mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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0e06f6c4fc
Closes findings P3-1 and P3-2 from the 2026-05-05 CLI/API/MCP↔GUI parity
audit (cowork/cli-gui-parity-audit-2026-05-05/RESULTS.md). Both findings
flagged hidden defaults that the CLI was sending without exposing them
to operators: `force=false` baked into every renew payload, and a silent
fallback to `reason="unspecified"` whenever --reason was omitted.
P3-1 — promote --force on `certs renew` (full end-to-end plumbing)
The pre-2026-05-05 CLI sent `{"force": false}` in the renew body. The
API handler never decoded it — a textbook "lying field" per the
operator's CLAUDE.md "complete path, not the easy path" rule: the body
field stored a value, claimed to do something, and silently did nothing
because the wire never reached the consumer. Adding a --force flag that
also went unread would have created another lying field.
This commit takes the complete path:
service.CertificateService.TriggerRenewal grew a `force bool` parameter
(internal/service/certificate.go). When force=true, the
RenewalInProgress block is overridden so operators can recover stuck
in-flight renewals where a previous job hung without releasing the
status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal blockers regardless
of force — those are semantic dead-ends that --force should not paper
over (archived = decommissioned, expired = issue a new cert instead of
renewing a dead one).
handler.CertificateHandler.TriggerRenewal parses force from
?force=true (or ?force=1) query param, OR {"force": true} JSON body,
whichever the client picks. Defaults to false. Passes through to the
service.
internal/cli/client.go::RenewCertificate(id, force bool) sends
?force=true on the URL when --force is set. The historical hardcoded
`{"force": false}` body is gone — no more lying field.
cmd/cli/main.go dispatches `certs renew <id> [--force]` (ID-first
flag-second convention matches the existing `agents retire <id>
[--force]`).
P3-2 — require --reason on `certs revoke` (Option A: strict refusal)
The pre-2026-05-05 CLI dropped to `--reason unspecified` whenever the
operator omitted the flag. Compliance reporting (RFC 5280 §5.3.1, PCI-
DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312) relies on the reason code being meaningful;
silent fallback defeats the audit trail because every revocation looks
identical.
cmd/cli/main.go dispatch refuses to send when --reason is empty,
prints the canonical RFC 5280 §5.3.1 reason-code menu, and exits
non-zero.
internal/cli/client.go exposes ValidRevokeReasons() returning the
canonical camelCase list (unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold,
removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aaCompromise) and
NormalizeRevokeReason() that accepts both camelCase and snake_case
inputs and normalises to the canonical wire form. Off-list reasons
are rejected at dispatch with the menu re-printed.
Test pins:
internal/cli/client_test.go::TestClient_RenewCertificate_ForceFlag —
--force=true sends ?force=true with empty body; --force=false sends
no query and no body.
internal/cli/client_test.go::TestNormalizeRevokeReason +
TestValidRevokeReasons — canonical-camelCase + snake_case + reject-
off-enum behaviour.
cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go::TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RequiresReason +
TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RejectsUnknownReason +
TestHandleCerts_Renew_ForceFlag — dispatch-layer pins for the same
contracts.
internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
ForceQueryParam — query-param passthrough (no-flag, force=true,
force=1, force=false) flows through to the service-layer parameter.
internal/service/certificate_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
ForceOverridesInProgress — force=false preserves the
RenewalInProgress block; force=true clears it.
Existing TestTriggerRenewal_Archived extended to assert force=true
still blocks Archived (terminal-state guarantee).
Docs: docs/reference/cli.md updated with the --force example for renew
and the strict --reason semantics for revoke (including snake_case
input acceptance).
Acceptance gate (verified):
- go build ./cmd/server/... ./cmd/agent/... ./cmd/cli/...
./cmd/mcp-server/... clean.
- go vet ./... clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./... pass repo-wide.
- bash scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh clean
(router 178, OpenAPI 144, exceptions 36 — unchanged; we add
parameter parsing, not routes).
- gofmt -l clean.
685 lines
25 KiB
Go
685 lines
25 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// CertificateService provides business logic for certificate management.
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type CertificateService struct {
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
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targetRepo repository.TargetRepository
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jobRepo repository.JobRepository
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policyService *PolicyService
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auditService *AuditService
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revSvc *RevocationSvc
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caSvc *CAOperationsSvc
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// tx, when set, wraps the issuance write (cert insert + audit row)
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// in a single transaction so the audit row cannot be silently lost
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// after a successful cert insert. Closes the #3 audit-readiness
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// blocker (atomic audit rows). Optional via SetTransactor — when
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// nil, Create falls back to the legacy non-transactional path
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// (cert.Create + best-effort RecordEvent) for backward compatibility.
