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17b30c1f7f
validation, idle/absolute expiry, signing-key rotation, CSRF, GC),
15-case negative-test matrix, fail-fatal initial-key bootstrap
Phase 4 of the bundle ships the post-login session lifecycle that backs
every authenticated request once Phase 5 wires the OIDC handlers + the
session middleware. The state machine is the load-bearing primitive for
the Bundle 2 control plane: forge a session cookie and you bypass every
RBAC gate.
Service surface (internal/auth/session/service.go, ~880 LOC):
- Service.Create(actorID, actorType, ip, ua) -> *CreateResult
Mints a session row; signs the cookie value with the active signing
key; returns the cookie payload AND the CSRF token plaintext for
the handler to set on the response.
- Service.Validate(ValidateInput) -> *Session
Parses the cookie, looks up the signing key (incl. retired-but-in-
retention), recomputes HMAC-SHA256, loads the session row, enforces
revocation + absolute + idle expiry + optional IP/UA bind. Maps to
one of 9 sentinel errors; the handler uniformly returns 401 to the
wire (specific reason in the audit row).
- Service.ValidateCSRF(headerValue, *Session) error
Constant-time compares SHA-256(header) against the stored hash on
the session row.
- Service.UpdateLastSeen / Revoke / RevokeAllForActor
- Service.RotateCSRFToken — mints fresh token, persists hash, returns
plaintext; called on login completion, logout, role-change against
actor, explicit operator rotate.
- Service.RotateSigningKey — mints new active key, retires previous;
retired keys stay valid for cfg.SigningKeyRetention so existing
cookies don't immediately fail.
- Service.EnsureInitialSigningKey — idempotent; mints first key on
fresh deploys; emits auth.session_signing_key_bootstrap audit row
with event_category=auth. Wired into cmd/server/main.go AFTER
migrations + RBAC backfill, BEFORE the HTTP listener binds; failure
is FATAL (logger.Error + os.Exit(1)) per the prompt — server refuses
to boot rather than serve session-less.
- Service.GarbageCollect — sweeps expired post-login sessions +
pre-login rows >10min + retired-past-retention signing keys. Wired
into the new internal/scheduler/scheduler.go::sessionGCLoop on a
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL tick.
Cookie wire format (load-bearing):
v1.<session_id>.<signing_key_id>.<base64url-no-pad(HMAC-SHA256)>
The HMAC input is LENGTH-PREFIXED to defeat concatenation collisions:
len(session_id) || ":" || session_id || ":" || len(signing_key_id) || ":" || signing_key_id
where len(...) is the ASCII decimal byte-length. Without the length
prefix, the bare-concatenation form `session_id || signing_key_id`
would let a forger swap one byte across the boundary — `<a, bc>` and
`<ab, c>` produce identical HMAC inputs. The length prefix moves the
boundary into the input itself so the two cases can never collide.
The v1. version prefix is reserved. A future incompatible upgrade
ships as v2. and the parser rejects unknown prefixes (no fallback).
CSRF token model:
- Plaintext goes in a JS-readable certctl_csrf cookie (HttpOnly=false
intentional; the GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
- SHA-256 hash of the plaintext lives on the session row.
- Validation: SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token) constant-time-compared.
- Rotated by Service.RotateCSRFToken on login / logout / role-change /
explicit admin-trigger.
Optional defense-in-depth (default OFF):
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP — Validate compares client IP to row's
recorded IP. Mismatch -> 401, audit row, session NOT auto-revoked
(user may have legitimate IP change). Mobile + corporate-NAT
environments leave this off.
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT — same shape against UA.
Configurable lifetimes (env vars wired in internal/config/config.go):
CERTCTL_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT 8h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY_RETENTION 24h
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE Lax
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP false
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT false
Test surface (internal/auth/session/service_test.go, ~860 LOC):
All 15 prompt-mandated negative cases:
1. Tampered cookie (HMAC byte flipped near segment start where all
6 bits are real — base64url-no-pad's last char carries only 2
bits so a tail-flip is unreliable).
1b. Tampered SESSION_ID segment (same HMAC-recompute outcome).
