mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 15:11:29 +00:00
21aeed4f4e
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):
addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).
Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.
Generated via:
addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
-f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
-ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
cmd/ internal/
Verification:
find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
-not -path '*/testdata/*' \
-exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l
Returns: 0
gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
180 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
180 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
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package service
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import (
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"strings"
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)
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// Bundle-6 / Audit H-008 + M-022 / CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File):
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//
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// Audit events flow into the audit_events.details JSONB column. Pre-Bundle-6,
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// the middleware stored only `body_hash` (sha256 truncated) — no raw body —
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// but service-layer call sites pass arbitrary map[string]interface{} details
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// at every RecordEvent invocation. A future call site that accidentally
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// includes a credential key (api_key, password, ACME EAB secret, etc.) or
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// a PII key (email, phone, SSN, etc.) would persist plaintext into the
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// append-only audit table.
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//
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// This file is the chokepoint that scrubs every details map BEFORE
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// AuditService.RecordEvent marshals it. Two deny-lists:
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//
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// credentialKeys — value replaced with "[REDACTED:CREDENTIAL]"
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// piiKeys — value replaced with "[REDACTED:PII]"
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//
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// The redacted entry surfaces in `details.redacted_keys` so operators can
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// audit the redactor itself during a compliance review (GDPR Art. 30
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// records-of-processing requires this transparency).
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//
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// Match semantics:
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// - case-insensitive
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// - structural: walks nested maps and arrays
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// - exact key match (substring would over-redact — e.g. "tokenized_data")
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//
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// Compliance mapping:
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// - GDPR Art. 32 (data minimization) — M-022
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// - HIPAA §164.312(b) (audit controls) — paired with WORM trigger
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// - PCI-DSS 4.0 Req 3 (protect stored PII) — paired with M-018 (deferred)
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// credentialKeys are field names whose values must never appear in the
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// audit log. Match is case-insensitive. Add new entries when a new
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// credential-bearing field is introduced anywhere in the codebase.
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var credentialKeys = map[string]bool{
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"api_key": true,
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"apikey": true,
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"password": true,
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"passphrase": true,
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"secret": true,
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"client_secret": true,
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"token": true,
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"access_token": true,
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"refresh_token": true,
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"bootstrap_token": true,
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"credential": true,
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"credentials": true,
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"private_key": true,
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"privatekey": true,
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"private_key_pem": true,
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"key_pem": true,
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"cert_pem": true,
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"chain_pem": true,
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"full_pem": true,
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"eab_secret": true,
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"eab_kid": true,
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"acme_account_key": true,
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"hmac": true,
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"hmac_key": true,
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"signature": true,
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"auth": true,
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"authorization": true,
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"bearer": true,
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}
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// piiKeys are field names that may carry personal data. Redacted by
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// default; per-route opt-in retention is a future enhancement (post-Bundle-6).
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// Note `ip_address` is debatable — useful for forensics but flagged by
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// GDPR Art. 32 — defaulting to redact, operators can audit + adjust.
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var piiKeys = map[string]bool{
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"email": true,
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"email_address": true,
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"phone": true,
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"phone_number": true,
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"telephone": true,
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"ssn": true,
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"social_security": true,
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"dob": true,
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"date_of_birth": true,
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"name": true,
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"full_name": true,
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"first_name": true,
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"last_name": true,
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"surname": true,
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"address": true,
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"street": true,
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"street_address": true,
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"city": true,
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"postal_code": true,
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"zip": true,
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"zipcode": true,
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"ip": true,
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"ip_address": true,
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}
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// RedactDetailsForAudit walks a details map and returns a NEW map with
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// credential + PII values scrubbed. The original map is NOT mutated (so
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// service-layer code that reuses the map for other purposes is safe).
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//
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// The returned map is the original shape PLUS a `redacted_keys` array
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// listing every key path that was scrubbed. The array surfaces redaction
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// footprint to operators without exposing values.
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//
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// nil-in / empty-in returns nil so callers can pass through to
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// json.Marshal which renders "null" — matches pre-Bundle-6 behaviour
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// for nil-details RecordEvent calls.
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func RedactDetailsForAudit(details map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
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if len(details) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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out := make(map[string]interface{}, len(details)+1)
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var redactedKeys []string
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for k, v := range details {
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lower := strings.ToLower(k)
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switch {
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case credentialKeys[lower]:
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out[k] = "[REDACTED:CREDENTIAL]"
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redactedKeys = append(redactedKeys, k)
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case piiKeys[lower]:
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out[k] = "[REDACTED:PII]"
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redactedKeys = append(redactedKeys, k)
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default:
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// Recurse into nested maps + arrays so deeply-nested credentials
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// don't bypass the redactor. Primitives pass through unchanged.
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out[k] = redactValue(v, &redactedKeys, k)
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}
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}
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if len(redactedKeys) > 0 {
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// Surface the redaction footprint. If the caller accidentally
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// passed `redacted_keys` themselves, prefer ours — the redactor's
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// view of what was scrubbed is the load-bearing audit signal.
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out["redacted_keys"] = redactedKeys
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}
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return out
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}
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// redactValue is the recursive arm of RedactDetailsForAudit. It walks
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// arbitrary JSON-shaped values (map / slice / scalar) and returns a value
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// with credential + PII keys scrubbed. Mutation-free.
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func redactValue(v interface{}, redactedKeys *[]string, parentKey string) interface{} {
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switch typed := v.(type) {
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case map[string]interface{}:
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nested := make(map[string]interface{}, len(typed))
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for k, vv := range typed {
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lower := strings.ToLower(k)
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switch {
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case credentialKeys[lower]:
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nested[k] = "[REDACTED:CREDENTIAL]"
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*redactedKeys = append(*redactedKeys, parentKey+"."+k)
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case piiKeys[lower]:
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nested[k] = "[REDACTED:PII]"
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*redactedKeys = append(*redactedKeys, parentKey+"."+k)
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default:
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nested[k] = redactValue(vv, redactedKeys, parentKey+"."+k)
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}
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}
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return nested
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case []interface{}:
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nested := make([]interface{}, len(typed))
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for i, item := range typed {
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nested[i] = redactValue(item, redactedKeys, parentKey)
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}
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return nested
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default:
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// scalar (string, number, bool, nil) — pass through unchanged.
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return typed
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}
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}
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