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tx repository.Transactor
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// crlCacheSvc, when set, makes GenerateDERCRL serve from the
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// pre-generated cache instead of regenerating per request. Bundle
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// CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4. Optional; when nil GenerateDERCRL
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// falls back to the historical on-demand path via caSvc.
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crlCacheSvc *CRLCacheService
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keygenMode string
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// approvalSvc + profileRepo, when both set, gate TriggerRenewal on
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// CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval. The job is created at
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// JobStatusAwaitingApproval (rather than Pending / AwaitingCSR) and
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// a parallel ApprovalRequest row is created via approvalSvc. The
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// scheduler does NOT dispatch until ApprovalService.Approve
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// transitions the job to Pending. Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03
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// Infisical deep-research deliverable. Both setters are optional —
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// when either is nil, gating is skipped and TriggerRenewal falls
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// back to the historical unattended path.
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approvalSvc *ApprovalService
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profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
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}
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// NewCertificateService creates a new certificate service.
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func NewCertificateService(
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
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policyService *PolicyService,
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auditService *AuditService,
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) *CertificateService {
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return &CertificateService{
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certRepo: certRepo,
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policyService: policyService,
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auditService: auditService,
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}
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}
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// SetTransactor wires a Transactor for atomic issuance (cert insert +
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// audit row) and atomic revocation (cert update + revocation row + audit
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// row). Closes the #3 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01
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// issuer coverage audit. Optional — when nil, Create falls back to the
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// legacy non-transactional path for backward compat with callers that
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// haven't been updated.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetTransactor(tx repository.Transactor) {
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s.tx = tx
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}
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// SetRevocationSvc sets the revocation service.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetRevocationSvc(svc *RevocationSvc) {
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s.revSvc = svc
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}
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// SetCAOperationsSvc sets the CA operations service.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetCAOperationsSvc(svc *CAOperationsSvc) {
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s.caSvc = svc
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}
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// SetCRLCacheSvc wires the CRL cache service. When set, GenerateDERCRL
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// reads from the scheduler-pre-generated cache (cheap DB lookup) and
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// only triggers an on-demand regeneration on cache miss / staleness.
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// When unset, GenerateDERCRL falls back to the historical per-request
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// regeneration via caSvc.
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//
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// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetCRLCacheSvc(svc *CRLCacheService) {
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s.crlCacheSvc = svc
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}
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// SetTargetRepo sets the target repository for deployment queries.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetTargetRepo(repo repository.TargetRepository) {
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s.targetRepo = repo
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}
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// SetJobRepo sets the job repository for creating renewal/issuance jobs.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetJobRepo(repo repository.JobRepository) {
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s.jobRepo = repo
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}
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// SetKeygenMode sets the key generation mode (agent or server).
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func (s *CertificateService) SetKeygenMode(mode string) {
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s.keygenMode = mode
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}
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// SetApprovalService wires the approval-workflow service. When both this
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// and SetProfileRepo are wired, TriggerRenewal gates on
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// CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval. Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical
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// deep-research deliverable.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetApprovalService(svc *ApprovalService) {
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s.approvalSvc = svc
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}
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// SetProfileRepo wires the certificate-profile repository for the
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// approval-workflow gate. Without it, TriggerRenewal cannot read the
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// per-profile RequiresApproval flag and gating is skipped.
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func (s *CertificateService) SetProfileRepo(repo repository.CertificateProfileRepository) {
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s.profileRepo = repo
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}
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// List returns a paginated list of certificates matching the filter.
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func (s *CertificateService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]*domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
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certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates: %w", err)
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}
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return certs, total, nil
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}
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// ListCertificatesWithFilter returns a list of certificates with advanced filtering (M20).
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// This method supports the new M20 filters and returns domain.ManagedCertificate (not pointers).
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func (s *CertificateService) ListCertificatesWithFilter(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
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certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates with filter: %w", err)
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}
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// Convert pointers to values for handler compatibility
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result := make([]domain.ManagedCertificate, len(certs))
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for i, cert := range certs {
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result[i] = *cert
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}
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return result, total, nil
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}
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// Get retrieves a certificate by ID.
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func (s *CertificateService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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return cert, nil
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}
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// Create validates and stores a new certificate.