2. Cookie missing v1. prefix.
3. Cookie with unknown version prefix (v99).
4. Idle expiry — back-dated last_seen_at + idle_expires_at.
5. Absolute expiry — back-dated absolute_expires_at.
6. Revoked session.
7. Wrong signing key id (no row matches).
8. Cookie signed under retired-but-in-retention key SUCCEEDS.
9. Cookie signed under retired-past-retention key FAILS.
10. Concatenation collision — direct evidence that
computeHMAC("abc","de") != computeHMAC("ab","cde") AND that
a forged-boundary-slide cookie is rejected.
11. CSRF token missing.
12. CSRF token mismatch (constant-time compare).
13. IP-bind enabled + IP changed -> ErrSessionIPMismatch + audit row.
14. UA-bind enabled + UA changed -> ErrSessionUAMismatch + audit row.
15. EnsureInitialSigningKey RNG failure -> ErrInitialSigningKeyMintFailed
wrap (cmd/server/main.go treats as fatal).
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: every error wrap on every repo
collaborator (Create, Get, UpdateLastSeen, UpdateCSRFTokenHash,
Revoke, RevokeAllForActor, GC), every RNG-failure surface in Create /
RotateCSRFToken / RotateSigningKey, every alg-pinning helper edge,
the cookie parser's full negative matrix (empty, wrong segment count,
missing prefixes, bad base64, wrong HMAC length), and a real-encryption
round-trip via internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet -> DecryptIfKeySet so
the v3-blob path is exercised end-to-end at the session-cookie level.
Coverage:
internal/auth/session 94.5% (floor 90)
internal/auth/session/domain 96+% (floor 90, Phase 1)
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml extended with 2 new gate entries
(internal/auth/session and internal/auth/session/domain). The
why: paragraphs explain why each fail-closed branch is load-bearing.
Repository extensions:
internal/repository/session.go gains UpdateCSRFTokenHash on the
SessionRepository interface; internal/repository/postgres/session.go
ships the implementation. RotateCSRFToken consumes it.
Scheduler extensions:
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go gains SessionGarbageCollector
interface + sessionGC field + sessionGCInterval +
SetSessionGarbageCollector + SetSessionGCInterval + sessionGCLoop.
Pattern matches the existing acmeGCLoop: atomic.Bool guard prevents
concurrent sweeps, sync.WaitGroup tracks for graceful shutdown,
per-tick context.WithTimeout(1m) bounds a stuck Postgres.
Server wiring:
cmd/server/main.go constructs sessionService AFTER the bootstrap
block (post-RBAC backfill) and BEFORE the policy-service block.
EnsureInitialSigningKey runs immediately; failure is fatal via
os.Exit(1). The scheduler section wires SetSessionGarbageCollector
+ SetSessionGCInterval alongside the other interval setters and
emits an Info log so operators can confirm the loop is enabled.
Phase 4 deviation note: Service.GarbageCollect() returns (int, error)
rather than the prompt's literal `error`. The int is the count of
session rows deleted on this sweep; the scheduler discards it (`_, err
:= ...`) but tests + future operator-facing audit rows can read it.
The wider behavior matches the spec exactly.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/session/...
./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/config/... ./cmd/server/...
./internal/repository/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green
across all 3 session packages, full repository + auth + scheduler +
config test sweeps green, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages.
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
package postgres
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/lib/pq"
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sessiondomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/session/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// =============================================================================
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// SessionRepository (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 2)
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// =============================================================================
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// SessionRepository is the postgres implementation of
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// repository.SessionRepository.
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type SessionRepository struct {
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db *sql.DB
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}
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// NewSessionRepository constructs a SessionRepository.
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func NewSessionRepository(db *sql.DB) *SessionRepository {
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return &SessionRepository{db: db}
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}
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const sessionColumns = `id, tenant_id, actor_id, actor_type,
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signing_key_id, is_pre_login, csrf_token_hash,
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idle_expires_at, absolute_expires_at, created_at, last_seen_at,
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ip_address, user_agent, revoked_at`
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func scanSession(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*sessiondomain.Session, error) {
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var s sessiondomain.Session
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var revokedAt sql.NullTime
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if err := row.Scan(
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&s.ID, &s.TenantID, &s.ActorID, &s.ActorType,
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&s.SigningKeyID, &s.IsPreLogin, &s.CSRFTokenHash,
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&s.IdleExpiresAt, &s.AbsoluteExpiresAt, &s.CreatedAt, &s.LastSeenAt,
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&s.IPAddress, &s.UserAgent, &revokedAt,
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); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if revokedAt.Valid {
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s.RevokedAt = &revokedAt.Time
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}
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return &s, nil
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}
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// Create persists a session row. Caller MUST have called s.Validate().
