Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/scep_profile_counter_isolation_test.go
T
shankar0123 530593507b fix(scep-intune): close 11 audit gaps from 2026-04-29 pre-tag review
Closes the eleven gaps identified in the pre-v2.1.0 audit of the SCEP
RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle (cowork/scep-bundle-gap-closure-prompt.md).
Constitutional rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'Always
take the complete path, not the easy path' — drove this closure: each
gap was a load-bearing wire that crossed multiple layers (config →
validator → service wire-up → tests → docs) and shipping the bundle
without them would have produced lying-field footguns where operator-
visible config options stored values without affecting behavior.

WHAT LANDS:

Phase A — Clock-skew tolerance (master prompt §15 hazard closure)
  internal/scep/intune/challenge.go: ValidateChallenge migrated from
  positional args to ValidateOptions{} struct; new ClockSkewTolerance
  field with default 0 (strict). 24 call sites updated mechanically.
  Asymmetric application: now+tolerance >= iat AND now-tolerance < exp.
  internal/config/config.go: SCEPIntuneProfileConfig.ClockSkewTolerance
  default 60s + Validate() refusal when >= ChallengeValidity.
  cmd/server/main.go: SetIntuneIntegration signature extended;
  per-profile env-var loader honors CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE.
  internal/service/scep.go: intuneClockSkew field + IntuneStatsSnapshot
  surfaces clock_skew_tolerance_ns. web/src/api/types.ts mirrors.
  4 new tests in challenge_test.go covering accept-within-tolerance,
  reject-beyond-tolerance, accept-expired-within-tolerance,
  negative-treated-as-zero defensive normalization.
  docs/scep-intune.md updated with the new env var + time-bounds rule.

Phase B — unknown-version-rejected golden test
  internal/scep/intune/golden_helper_test.go: goldenUnknownVersionPayload
  helper + signGoldenChallengeAny generic signer.
  challenge_golden_test.go: TestGoldenChallenge_UnknownVersionRejected
  uses an in-process ECDSA fixture (the on-disk PEM was generated with
  a Go-stdlib version that produces different ecdsa.GenerateKey bytes
  from the current call). TestRegenerateGoldenFixtures emits the new
  unknown_version fixture file too.

Phase C — Two named Intune e2e tests
  internal/api/handler/scep_intune_e2e_test.go:
    TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_RateLimited_E2E (cap=2 + 3 attempts; 3rd
    returns FAILURE+badRequest with rate_limited counter ticked)
    TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_TrustAnchorSIGHUPReload_E2E (rotate
    on-disk PEM + holder.Reload(); old-key challenge fails with
    badMessageCheck; signature_invalid counter ticked)
  intuneE2EFixture struct extended with trustHolder + trustPath fields
  so tests can rotate.

Phase D — Four new ChromeOS hermetic tests (10 total now)
  internal/api/handler/scep_chromeos_test.go:
    _RAKeyMismatch — PKIMessage encrypted to wrong RA cert; handler
      rejects without reaching service.
    _3DESBackwardCompat — RFC 8894 §3.5.2 legacy fallback verified.
    _RSACSR + _ECDSACSR — explicit matrix-pair pinning.
  buildTestECDSACSR helper for ECDSA P-256 CSR construction;
  tripleDESCBCEncrypt mirrors aesCBCEncrypt for 3DES-CBC;
  assertChromeOSPositiveCertRep shared assertion.

Phase E — Per-profile counter isolation test
  internal/api/handler/scep_profile_counter_isolation_test.go:
    TestSCEPHandler_PerProfileIntuneCountersIsolated wires two
    SCEPService instances + drives distinct PKIMessages + asserts
    counter isolation. Guards against a future cmd/server/main.go
    refactor that shares a *intuneCounterTab across profiles.
  buildPerProfileIntuneFixture parameterized helper.

Phase F — Server-boot regression tests
  cmd/server/preflight_scep_intune_test.go: 3 named tests covering
  disabled-backward-compat, broken-config-with-PathID, expired-cert
  refusal. preflightSCEPIntuneTrustAnchor signature extended with
  pathID arg so error messages carry PathID= for operator log-grep.

Phase G — docs/connectors.md
  Four new subsections under §EST/SCEP Integration: multi-profile
  dispatch + mTLS sibling route + Intune Connector dispatcher + SCEP
  probe in network scanner. Each has a one-paragraph operator
  explanation + an env-var or endpoint table.

