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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
106 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
106 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"strings"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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)
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// assembleNamedAPIKeys translates the operator's CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED
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// env-var (preferred) or CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET (legacy) into the
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// auth.NamedAPIKey slice the rest of the boot path consumes.
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//
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// Authentication unification (M-002): every authenticated request now
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// carries a named actor in the request context so audit events record
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// the real key identity instead of the hardcoded "api-key-user"
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// string. Named keys come from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (preferred). For
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// backward compatibility CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is synthesized into
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// legacy-key-N entries with Admin=false.
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func assembleNamedAPIKeys(cfg *config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) []auth.NamedAPIKey {
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if config.AuthType(cfg.Auth.Type) == config.AuthTypeNone {
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return nil
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}
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var out []auth.NamedAPIKey
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for _, nk := range cfg.Auth.NamedKeys {
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out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
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Name: nk.Name,
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Key: nk.Key,
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Admin: nk.Admin,
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})
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}
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if len(out) == 0 && cfg.Auth.Secret != "" {
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idx := 0
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for _, p := range strings.Split(cfg.Auth.Secret, ",") {
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p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
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if p == "" {
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
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Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
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Key: p,
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Admin: false,
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})
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idx++
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}
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if len(out) > 0 && logger != nil {
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logger.Warn("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is deprecated — set CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named actor attribution and admin gating",
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"synthesized_keys", len(out))
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// actorRoleGranter is the narrow interface backfillNamedKeyActorRoles
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// needs from the postgres ActorRoleRepository. Pulled out so the unit
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// test can inject a fake without spinning up the full repo / DB.
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type actorRoleGranter interface {
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Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
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}
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// backfillNamedKeyActorRoles is the Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (C2)
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// startup hook that ensures every CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED entry — and
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// every legacy CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET synthesized fallback — has an
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// actor_roles row before the HTTP server accepts requests. Admin-flagged
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// keys grant `r-admin` (full canonical permission set); non-admin keys
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// grant `r-viewer` (read-only surface), matching the pre-Phase-3.5
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// capability shape.
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//
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// Idempotent via ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING in the repo Grant — reboots
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// don't create duplicates. Failures are logged but non-fatal: the server
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// still starts, and the operator can fix the grant via the RBAC API.
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//
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// The function is package-private + extracted from main() so the unit
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// test in auth_backfill_test.go can pin the role-mapping invariant
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// without depending on the full server bootstrap path.
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func backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(
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ctx context.Context,
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repo actorRoleGranter,
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keys []auth.NamedAPIKey,
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logger *slog.Logger,
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) {
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for _, nk := range keys {
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role := authdomain.RoleIDViewer
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if nk.Admin {
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role = authdomain.RoleIDAdmin
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}
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if err := repo.Grant(ctx, &authdomain.ActorRole{
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ActorID: nk.Name,
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ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
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RoleID: role,
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TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
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GrantedBy: "bootstrap",
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}); err != nil {
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if logger != nil {
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logger.Warn("api-key actor-role backfill failed; key authenticates but RBAC routes will 403 until grant is added via /v1/auth/keys",
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"key", nk.Name, "role", role, "err", err)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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