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func (r *SessionRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, s *sessiondomain.Session) error {
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_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO sessions (
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id, tenant_id, actor_id, actor_type, signing_key_id,
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is_pre_login, csrf_token_hash, idle_expires_at,
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absolute_expires_at, created_at, last_seen_at,
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ip_address, user_agent
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) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13)`,
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s.ID, s.TenantID, s.ActorID, s.ActorType, s.SigningKeyID,
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s.IsPreLogin, s.CSRFTokenHash, s.IdleExpiresAt,
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s.AbsoluteExpiresAt, s.CreatedAt, s.LastSeenAt,
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s.IPAddress, s.UserAgent)
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if err != nil {
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var pqErr *pq.Error
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if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
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return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions create: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Get returns a session by id. Returns the row even if revoked /
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// expired; the service layer handles the disposition.
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func (r *SessionRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*sessiondomain.Session, error) {
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT `+sessionColumns+` FROM sessions WHERE id = $1`, id)
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s, err := scanSession(row)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, repository.ErrSessionNotFound
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("sessions get: %w", err)
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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// ListByActor returns active (non-revoked, non-expired, non-pre-login)
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// sessions for an actor.
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func (r *SessionRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID string) ([]*sessiondomain.Session, error) {
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT `+sessionColumns+`
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FROM sessions
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WHERE actor_id = $1
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AND actor_type = $2
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AND tenant_id = $3
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AND revoked_at IS NULL
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AND is_pre_login = FALSE
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AND absolute_expires_at > NOW()
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ORDER BY created_at DESC`,
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actorID, actorType, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("sessions list_by_actor: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []*sessiondomain.Session
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for rows.Next() {
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s, err := scanSession(rows)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("sessions scan: %w", err)
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}
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out = append(out, s)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// UpdateLastSeen sets last_seen_at = NOW() for the named session.
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func (r *SessionRepository) UpdateLastSeen(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1`, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions update_last_seen: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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if n == 0 {
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return repository.ErrSessionNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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// UpdateCSRFTokenHash replaces csrf_token_hash on the named session.
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// Phase 4's RotateCSRFToken consumes this on login completion, logout,
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// and any actor-role mutation against this actor.
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func (r *SessionRepository) UpdateCSRFTokenHash(ctx context.Context, id, csrfTokenHash string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sessions SET csrf_token_hash = $2 WHERE id = $1`, id, csrfTokenHash)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions update_csrf_token_hash: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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if n == 0 {
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return repository.ErrSessionNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Revoke sets revoked_at = NOW() for the named session. Idempotent:
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// re-revoking an already-revoked session is a no-op (returns nil).
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func (r *SessionRepository) Revoke(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions revoke: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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if n == 0 {
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// Distinguish "not found" from "already revoked" by re-querying.
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE id = $1`, id)
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var x int
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if err := row.Scan(&x); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return repository.ErrSessionNotFound
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions revoke probe: %w", err)
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}
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// Row exists but already revoked: idempotent success.
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RevokeAllForActor sets revoked_at = NOW() on every active session
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// for an actor. Returns nil on zero matches (idempotent).
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func (r *SessionRepository) RevokeAllForActor(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID string) error {
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_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = NOW()
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WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND tenant_id = $3 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
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actorID, actorType, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions revoke_all_for_actor: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// GarbageCollectExpired deletes:
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// - Sessions whose absolute_expires_at < NOW() (post-login expired).
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// - Pre-login sessions older than 10 minutes.
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//
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// Returns the number of rows deleted across both classes.
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func (r *SessionRepository) GarbageCollectExpired(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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DELETE FROM sessions
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WHERE absolute_expires_at < NOW()
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OR (is_pre_login = TRUE AND created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '10 minutes')`)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("sessions garbage_collect: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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return int(n), nil
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}
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// Delete unconditionally removes a session row.