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func (s *CertificateService) Create(ctx context.Context, cert *domain.ManagedCertificate, actor string) error {
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// Validate certificate structure
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if cert.ID == "" || cert.CommonName == "" || cert.IssuerID == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid certificate: missing required fields")
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}
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// Run policy validation
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violations, err := s.policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("policy validation failed: %w", err)
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}
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if len(violations) > 0 {
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// Record violations but do not block creation
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for _, v := range violations {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"policy_violation_detected", "certificate", cert.ID,
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map[string]interface{}{"rule_id": v.RuleID, "message": v.Message}); auditErr != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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}
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auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}
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// Atomic path (production): cert insert + audit row in a single
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// transaction. Closes the #3 audit-readiness blocker — if the audit
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// insert fails after the cert insert, the cert insert rolls back so
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// the operator sees the failure and the audit trail is never silently
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// incomplete.
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if s.tx != nil {
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return s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
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if err := s.certRepo.CreateWithTx(ctx, q, cert); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"certificate_created", "certificate", cert.ID, auditDetails); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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})
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}
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// Legacy non-transactional path — kept for callers that haven't
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// wired SetTransactor yet. Fails open on audit-insert failure (logs
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// and returns success), which is the pre-fix behavior; do not
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// rely on this path for compliance-relevant audit trails.
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if err := s.certRepo.Create(ctx, cert); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"certificate_created", "certificate", cert.ID, auditDetails); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Update modifies an existing certificate.
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func (s *CertificateService) Update(ctx context.Context, cert *domain.ManagedCertificate, actor string) error {
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existing, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, cert.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch existing certificate: %w", err)
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}
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// Run policy validation on updated cert
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violations, err := s.policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("policy validation failed: %w", err)
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}
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if len(violations) > 0 {
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for _, v := range violations {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"policy_violation_detected", "certificate", cert.ID,
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map[string]interface{}{"rule_id": v.RuleID, "message": v.Message}); auditErr != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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}
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// Store updated certificate
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if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate: %w", err)
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}
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// Record audit event with diff info
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changes := map[string]interface{}{}
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if existing.Status != cert.Status {
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changes["status"] = fmt.Sprintf("%s -> %s", existing.Status, cert.Status)
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}
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if existing.ExpiresAt != cert.ExpiresAt {
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changes["expiry"] = fmt.Sprintf("%s -> %s", existing.ExpiresAt, cert.ExpiresAt)
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}
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if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"certificate_updated", "certificate", cert.ID, changes); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Archive marks a certificate as archived.
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func (s *CertificateService) Archive(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) error {
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.certRepo.Archive(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to archive certificate: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"certificate_archived", "certificate", id,
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map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// GetVersions returns all versions of a certificate.
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func (s *CertificateService) GetVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]*domain.CertificateVersion, error) {
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versions, err := s.certRepo.ListVersions(ctx, certID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificate versions: %w", err)
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}
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return versions, nil
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}
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// TriggerRenewal initiates a renewal job if the certificate is eligible.
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// Creates a Renewal job (or Issuance for new certs) so the scheduler's job processor
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// can pick it up and route it through the issuer connector.
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//
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// 2026-05-05 parity-defaults-cleanup (P3-1): the `force` parameter, when
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// true, overrides the RenewalInProgress block — operators use this to
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// recover from a stuck in-flight renewal where the previous job hung
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// without releasing the status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal
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// blockers regardless of force; those are semantic dead-ends (archived =
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// "this cert is decommissioned", expired = "issue a new cert, don't renew
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// a dead one") that --force should not paper over.
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func (s *CertificateService) TriggerRenewal(ctx context.Context, certID string, actor string, force bool) error {
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
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}
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// Validate eligibility
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if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot renew archived certificate")
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}
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if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusExpired {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot renew expired certificate; reissue instead")
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}
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// Check if already renewing — overridable with force=true so operators
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// can clear stuck in-flight renewals.
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if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusRenewalInProgress && !force {
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return fmt.Errorf("certificate renewal already in progress")
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}
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// Update status
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cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusRenewalInProgress
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if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate status: %w", err)
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}
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// Create a renewal job so the job processor can pick it up.
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// In agent keygen mode, the job starts as AwaitingCSR so the agent
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// generates the key pair and submits a CSR. In server mode, it starts as Pending.
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//
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// Rank 7: if the cert's profile has RequiresApproval=true and the
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// approval service + profile repo are wired, the job is created at
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// JobStatusAwaitingApproval (overriding the keygen-mode default) and
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// a parallel ApprovalRequest row is created. The scheduler does NOT
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// dispatch until ApprovalService.Approve transitions the job to
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// Pending. Profile lookup failures fall back to the historical
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// unattended path so a transient profile-repo error never silently
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// blocks renewal — the gate is fail-open from the operator's
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// perspective + fail-loud via the slog warning.
