Files
certctl/internal/secret/secret.go
T
shankar0123 633a10aa4e secret: add Ref opaque-credential abstraction (Phase 1)
Phase 1 of the #6 acquisition-readiness fix from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. Pre-fix, GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo store API keys
/ OAuth tokens / 3-header credentials as plain Go strings on the
Connector struct. Encrypted at rest via internal/crypto/encryption.go
(AES-256-GCM v3 + PBKDF2-600k), they sit in process memory in the
clear after load and are sent in HTTP headers on every API call.
Under DEBUG-level HTTP request logging, the headers leak.

This commit ships the foundation type. Per-connector migrations
(GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo Config field changes from string to
*secret.Ref, plus auth-header write-path changes) are Phase 2 — a
separate commit per connector keeps each diff reviewable.

Phase 1 (this commit):
- internal/secret/secret.go with Ref:
    NewRef(src func() ([]byte, error))   — production: decrypt-on-demand
    NewRefFromString(s string)            — tests / config-loading
    Use(fn func(buf []byte) error)        — invoke fn with a fresh
                                            buffer, zero on return
    WriteTo(w io.Writer)                  — convenience for the
                                            "set a header" case
    String()                              — returns "[redacted]"
    MarshalJSON()                         — returns "[redacted]"
    IsEmpty()                             — for ValidateConfig paths
- The bytes are zeroed (every byte set to 0) after Use returns —
  defeats casual heap-dump extraction. The `[redacted]` brackets
  (rather than `<redacted>`) avoid Go's json HTMLEscape behavior.
- 9 unit tests covering: bytes-exposed-and-zeroed contract, the
  buffer-escape anti-pattern (asserts post-Use buffer is zeroed),
  WriteTo, String/MarshalJSON redaction, JSON-encoding inside a
  parent struct, nil-Ref safety on every method, source-error
  propagation, IsEmpty, direct test of the zero helper.

Phase 2 (separate follow-up commits):
- GlobalSign Config.APIKey / APISecret migration to *secret.Ref.
- EJBCA Config.Token migration to *secret.Ref.
- Sectigo Config.CustomerURI / Login / Password migration.
- Each migration includes the auth-header write-path change
  (setAuthHeaders → Ref.WriteTo) and the env-var-loading update
  (NewRefFromString at config load time).
- Outbound HTTP transport-wrapping for per-connector credential-
  header redaction in DEBUG logs (defense against third-party
  SDK leakage; not in scope for the foundation).

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #6 — Phase 1.
2026-05-02 02:22:07 +00:00

149 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) certctl
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
// Package secret provides Ref, an opaque handle to a credential.
//
// Closes the #6 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01
// issuer coverage audit. Pre-fix, GlobalSign / EJBCA / Sectigo stored
// API keys / OAuth tokens / 3-header credentials as plain Go strings
// on the Connector struct. Encrypted at rest via
// internal/crypto/encryption.go (AES-256-GCM v3 + PBKDF2-600k), they
// sat in process memory in the clear after load and were written to
// HTTP headers on every API call. DEBUG-level HTTP request logging
// leaked them into logs.
//
// Ref defeats casual heap-dump extraction and accidental log leaks:
//
// - The bytes are never marshalled into a string. Use(fn) is the
// only access path; Ref.String() returns "[redacted]".
// - The buffer passed to fn is zeroed (overwritten with 0 bytes)
// after fn returns. The credential is present in the heap only
// for the duration of fn.
// - MarshalJSON returns "[redacted]" so JSON-encoding a config
// struct (e.g., GET /issuers response) doesn't leak.
//
// Ref is paired with the request-logging middleware filter in
// internal/api/middleware/redact.go which strips known credential
// headers (Authorization, X-API-Key, X-DC-DEVKEY, X-Vault-Token,
// customerUri, login, password) from outbound DEBUG logs as a
// belt-and-braces defense against third-party HTTP clients (AWS SDK
// at DEBUG, etc.) that format headers themselves.
package secret
import (
"fmt"
"io"
)
// Ref is an opaque handle to a credential. Use Use(fn) or WriteTo(w)
// to obtain the underlying bytes; do not store the slice beyond the
// callback's return — the buffer is zeroed and may be reused.
type Ref struct {
// src returns a fresh copy of the credential bytes on every
// invocation. Production: a closure that decrypts an at-rest
// blob. Test: a closure that returns a copy of a static []byte.
src func() ([]byte, error)
}
// NewRef constructs a Ref backed by the supplied source. The source
// closure is called every time Use / WriteTo is invoked; it must
// return a fresh slice (the caller will zero it).
func NewRef(src func() ([]byte, error)) *Ref {
return &Ref{src: src}
}
// NewRefFromString is a convenience for tests / config-loading paths
// that have a plaintext string already. The source returns a copy of
// the string's bytes on every invocation; the original string still
// lives in the caller's memory (immutable Go string semantics) — the
// caller should drop the reference once it has been wrapped in a Ref.
//
// Production code paths should prefer NewRef with a decrypt-on-demand
// closure so the plaintext is never present in process memory at rest.
func NewRefFromString(s string) *Ref {
return &Ref{
src: func() ([]byte, error) {
// Copy so the returned slice is independent — Use will
// zero the copy without disturbing s.
b := make([]byte, len(s))
copy(b, s)
return b, nil
},
}
}
// Use invokes fn with a freshly-allocated buffer holding the secret
// bytes. After fn returns (or panics), the buffer is overwritten with
// zeros and dropped.
//
// fn MUST NOT retain the slice beyond its return. Storing the slice
// in a struct field, sending it on a channel, or passing it to a
// goroutine that runs after Use returns are all bugs — the buffer
// will be zeroed before the consumer reads it.
func (r *Ref) Use(fn func(buf []byte) error) error {
if r == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref.Use: nil Ref")
}
buf, err := r.src()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref: source: %w", err)
}
defer zero(buf)
return fn(buf)
}
// WriteTo writes the secret bytes to w (typically an HTTP header
// writer or a CSR signing routine) and zeros the staging buffer
// afterwards. Convenience over Use for the common "set a header"
// case.
//
// Returns the byte count and any write error.
func (r *Ref) WriteTo(w io.Writer) (int64, error) {
if r == nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref.WriteTo: nil Ref")
}
buf, err := r.src()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("secret.Ref: source: %w", err)
}
defer zero(buf)
n, werr := w.Write(buf)
return int64(n), werr
}
// String returns "[redacted]" — the type intentionally never
// stringifies the underlying bytes. Catches accidental leak via
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", cfg), slog attribute formatting, etc.
func (r *Ref) String() string { return "[redacted]" }
// MarshalJSON returns "[redacted]" so a config struct holding *Ref
// fields can be JSON-encoded without leaking credentials. Used by
// the API surface (GET /issuers etc.) and any operator-facing
// serialization path.
func (r *Ref) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return []byte(`"[redacted]"`), nil
}
// IsEmpty reports whether the source returns an empty byte slice
// (zero-length credential). Useful for ValidateConfig paths that need
// to check "did the operator set the credential" without obtaining
// the bytes.
func (r *Ref) IsEmpty() bool {
if r == nil {
return true
}
buf, err := r.src()
if err != nil {
return true
}
defer zero(buf)
return len(buf) == 0
}
// zero overwrites b with zero bytes. Visible for testing.
func zero(b []byte) {
for i := range b {
b[i] = 0
}
}