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func (r *SessionRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = $1`, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sessions delete: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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if n == 0 {
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return repository.ErrSessionNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// SessionSigningKeyRepository (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 2)
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// =============================================================================
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// SessionSigningKeyRepository is the postgres implementation of
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// repository.SessionSigningKeyRepository.
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type SessionSigningKeyRepository struct {
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db *sql.DB
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}
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// NewSessionSigningKeyRepository constructs a SessionSigningKeyRepository.
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func NewSessionSigningKeyRepository(db *sql.DB) *SessionSigningKeyRepository {
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return &SessionSigningKeyRepository{db: db}
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}
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const sessionSigningKeyColumns = `id, tenant_id, key_material_encrypted, created_at, retired_at`
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func scanSessionSigningKey(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error) {
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var k sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey
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var retiredAt sql.NullTime
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if err := row.Scan(&k.ID, &k.TenantID, &k.KeyMaterialEncrypted, &k.CreatedAt, &retiredAt); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if retiredAt.Valid {
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k.RetiredAt = &retiredAt.Time
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}
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return &k, nil
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}
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// List returns every signing key in the tenant, including retired ones.
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func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error) {
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
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`SELECT `+sessionSigningKeyColumns+` FROM session_signing_keys WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC`,
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tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys list: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey
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for rows.Next() {
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k, err := scanSessionSigningKey(rows)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys scan: %w", err)
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}
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out = append(out, k)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// GetActive returns the most-recently-created non-retired key. Returns
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// ErrSessionSigningKeyNotFound when no non-retired key exists.
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func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) GetActive(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error) {
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
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SELECT `+sessionSigningKeyColumns+`
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FROM session_signing_keys
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WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND retired_at IS NULL
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ORDER BY created_at DESC
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LIMIT 1`, tenantID)
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k, err := scanSessionSigningKey(row)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, repository.ErrSessionSigningKeyNotFound
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys get_active: %w", err)
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}
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return k, nil
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}
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// Get returns a key by id (including retired keys; Phase 4's Validate
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// consults this for cookies signed under retired-but-in-retention keys).
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func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error) {
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT `+sessionSigningKeyColumns+` FROM session_signing_keys WHERE id = $1`, id)
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k, err := scanSessionSigningKey(row)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, repository.ErrSessionSigningKeyNotFound
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys get: %w", err)
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}
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return k, nil
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}
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// Add persists a new signing key. Caller MUST have called k.Validate().
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func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) Add(ctx context.Context, k *sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey) error {
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if k.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO session_signing_keys (id, tenant_id, key_material_encrypted)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
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k.ID, k.TenantID, k.KeyMaterialEncrypted)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys add: %w", err)
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}
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// Read the row back to populate CreatedAt.
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT created_at FROM session_signing_keys WHERE id = $1`, k.ID)
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if err := row.Scan(&k.CreatedAt); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys add (read created_at): %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO session_signing_keys (id, tenant_id, key_material_encrypted, created_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)`,
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k.ID, k.TenantID, k.KeyMaterialEncrypted, k.CreatedAt)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys add: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Retire marks an active key as retired (sets retired_at = NOW()).
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// Idempotent: re-retiring an already-retired key is a no-op.
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func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) Retire(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`UPDATE session_signing_keys SET retired_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1 AND retired_at IS NULL`, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys retire: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
// Distinguish not-found vs already-retired.
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT 1 FROM session_signing_keys WHERE id = $1`, id)
|
|
var x int
|
|
if err := row.Scan(&x); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return repository.ErrSessionSigningKeyNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys retire probe: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Row exists but already retired: idempotent success.
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Delete unconditionally removes a signing key. Returns
|
|
// ErrSessionSigningKeyInUse on SQLSTATE 23503 (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT
|
|
// from sessions.signing_key_id).
|
|
func (r *SessionSigningKeyRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
|
|
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM session_signing_keys WHERE id = $1`, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
|
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23503" {
|
|
return repository.ErrSessionSigningKeyInUse
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("session_signing_keys delete: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return repository.ErrSessionSigningKeyNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|