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if s.jobRepo != nil {
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needsApproval := false
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var approvalProfileID string
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if s.approvalSvc != nil && s.profileRepo != nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
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profile, profileErr := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
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if profileErr != nil {
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slog.Warn("approval gate: profile lookup failed; falling back to unattended path",
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"cert_id", cert.ID, "profile_id", cert.CertificateProfileID, "error", profileErr)
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} else if profile != nil && profile.RequiresApproval {
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needsApproval = true
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approvalProfileID = profile.ID
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}
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}
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jobStatus := domain.JobStatusPending
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switch {
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case needsApproval:
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jobStatus = domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval
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case s.keygenMode == "agent":
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jobStatus = domain.JobStatusAwaitingCSR
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}
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// Determine job type: Issuance for certs that have never been issued,
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// Renewal for certs that already have a version.
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jobType := domain.JobTypeRenewal
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if cert.ExpiresAt.IsZero() || cert.ExpiresAt.Year() < 2000 {
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jobType = domain.JobTypeIssuance
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}
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: generateID("job"),
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CertificateID: cert.ID,
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Type: jobType,
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Status: jobStatus,
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MaxAttempts: 3,
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ScheduledAt: time.Now(),
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CreatedAt: time.Now(),
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}
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if err := s.jobRepo.Create(ctx, job); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to create renewal job", "cert_id", cert.ID, "error", err)
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create renewal job: %w", err)
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}
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// Create the parallel ApprovalRequest row. If RequestApproval fails,
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// transition the job to Cancelled so the scheduler doesn't dispatch
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// a half-gated request (defense in depth — without this, a partial
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// failure would leave the job at AwaitingApproval forever, blocking
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// renewal until the operator manually intervenes).
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|
if needsApproval {
|
|
metadata := map[string]string{
|
|
"common_name": cert.CommonName,
|
|
}
|
|
if _, apErr := s.approvalSvc.RequestApproval(ctx, cert, job.ID, approvalProfileID, actor, metadata); apErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("approval gate: failed to create ApprovalRequest row; cancelling gated job",
|
|
"cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID, "error", apErr)
|
|
if cancelErr := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, job.ID, domain.JobStatusCancelled,
|
|
"approval request creation failed: "+apErr.Error()); cancelErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("approval gate: also failed to cancel orphan job",
|
|
"cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID, "error", cancelErr)
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create approval request: %w", apErr)
|
|
}
|
|
slog.Info("approval gate fired", "cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID,
|
|
"profile_id", approvalProfileID, "requested_by", actor)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
slog.Info("created renewal job via API trigger",
|
|
"job_id", job.ID,
|
|
"cert_id", cert.ID,
|
|
"job_type", string(jobType),
|
|
"job_status", string(jobStatus),
|
|
"keygen_mode", s.keygenMode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Record audit event
|
|
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
|
|
"renewal_triggered", "certificate", certID,
|
|
map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TriggerDeployment creates deployment jobs for all targets of a certificate.
|
|
// The targetID parameter is accepted from the handler interface but currently unused;
|
|
// deployment coordination happens per-certificate across all of its targets.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) TriggerDeployment(ctx context.Context, certID string, targetID string, actor string) error {
|
|
_ = targetID
|
|
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot deploy archived certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: In practice, the DeploymentService would be called to create jobs.
|
|
// This is a placeholder for the coordination logic.
|
|
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
|
|
"deployment_triggered", "certificate", certID,
|
|
map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListCertificates returns paginated certificates with optional filtering (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, status, environment, ownerID, teamID, issuerID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int64, error) {
|
|
if page < 1 {
|
|
page = 1
|
|
}
|
|
if perPage < 1 {
|
|
perPage = 50
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build filter for repository
|
|
filter := &repository.CertificateFilter{
|
|
Status: status,
|
|
Environment: environment,
|
|
OwnerID: ownerID,
|
|
TeamID: teamID,
|
|
IssuerID: issuerID,
|
|
Page: page,
|
|
PerPage: perPage,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var result []domain.ManagedCertificate
|
|
for _, c := range certs {
|
|
if c != nil {
|
|
result = append(result, *c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result, int64(total), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCertificate returns a single certificate (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
|
|
return s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCertificate creates a new certificate (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
|
|
if cert.ID == "" {
|
|
cert.ID = generateID("cert")
|
|
}
