Files
certctl/internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go
T
shankar0123 b813660c74 security: require SCEP challenge password when SCEP enabled (fixes H-2)
Problem (CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function):
internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq skipped the shared-secret check when
s.challengePassword was empty. An unconfigured-but-enabled SCEP server
accepted any unauthenticated client reaching /scep and issued a
certificate against the configured issuer for any CSR with a valid
signature. No audit trail distinguished authenticated from
unauthenticated enrollments. This matches the two-layer fail-closed
pattern already used for C-2 (f549a7a): reject at startup AND reject
at the service boundary.

Fix (two layers, defense-in-depth):

Layer 1 — startup pre-flight in cmd/server/main.go:
  preflightSCEPChallengePassword returns a non-nil error when SCEP is
  enabled and CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD is empty. main logs and
  os.Exit(1)s before the SCEP service is constructed. Disabled SCEP is
  unaffected. The helper is unit-testable in isolation.

Layer 2 — service-layer rejection in internal/service/scep.go:
  PKCSReq refuses enrollment when s.challengePassword == "" even though
  main already blocks this state — protects future call sites (tests,
  library reuse, a REST-over-HTTPS wrapper). When a secret is
  configured, the comparison now uses crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
  so response time does not leak the configured secret through a
  short-circuiting byte compare.

Files:
- cmd/server/main.go: preflightSCEPChallengePassword helper; call site
  inside the `if cfg.SCEP.Enabled` block before issuer lookup; fatal
  slog error references CWE-306 and names the env var so operators can
  diagnose the startup failure without reading code.
- cmd/server/main_test.go: TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword with five
  table-driven subtests (disabled empty, disabled set, enabled empty
  rejected, enabled set, single-char boundary). The enabled-empty case
  asserts the error string contains both CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD
  and CWE-306 so the log message remains actionable.
- internal/config/config.go: SCEPConfig.ChallengePassword godoc now
  states the field is REQUIRED when SCEP.Enabled and cross-references
  preflightSCEPChallengePassword.
- internal/service/scep.go: imports crypto/subtle; PKCSReq rewritten
  with the two-layer check; comment block cites H-2 / CWE-306 and the
  constant-time rationale.
- internal/service/scep_test.go: existing tests that relied on the
  vulnerable empty-password path now configure a secret on both sides.
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_NotRequired is replaced by
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_EmptyServerConfigRejected
  which iterates ["", "any-value", "guess"] against an unconfigured
  server and asserts "not configured" in the error. A new
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_ConstantTimeLengthIndependence
  exercises same-prefix-longer and wrong-case inputs to guard against a
  regression from ConstantTimeCompare to a short-circuiting byte compare.
- internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go: four tests
  (RejectsWeakKey, AcceptsStrongKey, MaxTTL_ForwardedToIssuer,
  NoProfileRepo_PassesThrough) constructed NewSCEPService with an empty
  challenge password and exercised PKCSReq through the now-rejected
  vulnerable path. All four now configure "secret123" on both sides with
  an inline H-2 comment; the crypto/MaxTTL/profile behavior they assert
  is unchanged.

Wire-format / behavioral invariants preserved:
- RFC 8894 SCEP handler is untouched (internal/api/handler/scep.go and
  internal/pkcs7/*): GetCACaps/GetCACert responses, PKIOperation request
  parsing, and the PKCS#7 certs-only response format are byte-identical.
- RFC 7030 EST handler is untouched
  (internal/api/handler/est.go + internal/pkcs7/*).
- Revocation idempotency composite key (H-1, migration 000012) untouched.
- AES-256-GCM config encryption (C-2) untouched.
- CRL DER bytes and OCSP response bytes unchanged.

Verification:
- go build ./...              silent success
- go vet ./...                silent success
- go test -race -count=1 ./internal/service/ ./cmd/server/
  ./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/integration/    all OK
- Coverage with comfortable headroom over CI gates:
    service     67.8% (gate 55%)
    handler     79.0% (gate 60%)
    domain      92.7% (gate 40%)
    middleware  80.0% (gate 30%)
    cmd/server  1.6%  (preflightSCEPChallengePassword: 100%)
  internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq statement coverage: 100%.
- rg sweeps: no `s.challengePassword != ""` remains;
  no `challengePassword != s.challengePassword` remains.

Operational note: operators with SCEP enabled but no challenge password
set will see a fatal startup error and a log line citing
CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD and CWE-306 after upgrading. This is the
intended fail-closed behavior. Fix by either setting the env var to a
non-empty shared secret or setting CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=false.

