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shankar0123
5e2accbf5f
Closes Phase 12 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. The single
canonical operator-facing threat model (one doc per topic per the
docs convention) now covers both Bundle 1 (RBAC) AND Bundle 2 (OIDC
+ sessions + back-channel logout + OIDC first-admin + break-glass)
in one place.
File: docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (MODIFIED, +485 LOC)
Conventions held
================
* The Bundle 1 sections ("Threat actors", "Defenses Bundle 1
ships", "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close", "Compliance mapping",
"Operator-facing checks", "Cross-references") stay structurally
intact. Bundle 2 EXTENDS them; nothing is rewritten in place.
* `Last reviewed:` header bumped 2026-05-09 → 2026-05-10.
* Per the prompt's explicit instruction: "do NOT create a separate
auth-threat-model-bundle-2.md companion." This commit is a
single-file extension.
Changes
=======
Intro paragraph rewritten:
* From "Bundle 1 lands... Bundle 2 will be updated" to "Bundle 1
AND Bundle 2 land." Sets the reader's expectation that this is
the post-Bundle-2 doc.
Threat actors section (4 new actors appended):
* OIDC-federated end user (token-forgery / session-hijacking /
group-claim-manipulation surface).
* Stolen session cookie holder (XSS / network MITM / pasted-token).
* Compromised IdP (rogue token issuance; mitigations bounded to
audit trail + group-mapping configuration).
* Break-glass-password holder (Phase 7.5 path bypasses OIDC + group
layer entirely; default-OFF is the load-bearing mitigation).
NEW: Defenses Bundle 2 ships (5 sub-sections):
* OIDC token validation (Phase 3) — alg allow-list, IdP-downgrade
defense, exact iss match, aud + azp checks, at_hash
REQUIRED-when-access_token-present (Phase 3 tightening of OIDC
core's MAY → MUST), single-use state + nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory,
iat window, JWKS rotation handling, JWKS-fetch-fail closed,
encrypted client_secret at rest.
* Session minting + cookies (Phases 4 + 6) — length-prefixed HMAC
defeating concatenation collision, HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite
cookie hardening, idle + absolute timeouts, CSRF defense via
double-submit-cookie + hashed-token-on-row, optional IP/UA bind,
signing-key rotation primitive with retention window, fail-fatal
EnsureInitialSigningKey at boot, pre-login vs post-login cookie
discrimination.
* Back-channel logout (Phase 5) — OpenID Connect Back-Channel
Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414), required-claim pinning, jti-based
replay defense, alg allow-list applies, Cache-Control: no-store.
* OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Phase 7) — coexists with Bundle 1's
env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped, one-shot per tenant via
admin-existence probe, explicit OIDC provider gate, audit row on
every grant.
* Break-glass admin (Phase 7.5) — default-OFF, surface-invisibility
via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params, lockout state
machine, constant-time across all failure paths via verifyDummy,
WARN log at boot when ENABLED=true, 5/min rate limit on the
public login endpoint.
NEW: Bundle 2 threat catalogue (8 sub-sections, one per
prompt-enumerated threat axis):
1. OIDC token forgery vectors and mitigations (9-row table covering
alg confusion, audience injection, issuer mismatch, nonce replay,
state replay, at_hash substitution, iat window manipulation,
JWKS rotation mid-login, JWKS-fetch failure during a key
rotation).
2. Session hijacking vectors and mitigations (7-row table covering
XSS cookie theft, network MITM, CSRF, concatenation-collision
forgery, stolen-cookie replay, cross-tab interference, sign-out
race).
3. IdP compromise scenarios (operator monitors IdP audit logs,
operator can rotate group-role mappings without redeploying,
audit trail records source provider, provider-delete returns
409 with active sessions).
4. Back-channel logout failure modes (6-row table covering IdP
unreachable, invalid signature, replay via jti, alg confusion,
missing events claim, present-nonce-claim).
5. Group-claim manipulation (4-row table covering operator
misconfigured mapping, misconfigured groups_claim_path, IdP
renames a group, IdP user maintainer adds user to unintended
group).
6. Bootstrap phase risks post-Bundle-2 (4-row table covering
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN leak, CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS
misconfigured to a wide group, both bootstrap strategies
simultaneously, multi-IdP without explicit provider gate).
7. Break-glass risks (7-row table covering phished password,
online brute-force, offline brute-force on DB compromise,
operator forgets to disable, side-channel timing on
wrong-vs-no-credential-vs-locked, surface fingerprinting,
reserved-actor mutation).