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
if cert.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
cert.CreatedAt = now
|
|
}
|
|
if cert.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
cert.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
}
|
|
// Default status to Pending if not set (DB column DEFAULT only applies when column is omitted from INSERT)
|
|
if cert.Status == "" {
|
|
cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusPending
|
|
}
|
|
// Default tags to empty map if nil (avoids JSON null in JSONB column)
|
|
if cert.Tags == nil {
|
|
cert.Tags = make(map[string]string)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.certRepo.Create(ctx, &cert); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return &cert, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateCertificate modifies a certificate (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) UpdateCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string, patch domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
|
|
// Fetch existing certificate so partial updates don't zero out fields
|
|
existing, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Merge non-zero fields from patch into existing
|
|
if patch.Name != "" {
|
|
existing.Name = patch.Name
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.CommonName != "" {
|
|
existing.CommonName = patch.CommonName
|
|
}
|
|
if len(patch.SANs) > 0 {
|
|
existing.SANs = patch.SANs
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.Environment != "" {
|
|
existing.Environment = patch.Environment
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.OwnerID != "" {
|
|
existing.OwnerID = patch.OwnerID
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.TeamID != "" {
|
|
existing.TeamID = patch.TeamID
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.IssuerID != "" {
|
|
existing.IssuerID = patch.IssuerID
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.RenewalPolicyID != "" {
|
|
existing.RenewalPolicyID = patch.RenewalPolicyID
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.CertificateProfileID != "" {
|
|
existing.CertificateProfileID = patch.CertificateProfileID
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.Status != "" {
|
|
existing.Status = patch.Status
|
|
}
|
|
if patch.Tags != nil {
|
|
existing.Tags = patch.Tags
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
existing.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, existing); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return existing, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ArchiveCertificate marks a certificate as archived (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) ArchiveCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
|
|
return s.certRepo.Archive(ctx, id)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCertificateVersions returns certificate versions (handler interface method).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificateVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateVersion, int64, error) {
|
|
if page < 1 {
|
|
page = 1
|
|
}
|
|
if perPage < 1 {
|
|
perPage = 50
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
versions, err := s.certRepo.ListVersions(ctx, certID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificate versions: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total := int64(len(versions))
|
|
start := (page - 1) * perPage
|
|
if start >= int(total) {
|
|
return nil, total, nil
|
|
}
|
|
end := start + perPage
|
|
if end > int(total) {
|
|
end = int(total)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var result []domain.CertificateVersion
|
|
for _, v := range versions[start:end] {
|
|
if v != nil {
|
|
result = append(result, *v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result, total, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeCertificate performs revocation with actor tracking. Delegates to RevocationSvc.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error {
|
|
if s.revSvc == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("revocation service not configured")
|
|
}
|
|
return s.revSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor(ctx, certID, reason, actor)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetRevokedCertificates returns all revoked certificate records (for CRL generation).
|
|
// Delegates to RevocationSvc.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
|
|
if s.revSvc == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation service not configured")
|
|
}
|
|
return s.revSvc.GetRevokedCertificates(ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GenerateDERCRL returns the DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the given
|
|
// issuer. When the CRL cache service is wired (SetCRLCacheSvc), reads
|
|
// from the scheduler-pre-generated cache and only regenerates on miss
|
|
// / staleness — the cache layer's singleflight gate collapses
|
|
// concurrent miss requests to a single underlying generation.
|
|
//
|
|
// When the cache service is not wired, falls back to the historical
|
|
// on-demand path via CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL — every HTTP fetch
|
|
// triggers a fresh generation.
|
|
//
|
|
// Backward-compatible: existing callers that don't wire the cache see
|
|
// no behavioural change.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if s.crlCacheSvc != nil {
|
|
der, _, err := s.crlCacheSvc.Get(ctx, issuerID)
|
|
return der, err
|
|
}
|
|
if s.caSvc == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA operations service not configured")
|
|
}
|
|
return s.caSvc.GenerateDERCRL(ctx, issuerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOCSPResponse generates a signed OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
|
|
// Back-compat wrapper around GetOCSPResponseWithNonce; passes nil nonce so the
|
|
// response omits the RFC 6960 §4.4.1 nonce extension.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
return s.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx, issuerID, serialHex, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOCSPResponseWithNonce generates a signed OCSP response and (when
|
|
// nonce != nil) echoes the nonce in the response per RFC 6960 §4.4.1.
|
|
// Production hardening II Phase 1.
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if s.caSvc == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA operations service not configured")
|
|
}
|
|
return s.caSvc.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx, issuerID, serialHex, nonce)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCertificateDeployments returns all deployment targets for a certificate (M20).
|
|
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificateDeployments(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
|
|
// Verify certificate exists
|
|
_, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.targetRepo == nil {
|
|
return []domain.DeploymentTarget{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get targets from repository
|
|
targets, err := s.targetRepo.ListByCertificate(ctx, certID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list deployment targets: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert pointers to values
|
|
result := make([]domain.DeploymentTarget, len(targets))
|
|
for i, target := range targets {
|
|
result[i] = *target
|
|
}
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|