Audit report: certctl-audit-report.md (revision 5) logs this under
H-2 Resolution Log.
2026-04-16 22:22:51 +00:00

407 lines
13 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// m11cProfileRepo wraps the existing mockProfileRepo from profile_test.go with AddProfile helper.
// We reuse the existing mock and just create instances with pre-populated profiles.
func newM11cProfileRepo() *mockProfileRepo {
return &mockProfileRepo{
profiles: make(map[string]*domain.CertificateProfile),
}
}
// --- EST Crypto Policy Enforcement Tests ---
func TestESTService_CryptoValidation_RejectsWeakKey(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
svc := NewESTService("iss-local", mockIssuer, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})))
// Profile requiring ECDSA P-384 minimum
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-high-sec"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-high-sec",
Name: "High Security",
AllowedKeyAlgorithms: []domain.KeyAlgorithmRule{
{Algorithm: "ECDSA", MinSize: 384},
},
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-high-sec")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
// P-256 CSR should be rejected by P-384 minimum
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "weak.example.com", nil)
_, err := svc.SimpleEnroll(context.Background(), csrPEM)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected rejection for ECDSA P-256 against P-384 minimum")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "EST enrollment rejected") {
t.Errorf("expected 'EST enrollment rejected' in error, got: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not match any allowed algorithm") {
t.Errorf("expected algorithm mismatch message, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestESTService_CryptoValidation_AcceptsStrongKey(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
auditRepo := newMockAuditRepository()
auditSvc := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
svc := NewESTService("iss-local", mockIssuer, auditSvc, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})))
// Profile allows P-256+
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-standard"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-standard",
Name: "Standard TLS",
AllowedKeyAlgorithms: []domain.KeyAlgorithmRule{
{Algorithm: "ECDSA", MinSize: 256},
},
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-standard")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "strong.example.com", nil)
result, err := svc.SimpleEnroll(context.Background(), csrPEM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success for ECDSA P-256 against P-256 minimum: %v", err)
}
if result == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil result")
}
}
func TestESTService_MaxTTL_ForwardedToIssuer(t *testing.T) {
// Track what the mock issuer receives
var capturedMaxTTL int
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
// Override IssueCertificate to capture maxTTLSeconds
// We'll use a capturing mock instead
capturingMock := &capturingIssuerConnector{}
svc := NewESTService("iss-local", capturingMock, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})))
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-short"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-short",
Name: "Short Lived",
MaxTTLSeconds: 3600, // 1 hour
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-short")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "short.example.com", nil)
_, err := svc.SimpleEnroll(context.Background(), csrPEM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
capturedMaxTTL = capturingMock.lastMaxTTLSeconds
if capturedMaxTTL != 3600 {
t.Errorf("expected maxTTLSeconds=3600 forwarded to issuer, got %d", capturedMaxTTL)
}
_ = mockIssuer // suppress unused
}
// --- SCEP Crypto Policy Enforcement Tests ---
func TestSCEPService_CryptoValidation_RejectsWeakKey(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
// H-2: SCEPService now requires a configured challenge password. Pass a
// matching client password so this test exercises the crypto-policy path
// rather than being short-circuited by the challenge-password guard.
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})), "secret123")
// Profile requiring ECDSA P-384 minimum
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-high-sec"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-high-sec",
Name: "High Security",
AllowedKeyAlgorithms: []domain.KeyAlgorithmRule{
{Algorithm: "ECDSA", MinSize: 384},
},
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-high-sec")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
// P-256 CSR should be rejected
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", nil)
_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "secret123", "txn-001")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected rejection for ECDSA P-256 against P-384 minimum")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "SCEP enrollment rejected") {
t.Errorf("expected 'SCEP enrollment rejected' in error, got: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not match any allowed algorithm") {
t.Errorf("expected algorithm mismatch message, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSCEPService_CryptoValidation_AcceptsStrongKey(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
auditRepo := newMockAuditRepository()
auditSvc := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
// H-2: happy path exercises the authenticated branch.
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, auditSvc, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})), "secret123")
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-standard"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-standard",
Name: "Standard TLS",
AllowedKeyAlgorithms: []domain.KeyAlgorithmRule{
{Algorithm: "ECDSA", MinSize: 256},
},
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-standard")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device-ok.example.com", nil)
result, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "secret123", "txn-002")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success: %v", err)
}
if result == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil result")
}
}
func TestSCEPService_MaxTTL_ForwardedToIssuer(t *testing.T) {
capturingMock := &capturingIssuerConnector{}
// H-2: challenge password required for enrollment.
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", capturingMock, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})), "secret123")
profileRepo := newM11cProfileRepo()
profileRepo.profiles["prof-device"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
ID: "prof-device",
Name: "Device Cert",
MaxTTLSeconds: 86400, // 24 hours
}
svc.SetProfileID("prof-device")
svc.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "mdm-device.example.com", nil)