Phase H — Coverage uplift
  internal/service/scep_probe_persist_test.go: 5 unit tests on
  persistProbeResult (nil-safe + nil-repo-safe + repo-error swallow +
  nil-logger guard) + ListRecentSCEPProbes (empty-slice-not-nil + repo
  pass-through) + describeCertAlgorithm (RSA/ECDSA/QF1008-nil-curve
  defensive branch/Ed25519/DSA/empty). CI gates (service ≥70, handler
  ≥75) PASS at 70.9% / 79.3%.

Phase I — deploy/test integration variant
  deploy/test/scep_intune_e2e_test.go (//go:build integration):
    TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_Integration + _RateLimited_Integration
    against the live docker-compose certctl container. Skip-when-
    stack-missing semantics so sandbox + CI both work.
  deploy/docker-compose.test.yml: new e2eintune SCEP profile env
  vars + bind-mount of deploy/test/fixtures/.
  deploy/test/fixtures/README.md: documents the deterministic trust
  anchor regeneration recipe.

VERIFICATION (sandbox):
  gofmt -d        — clean for all changed files
  staticcheck     — clean for intune + handler + config + service +
                    cmd/server packages
  go vet          — clean for the same packages
  go test -short  — green for intune (95.3% cov), service (70.9%),
                    handler (79.3%), config (94.0%), cmd/server (boot
                    path; my preflight tests cover the directly-
                    testable function), pkcs7 (80.5% informational)

DEFERRED (per closure prompt §7 out-of-scope):
  - V3-Pro Conditional Access gating + Microsoft Graph integration
  - Standalone certctl-scan CLI binary
  - OCSP rate-limiting, OCSP stapling, delta CRLs

Spec preserved at cowork/scep-bundle-gap-closure-prompt.md;
journal at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md (audit-closure
section appended).
2026-04-29 20:28:53 +00:00