8. Token-leak hygiene (the explicit grep policy with three
per-package logging_test.go pointers + the audit_redact.go
defense-in-depth note).
Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close section relabeled:
* Section header now reads "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close
(Bundle 2 closure status)" with each item carrying ✅ / ⚠️ /
"still deferred" markers.
* Items 1, 2, 3, 8 marked ✅ closed by Bundle 2.
* Items 4, 5, 7, 9 marked still-deferred with v3 / follow-on
pointers.
* Item 6 (rate limiting on bootstrap) marked acceptable; Bundle 2
adds the same rate-limit primitive to /auth/breakglass/login.
NEW: Threats Bundle 2 does NOT close section listing the 8 v3 /
future-work items:
* WebAuthn / FIDO2 second factor (Decision 12).
* Time-bound role grants / JIT elevation.
* SAML federation (operators broker through Keycloak).
* Multi-tenant data isolation activation (gated to managed-service
hosting work).
* HSM / FIPS-validated signing key for sessions.
* OIDC RP-initiated logout (Bundle 2 implements only back-channel).
* GUI E2E via Playwright.
* Per-IdP runbook external-tester sign-off (encouraged, NOT a merge
gate post-2026-05-10 policy change).
Operator-facing checks section extended:
* 6 new SQL-shaped checks for Bundle 2 (provider count drift,
per-actor session count, unmapped-groups audit-row spike,
break-glass usage outside incidents, OIDC first-admin one-row-per-
tenant invariant, retired-signing-key GC liveness).
Cross-references section split into Bundle 1 anchors + Bundle 2
anchors:
* Bundle 2 anchors enumerate every load-bearing file: 6
internal/auth/ packages, 5 migrations, 3 ci-guards.
Compliance mapping section UNCHANGED:
* Phase 15 (standards-and-RFC-implementation table) is the proper
home for the RFC + CWE evidence the Bundle 2 surface adds.
Re-introducing framework-mapping prose at the threat-model layer
would regress the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs
decision, which is explicitly forbidden by the Phase 15 prompt.
Verification
============
* `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` — confirmed via head -3.
* All 8 prompt-mandated Bundle 2 threat sub-sections present —
confirmed via grep `^### ` count (19 ### headers total: 6 Bundle
1 + 5 Bundle 2 defenses + 8 Bundle 2 threats).
* All 39 prompt-listed threat-vector keywords present — confirmed
via single-line grep counting 39 hits across the prompt's
vocabulary.
* Internal markdown links resolve cleanly — confirmed via shell
loop iterating each `]( ...)` reference and checking `[ -e "$path" ]`.
* No backend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit.
* `make verify` gate unchanged.
certctl Documentation
Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.
Getting Started
You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Concepts | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
| Quickstart | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
| Examples | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
| Advanced demo | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
| Why certctl | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
Reference
You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
| Profiles | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure) |
| API | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
| CLI | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
| Configuration | CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
| MCP server | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
| Release verification | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
| Intermediate CA hierarchy | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
| Deployment model | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
| Vendor matrix | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
Connectors
The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI
Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store
Protocols
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| ACME server | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
| ACME server threat model | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
| SCEP server | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
| SCEP for Microsoft Intune | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
| EST server | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
| CRL & OCSP | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
| Async CA polling | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
Operator
You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Security posture | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap |
| RBAC operator reference | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1) |
| Auth threat model | API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1) |
| OIDC / SSO runbooks | Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace (Bundle 2) |
| Control plane TLS | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
| Database TLS | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
| Approval workflow | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure |
| Helm deployment | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
| Performance baselines | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
| Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
Runbooks
| Runbook | When |
|---|---|
| Cloud targets | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
| Expiry alerts | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
| Disaster recovery | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
Migration
You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
| From | Doc |
|---|---|
| Certbot | migration/from-certbot.md |
| acme.sh | migration/from-acmesh.md |
| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md |
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | migration/acme-from-caddy.md |
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md |
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | migration/acme-from-traefik.md |
| API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) | migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — AUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade |
Contributor
You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Testing strategy | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
| Test environment | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
| QA prerequisites | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
| QA test suite | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
| GUI QA checklist | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
| Release sign-off | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
| CI pipeline | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
Archive
Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
| Doc | Why archived |
|---|---|
| Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
| Upgrade past v2 JWT removal | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
Reading order by role
First-time operator: Concepts → Quickstart → Examples. About 90 minutes end to end.
Production operator: Architecture → Security posture → Control plane TLS → Disaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.
PKI engineer: ACME server → SCEP server → EST server → Intermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.
Contributor: Architecture → Testing strategy → Test environment → CI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.