_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "secret123", "txn-003")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if capturingMock.lastMaxTTLSeconds != 86400 {
t.Errorf("expected maxTTLSeconds=86400 forwarded to issuer, got %d", capturingMock.lastMaxTTLSeconds)
}
}
// --- Adapter MaxTTL Forwarding Tests ---
func TestIssuerConnectorAdapter_IssueCertificate_MaxTTLForwarded(t *testing.T) {
mock := &mockConnectorLayerIssuer{}
adapter := NewIssuerConnectorAdapter(mock)
_, err := adapter.IssueCertificate(context.Background(), "test.example.com", nil, "csr", nil, 7200)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if mock.lastIssueReq == nil {
t.Fatal("expected request to be recorded")
}
if mock.lastIssueReq.MaxTTLSeconds != 7200 {
t.Errorf("expected MaxTTLSeconds=7200, got %d", mock.lastIssueReq.MaxTTLSeconds)
}
}
func TestIssuerConnectorAdapter_RenewCertificate_MaxTTLForwarded(t *testing.T) {
mock := &mockConnectorLayerIssuer{}
adapter := NewIssuerConnectorAdapter(mock)
_, err := adapter.RenewCertificate(context.Background(), "renew.example.com", nil, "csr", nil, 14400)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if mock.lastRenewReq == nil {
t.Fatal("expected request to be recorded")
}
if mock.lastRenewReq.MaxTTLSeconds != 14400 {
t.Errorf("expected MaxTTLSeconds=14400, got %d", mock.lastRenewReq.MaxTTLSeconds)
}
}
func TestIssuerConnectorAdapter_IssueCertificate_ZeroMaxTTL(t *testing.T) {
mock := &mockConnectorLayerIssuer{}
adapter := NewIssuerConnectorAdapter(mock)
_, err := adapter.IssueCertificate(context.Background(), "test.example.com", nil, "csr", nil, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if mock.lastIssueReq.MaxTTLSeconds != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected MaxTTLSeconds=0 (no cap), got %d", mock.lastIssueReq.MaxTTLSeconds)
}
}
// --- CreateVersion Key Metadata Persistence Tests ---
func TestCreateVersion_KeyMetadata_Persisted(t *testing.T) {
certRepo := newMockCertificateRepository()
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
ID: "ver-001",
CertificateID: "cert-001",
SerialNumber: "serial-001",
PEMChain: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\ntest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
KeyAlgorithm: "ECDSA",
KeySize: 256,
}
err := certRepo.CreateVersion(context.Background(), version)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateVersion failed: %v", err)
}
// Retrieve and verify key metadata was stored
versions, err := certRepo.ListVersions(context.Background(), "cert-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListVersions failed: %v", err)
}
if len(versions) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 version, got %d", len(versions))
}
if versions[0].KeyAlgorithm != "ECDSA" {
t.Errorf("expected KeyAlgorithm=ECDSA, got %s", versions[0].KeyAlgorithm)
}
if versions[0].KeySize != 256 {
t.Errorf("expected KeySize=256, got %d", versions[0].KeySize)
}
}
func TestCreateVersion_RSAKeyMetadata_Persisted(t *testing.T) {
certRepo := newMockCertificateRepository()
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
ID: "ver-002",
CertificateID: "cert-002",
SerialNumber: "serial-002",
PEMChain: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\ntest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
KeyAlgorithm: "RSA",
KeySize: 4096,
}
err := certRepo.CreateVersion(context.Background(), version)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateVersion failed: %v", err)
}
versions, err := certRepo.ListVersions(context.Background(), "cert-002")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListVersions failed: %v", err)
}
if versions[0].KeyAlgorithm != "RSA" {
t.Errorf("expected KeyAlgorithm=RSA, got %s", versions[0].KeyAlgorithm)
}
if versions[0].KeySize != 4096 {
t.Errorf("expected KeySize=4096, got %d", versions[0].KeySize)
}
}
// --- EST/SCEP without profile repo (graceful passthrough) ---
func TestESTService_NoProfileRepo_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
svc := NewESTService("iss-local", mockIssuer, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})))
svc.SetProfileID("nonexistent-profile")
// Deliberately NOT calling SetProfileRepo — should pass through without validation
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "no-profile.example.com", nil)
result, err := svc.SimpleEnroll(context.Background(), csrPEM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success when no profile repo set: %v", err)
}
if result == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil result")
}
}
func TestSCEPService_NoProfileRepo_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
// H-2: challenge password required for enrollment.
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, nil, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError})), "secret123")
svc.SetProfileID("nonexistent-profile")
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "no-profile-scep.example.com", nil)
result, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "secret123", "txn-004")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success when no profile repo set: %v", err)
}
if result == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil result")
}
}
// --- capturingIssuerConnector captures maxTTLSeconds for verification ---
type capturingIssuerConnector struct {
lastMaxTTLSeconds int
lastEKUs []string
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, commonName string, sans []string, csrPEM string, ekus []string, maxTTLSeconds int) (*IssuanceResult, error) {
c.lastMaxTTLSeconds = maxTTLSeconds
c.lastEKUs = ekus
now := time.Now()
return &IssuanceResult{
Serial: "test-serial",
CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\ntest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
ChainPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nchain\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
NotBefore: now,
NotAfter: now.AddDate(1, 0, 0),
}, nil
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, commonName string, sans []string, csrPEM string, ekus []string, maxTTLSeconds int) (*IssuanceResult, error) {
return c.IssueCertificate(ctx, commonName, sans, csrPEM, ekus, maxTTLSeconds)
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, serial string, reason string) error {
return nil
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) GenerateCRL(ctx context.Context, entries []CRLEntry) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) SignOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, req OCSPSignRequest) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) GetCACertPEM(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
return "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nmock-ca\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----", nil
}
func (c *capturingIssuerConnector) GetRenewalInfo(ctx context.Context, certPEM string) (*RenewalInfoResult, error) {
return nil, nil
}