213 lines
8.2 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/pem"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/pkcs7"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/scep/intune"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
)
// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master prompt §13 line 1851 acceptance —
// "Per-profile dispatch test must prove per-profile counters in
// metrics." Closed in the 2026-04-29 audit-closure bundle (Phase E).
//
// Why this test exists separately from the existing router-level
// /scep/<pathID> dispatch test (TestRouter_RegisterSCEPHandlers_
// MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed): that test proves the route table
// doesn't bleed; this one proves the in-memory observability state
// (intuneCounterTab) is per-SCEPService, not shared. The bug class
// it guards against is a future cmd/server/main.go refactor that
// constructs a single shared *intuneCounterTab and injects it into
// every per-profile service — that would compile cleanly, pass the
// existing route-table test, and silently inflate one profile's
// counters with another's traffic.
// TestSCEPHandler_PerProfileIntuneCountersIsolated wires two real
// SCEPService instances, each with its OWN trust anchor + audience.
// A success on profile "corp" MUST NOT tick "iot"'s success counter,
// and vice versa for the failure path. The test constructs the
// fixtures hermetically (no shared state between the two profiles
// except the test's t.TempDir + selfSignedRSACert helpers).
func TestSCEPHandler_PerProfileIntuneCountersIsolated(t *testing.T) {
corpFix := buildPerProfileIntuneFixture(t, "corp", "https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp")
iotFix := buildPerProfileIntuneFixture(t, "iot", "https://certctl.example.com/scep/iot")
now := time.Now()
// --- Drive a SUCCESS through CORP ---
corpChallenge := signIntuneChallengeES256(t, corpFix.connectorKey, map[string]any{
"iss": "intune-connector-corp-fixture",
"sub": "device-guid-corp-001",
"aud": "https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp",
"iat": now.Add(-1 * time.Minute).Unix(),
"exp": now.Add(59 * time.Minute).Unix(),
"nonce": "iso-corp-nonce-001",
"device_name": "device-corp-001.example.com",
})
corpMsg := buildIntuneE2EPKIMessage(t, corpFix, "txn-iso-corp", corpChallenge, "device-corp-001.example.com")
w, body := postPKIOperation(t, corpFix.handler, corpMsg)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("corp success: HTTP %d (body=%q)", w.Code, body)
}
// --- Drive an EXPIRED challenge through IOT ---
iotChallenge := signIntuneChallengeES256(t, iotFix.connectorKey, map[string]any{
"iss": "intune-connector-iot-fixture",
"sub": "device-guid-iot-001",
"aud": "https://certctl.example.com/scep/iot",
"iat": now.Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix(),
"exp": now.Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix(), // expired
"nonce": "iso-iot-nonce-001",
"device_name": "device-iot-001.example.com",
})
iotMsg := buildIntuneE2EPKIMessage(t, iotFix, "txn-iso-iot", iotChallenge, "device-iot-001.example.com")
w, body = postPKIOperation(t, iotFix.handler, iotMsg)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("iot expired: HTTP %d — RFC 8894 §3.3 mandates a CertRep on every PKIOperation including failures; body=%q", w.Code, body)
}
certRep, err := pkcs7.ParseSignedData(body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("iot expired: ParseSignedData: %v", err)
}
statusStr := decodeFirstSetMember(t, certRep.SignerInfos[0].AuthAttributes[pkcs7.OIDSCEPPKIStatus.String()])
if statusStr != string(domain.SCEPStatusFailure) {
t.Errorf("iot expired pkiStatus = %q, want FAILURE", statusStr)
}
// --- Assert per-service counter isolation ---
corpStats := corpFix.scepService.IntuneStats(time.Now())
iotStats := iotFix.scepService.IntuneStats(time.Now())
if got, want := corpStats.PathID, "corp"; got != want {
t.Errorf("corp PathID = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
if got, want := iotStats.PathID, "iot"; got != want {
t.Errorf("iot PathID = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
// CORP should have exactly one success and zero of every other label.
if got := corpStats.Counters["success"]; got != 1 {
t.Errorf("corp.Counters[success] = %d, want 1", got)
}
if got := corpStats.Counters["expired"]; got != 0 {
t.Errorf("corp.Counters[expired] = %d, want 0 (iot's expired traffic must NOT bleed into corp)", got)
}
// IOT should have exactly one expired and zero successes.
if got := iotStats.Counters["expired"]; got != 1 {
t.Errorf("iot.Counters[expired] = %d, want 1", got)
}
if got := iotStats.Counters["success"]; got != 0 {
t.Errorf("iot.Counters[success] = %d, want 0 (corp's success traffic must NOT bleed into iot)", got)
}
// And the issuer-side state — corp's mock issuer saw the issuance,
// iot's did not. This pins that the per-profile dispatch reaches
// the per-profile issuer connector too (not just the counter tab).
if got, want := len(corpFix.issuer.issued), 1; got != want {
t.Errorf("corp issuances = %d, want %d", got, want)
}
if got, want := len(iotFix.issuer.issued), 0; got != want {
t.Errorf("iot issuances = %d, want %d (iot's expired challenge must NOT have produced issuance)", got, want)
}
}
// buildPerProfileIntuneFixture builds an Intune-enabled SCEPService for
// the given pathID + audience, with its own freshly-generated trust
// anchor + RA pair + issuer mock. Mirrors newIntuneE2EFixture but
// parameterized so the per-profile-isolation test can stand up two
// independent stacks side-by-side.
func buildPerProfileIntuneFixture(t *testing.T, pathID, audience string) *intuneE2EFixture {
t.Helper()
connectorKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("connector key (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
connectorCert := selfSignedECCertForIntuneE2E(t, connectorKey, "intune-connector-"+pathID)
dir := t.TempDir()
trustPath := filepath.Join(dir, "intune-trust-"+pathID+".pem")
if err := os.WriteFile(trustPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: connectorCert.Raw}), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write trust anchor (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
trustHolder, err := intune.NewTrustAnchorHolder(trustPath, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError + 10})))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchorHolder (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
raKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ra key (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
raCert := selfSignedRSACert(t, raKey, "ra-iso-"+pathID)
caKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ca key (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
caCert := selfSignedRSACert(t, caKey, "test-fixture-ca-"+pathID)
caPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caCert.Raw})
issuer := &intuneE2EIssuerConnector{
caPEM: string(caPEM),
signKey: caKey,
caCert: caCert,
}
auditRepo := &intuneE2EAuditRepo{}
auditSvc := service.NewAuditService(auditRepo)
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError + 10}))
scepSvc := service.NewSCEPService("iss-"+pathID, issuer, auditSvc, logger, "static-fallback-"+pathID)
scepSvc.SetPathID(pathID)
scepSvc.SetIntuneIntegration(
trustHolder,
audience,
60*time.Minute,
0, // ClockSkewTolerance — strict
intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
)
deviceKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("device key (%s): %v", pathID, err)
}
deviceCert := selfSignedRSACert(t, deviceKey, "device-iso-"+pathID)
handler := NewSCEPHandler(scepSvc)
handler.SetRAPair(raCert, raKey)
return &intuneE2EFixture{
connectorKey: connectorKey,
connectorDir: dir,
trustPath: trustPath,
trustHolder: trustHolder,
raKey: raKey,
raCert: raCert,
deviceKey: deviceKey,
deviceCert: deviceCert,
issuer: issuer,
auditRepo: auditRepo,
scepService: scepSvc,
handler: handler,
}
}
// silence unused-import for httptest (only needed if a future test in
// this file constructs requests directly — kept here to avoid a
// goimports-driven churn the next time the file gains a test).
var _ = httptest.NewRecorder