Files
certctl/internal/service/ca_operations.go
T
shankar0123 4e5522a999 F-001/F-002/F-003: CRL prefix-scan, digest error sanitization, ctx-aware sleeps
F-001 (P3): GenerateDERCRL scoped to issuer via composite index
  - Add RevocationRepository.ListByIssuer leveraging migration 000012's
    idx_certificate_revocations_issuer_serial composite index as a
    prefix-scan target. Previously CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL called
    ListAll() and filtered by IssuerID in Go — O(total revocations)
    regardless of how many revocations belonged to the target issuer.
  - Rewrite GenerateDERCRL to call ListByIssuer(ctx, issuerID) so PostgreSQL
    drives a prefix scan of the composite index. Drops the in-memory filter.
  - New regression test in ca_operations_test.go asserts the CRL hot path
    invokes ListByIssuer exactly once and never ListAll, and that the
    issuerID is threaded through correctly.

F-002 (P3): digest.go admin-auth endpoints no longer leak internal errors
  - PreviewDigest (GET /api/v1/digest/preview) and SendDigest
    (POST /api/v1/digest/send) previously wrote err.Error() into the HTTP
    response body on 500s. Replace with slog.Error server-side logging plus
    a generic "internal error" response body, matching the house pattern
    in certificates.go and export.go.

F-003 (P4): three blocking time.Sleep sites now honor ctx cancellation
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:672 (DNS-01 propagation wait)
    now runs under a select{case <-ctx.Done(): CleanUp + return ctx.Err();
    case <-time.After(d):} so graceful shutdown doesn't get stuck behind
    the propagation delay.
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:786 (dns-persist-01 propagation
    wait) same pattern, returns ctx.Err() on cancel.
  - cmd/agent/main.go:272 (polling backoff inside the heartbeat loop) now
    wraps the sleep in select{case <-ctx.Done(): continue; case <-time.After(backoff):}
    so the outer <-ctx.Done() case on the parent loop fires cleanly.

Verification: build, vet, and race-enabled short tests green across all
55+ packages. govulncheck reports zero vulnerabilities in the code path.
No migration needed — F-001 reuses the existing 000012 composite index.
No frontend changes.
2026-04-20 16:51:52 +00:00

190 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// CAOperationsSvc provides CA operations: CRL generation and OCSP response signing.
// This service handles revocation status queries and certificate lifecycle operations
// related to the certificate authority.
type CAOperationsSvc struct {
revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
}
// NewCAOperationsSvc creates a new CA operations service.
func NewCAOperationsSvc(
revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository,
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository,
) *CAOperationsSvc {
return &CAOperationsSvc{
revocationRepo: revocationRepo,
certRepo: certRepo,
profileRepo: profileRepo,
}
}
// SetIssuerRegistry sets the issuer registry for CRL and OCSP operations.
func (s *CAOperationsSvc) SetIssuerRegistry(registry *IssuerRegistry) {
s.issuerRegistry = registry
}
// GenerateDERCRL generates a DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the given issuer.
// Short-lived certificates (profile TTL < 1 hour) are excluded from the CRL.
func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error) {
if s.revocationRepo == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
}
if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer registry not configured")
}
issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
}
// Scope the query to this issuer so the migration 000012 composite index
// drives a prefix scan; previously this path read every revocation in the
// table and filtered in Go, which did not scale as the revocation table
// grew across many issuers (F-001).
revocations, err := s.revocationRepo.ListByIssuer(ctx, issuerID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list revocations for issuer %s: %w", issuerID, err)
}
// Convert revocations to CRL entries. Short-lived certificates (profile
// TTL < 1 hour) are excluded — expiry is sufficient revocation.
var entries []CRLEntry
for _, rev := range revocations {
// Check short-lived exemption: look up the cert's profile
if s.profileRepo != nil && s.certRepo != nil {
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, rev.CertificateID)
if err == nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
profile, err := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
if err == nil && profile.IsShortLived() {
slog.Debug("skipping short-lived cert from CRL",
"certificate_id", rev.CertificateID,
"profile_id", cert.CertificateProfileID)
continue
}
}
}
// Parse serial number from hex string
serial := new(big.Int)
serial.SetString(rev.SerialNumber, 16)
entries = append(entries, CRLEntry{
SerialNumber: serial,
RevokedAt: rev.RevokedAt,
ReasonCode: domain.CRLReasonCode(domain.RevocationReason(rev.Reason)),
})
}
return issuerConn.GenerateCRL(ctx, entries)
}
// GetOCSPResponse generates a signed OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error) {
if s.revocationRepo == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
}
if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer registry not configured")
}
issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
}
serial := new(big.Int)
serial.SetString(serialHex, 16)
now := time.Now()
// Short-lived cert exemption: if the cert's profile has TTL < 1 hour,
// always return "good" — expiry is sufficient revocation for short-lived certs.
if s.profileRepo != nil && s.certRepo != nil {
// Look up cert by (issuer_id, serial) — per RFC 5280 §5.2.3, serial numbers
// are unique only within a single issuer. The OCSP URL path carries issuer_id,
// so we scope the lookup to avoid cross-issuer collisions.
rev, _ := s.revocationRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
if rev != nil {
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, rev.CertificateID)
if err == nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
profile, err := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
if err == nil && profile.IsShortLived() {
return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
CertSerial: serial,
CertStatus: 0, // good — short-lived exemption
ThisUpdate: now,
NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
})
}
}
}
}
// Check if this (issuer_id, serial) is revoked — RFC 5280 §5.2.3 scoping.
rev, err := s.revocationRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
if err == nil && rev != nil {
// Revoked
return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
CertSerial: serial,
CertStatus: 1, // revoked
RevokedAt: rev.RevokedAt,
RevocationReason: domain.CRLReasonCode(domain.RevocationReason(rev.Reason)),
ThisUpdate: now,
NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
})
}
// Not revoked. Per RFC 6960 §2.2, we must only return "good" for a
// certificate that was actually issued by this CA. Verify the
// (issuer_id, serial) tuple maps to a real certificate in inventory
// before asserting "good"; otherwise return "unknown". This closes the
// coverage gap where forged/guessed serials would be accepted as valid
// because they had no revocation row (M-004).
if s.certRepo != nil {
cert, certErr := s.certRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
if certErr != nil || cert == nil {
if certErr != nil && !errors.Is(certErr, sql.ErrNoRows) {
// Real repository failure — log but still fail closed with "unknown"
// rather than leaking a bogus "good" assertion.
slog.Warn("OCSP cert lookup failed; returning unknown",
"issuer_id", issuerID,
"serial", serialHex,
"error", certErr)
}
return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
CertSerial: serial,
CertStatus: 2, // unknown
ThisUpdate: now,
NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
})
}
}
// Known cert, not revoked — return "good"
return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
CertSerial: serial,
CertStatus: 0, // good
ThisUpdate: now,
NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
})
}