3 env-docs-drift guard catches drift. |
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN |
(empty) | One-shot token used to mint the first admin role binding via POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap. Once consumed, deletes itself from memory and unsets the bootstrap endpoint. |
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_SET |
(synthesised) | Boolean exposed by /api/v1/auth/runtime-config; true when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN was set at server start. Not operator-settable; documented here so the G-3 guard catches drift. |
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID |
(empty) | When OIDC is enabled, restricts the first-admin OIDC strategy to the named provider only — any other provider's tokens won't trigger the bootstrap hook. |
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS_COUNT |
(synthesised) | Read-only counter exposed by /api/v1/auth/runtime-config; mirrors len(CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS). Documented here so the G-3 guard catches drift. |
CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD |
5 |
Number of consecutive failed /auth/breakglass/login attempts that lock the credential. |
SCEP profile binding (single-profile back-compat)
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_ID |
(empty) | Optional certificate profile ID for the legacy single-profile SCEP path. The multi-profile path uses CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES=<list> + CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_PROFILE_ID instead — see scep-server.md. |
Related references
architecture.md— scheduler topology, system design, security modeldeployment-model.md— atomic write + verify + rollback contractoperator/security.md— full security posture (auth, rate limits, encryption at rest)operator/tls.md— control-plane TLS env vars- Per-connector pages under
reference/connectors/for connector-specific config - Per-protocol pages under
reference/protocols/for ACME / SCEP / EST / CRL+OCSP / async-CA polling