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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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3e78ecb799
Closes three 2026-04-24 audit findings (all P2):
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118: noAuthHandler chain accepted arbitrary-size
bodies (EST simpleenroll, SCEP, PKI CRL/OCSP, /health, /ready).
Memory exhaustion vector without HTTP-layer auth gatekeeping.
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers: zero security headers on any
response. Clickjacking, MIME-sniffing, untrusted-origin resource
loads against the dashboard and API.
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation: CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
accepted with any non-empty value including a single character.
PBKDF2-SHA256 (100k rounds) does not compensate for low-entropy
passphrases at scale (CWE-916, CWE-329).
Changes:
- cmd/server/main.go::noAuthHandler chain — added bodyLimitMiddleware
+ securityHeadersMiddleware. Same default cap as authed surface
(1MB via CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE), same 413 on overflow.
- cmd/server/main.go::middlewareStack (authed) — added
securityHeadersMiddleware before corsMiddleware.
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go (new) — SecurityHeaders
middleware + SecurityHeadersDefaults() with conservative defaults:
HSTS 1y+includeSubDomains, X-Frame-Options DENY, X-Content-Type-
Options nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer-when-downgrade, CSP
default-src 'self' + img/data + style 'unsafe-inline' (Tailwind/Vite
needs it; scripts still 'self' only) + connect 'self' + frame-
ancestors 'none'. Operators behind a customising reverse proxy can
disable any header by setting its config field to empty.
- internal/config/config.go::Validate() — enforce minEncryptionKeyLength
= 32 bytes when CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set. Empty stays
accepted (downstream fail-closed sentinel handles it). Structured
error names the env var, the actual length, the required minimum,
and the canonical generation command (`openssl rand -base64 32`).
Tests:
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders_test.go (new) — 4 cases
(defaults present, empty value disables single header, override
applied, headers on 4xx/5xx).
- internal/config/config_test.go — 5 new cases for the encryption-key
length check (empty accepted, 1-byte rejected, 31-byte rejected at
boundary, 32-byte accepted, 44-byte realistic operator key accepted).
Documentation:
- CHANGELOG.md — H-1 section above D-2 under [unreleased] with
Breaking-change callout (operators with low-entropy keys must rotate
before upgrade).
- coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md — Live Tracker
25/47 → 33/47, P1 14/14 (zero remaining), P2 11/27 → 16/27. Three
H-1 findings flipped + closed-bundle row added.
Verification:
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- golangci-lint v2.11.4 run ./... — 0 issues
- go test ./internal/api/middleware/... — pass (incl. 4 new
SecurityHeaders cases)
- go test ./internal/config/... — pass (incl. 5 new EncryptionKey
cases)
- tsc --noEmit (frontend) — clean
- All sibling guardrails (S-1 / G-3 / D-1 / D-2 / B-1 / L-1) still pass
Audit findings closed:
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118 (P2)
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers (P2)
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation (P2)
Breaking change:
- Operators with CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY shorter than 32 bytes
must rotate before upgrade. Generate via `openssl rand -base64 32`.
Deferred follow-ups:
- Weak-key dictionary check (reject password123, common ASCII patterns)
— adds operational friction with low marginal entropy gain at the
32-byte minimum.
- CSP 'unsafe-inline' for styles — required for Tailwind/Vite
per-component <style> blocks; removing requires HTML report or
component refactor outside H-1 scope.
- Permissions-Policy header — dashboard uses no advanced browser APIs
(camera, mic, geolocation); deferred until a real consumer needs it.
97 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
97 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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// SecurityHeadersConfig configures the SecurityHeaders middleware.
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//
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// Each field is the literal value to send. An empty string means
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// "do not send this header" — operators behind a customising reverse
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// proxy can disable any header per-deployment without touching code.
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// Defaults are applied via SecurityHeadersDefaults() which encodes
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// the H-1 closure's recommended baseline for an HTTPS-only API+UI
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// host: HSTS, deny-frame, no-MIME-sniff, conservative CSP, and a
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// no-referrer-when-downgrade fallback.
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//
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// H-1 closure (cat-s11-missing_security_headers).
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type SecurityHeadersConfig struct {
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HSTS string // Strict-Transport-Security
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FrameOptions string // X-Frame-Options
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ContentTypeOptions string // X-Content-Type-Options
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ReferrerPolicy string // Referrer-Policy
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ContentSecurityPolicy string // Content-Security-Policy
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}
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// SecurityHeadersDefaults returns a recommended baseline.
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//
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// CSP: default-src 'self' confines fetches to the same origin.
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// img-src 'self' data: allows inline base64 images (used by the
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// dashboard's certctl-logo and a few status icons).
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// style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' is required because Tailwind
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// (via Vite) injects per-component <style> blocks at build time;
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// without 'unsafe-inline' the dashboard would render unstyled.
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// 'unsafe-inline' is intentionally NOT in script-src — the
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// front-end ships as a bundled JS file, no inline scripts.
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//
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// HSTS: 1-year max-age + includeSubDomains. No `preload` directive
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// because preload submission requires explicit operator action and
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// the deployment topology may not span all subdomains.
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//
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// X-Frame-Options: DENY — the dashboard does not need to be embedded
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// anywhere, and DENY is more conservative than SAMEORIGIN against
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// clickjacking via subdomain takeover.
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//
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// X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff — prevent MIME sniffing on
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// JSON/PEM responses that browsers might otherwise interpret as HTML.
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//
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// Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade — preserves Referer
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// for same-origin navigation (useful for support/diagnostics) but
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// strips it on HTTPS→HTTP transitions.
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func SecurityHeadersDefaults() SecurityHeadersConfig {
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return SecurityHeadersConfig{
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HSTS: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
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FrameOptions: "DENY",
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ContentTypeOptions: "nosniff",
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ReferrerPolicy: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
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ContentSecurityPolicy: "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
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}
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}
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// SecurityHeaders returns a middleware that applies the configured
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// HTTP response headers on every response. Headers configured to the
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// empty string are omitted (operator opted out for that deployment).
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//
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// Apply BEFORE the audit middleware so headers reach 4xx/5xx responses
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// — which is where header omissions matter most for the security
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// posture (an attacker probing for misconfiguration sees the same
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// headers on a 401 as on a 200).
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func SecurityHeaders(cfg SecurityHeadersConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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// Pre-trim each value once; the per-request hot path stays a
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// straight set of map writes.
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type headerEntry struct{ name, value string }
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entries := make([]headerEntry, 0, 5)
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add := func(name, value string) {
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v := strings.TrimSpace(value)
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if v != "" {
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entries = append(entries, headerEntry{name, v})
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}
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}
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add("Strict-Transport-Security", cfg.HSTS)
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add("X-Frame-Options", cfg.FrameOptions)
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add("X-Content-Type-Options", cfg.ContentTypeOptions)
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add("Referrer-Policy", cfg.ReferrerPolicy)
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add("Content-Security-Policy", cfg.ContentSecurityPolicy)
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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h := w.Header()
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for _, e := range entries {
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h.Set(e.name, e.value)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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