Files
certctl/internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go
T
shankar0123 4e5522a999 F-001/F-002/F-003: CRL prefix-scan, digest error sanitization, ctx-aware sleeps
F-001 (P3): GenerateDERCRL scoped to issuer via composite index
  - Add RevocationRepository.ListByIssuer leveraging migration 000012's
    idx_certificate_revocations_issuer_serial composite index as a
    prefix-scan target. Previously CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL called
    ListAll() and filtered by IssuerID in Go — O(total revocations)
    regardless of how many revocations belonged to the target issuer.
  - Rewrite GenerateDERCRL to call ListByIssuer(ctx, issuerID) so PostgreSQL
    drives a prefix scan of the composite index. Drops the in-memory filter.
  - New regression test in ca_operations_test.go asserts the CRL hot path
    invokes ListByIssuer exactly once and never ListAll, and that the
    issuerID is threaded through correctly.

F-002 (P3): digest.go admin-auth endpoints no longer leak internal errors
  - PreviewDigest (GET /api/v1/digest/preview) and SendDigest
    (POST /api/v1/digest/send) previously wrote err.Error() into the HTTP
    response body on 500s. Replace with slog.Error server-side logging plus
    a generic "internal error" response body, matching the house pattern
    in certificates.go and export.go.

F-003 (P4): three blocking time.Sleep sites now honor ctx cancellation
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:672 (DNS-01 propagation wait)
    now runs under a select{case <-ctx.Done(): CleanUp + return ctx.Err();
    case <-time.After(d):} so graceful shutdown doesn't get stuck behind
    the propagation delay.
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:786 (dns-persist-01 propagation
    wait) same pattern, returns ctx.Err() on cancel.
  - cmd/agent/main.go:272 (polling backoff inside the heartbeat loop) now
    wraps the sleep in select{case <-ctx.Done(): continue; case <-time.After(backoff):}
    so the outer <-ctx.Done() case on the parent loop fires cleanly.

Verification: build, vet, and race-enabled short tests green across all
55+ packages. govulncheck reports zero vulnerabilities in the code path.
No migration needed — F-001 reuses the existing 000012 composite index.
No frontend changes.
2026-04-20 16:51:52 +00:00

956 lines
33 KiB
Go

package acme
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
)
// Config represents the ACME issuer connector configuration.
type Config struct {
DirectoryURL string `json:"directory_url"` // ACME directory URL (e.g., https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory)
Email string `json:"email"` // Contact email for the ACME account
EABKid string `json:"eab_kid,omitempty"` // External Account Binding Key ID (for some CAs)
EABHmac string `json:"eab_hmac,omitempty"` // External Account Binding HMAC Key
HTTPPort int `json:"http_port,omitempty"` // Port for HTTP-01 challenge server (default: 80)
// ChallengeType selects the ACME challenge method: "http-01" (default), "dns-01", or "dns-persist-01".
// DNS-01 is required for wildcard certificates (*.example.com).
// DNS-PERSIST-01 uses a standing TXT record (set once, reused forever) — no per-renewal DNS updates.
ChallengeType string `json:"challenge_type,omitempty"`
// DNSPresentScript is the path to a script that creates DNS TXT records (dns-01 and dns-persist-01).
// The script receives CERTCTL_DNS_DOMAIN, CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN, CERTCTL_DNS_VALUE, CERTCTL_DNS_TOKEN.
DNSPresentScript string `json:"dns_present_script,omitempty"`
// DNSCleanUpScript is the path to a script that removes DNS TXT records (dns-01 only).
// Optional — if not set, records are not cleaned up automatically.
// Not used by dns-persist-01 (records are permanent).
DNSCleanUpScript string `json:"dns_cleanup_script,omitempty"`
// DNSPropagationWait is how long to wait (in seconds) after creating the TXT record
// before telling the CA to validate. Defaults to 30 seconds.
DNSPropagationWait int `json:"dns_propagation_wait,omitempty"`
// DNSPersistIssuerDomain is the CA's issuer domain name for dns-persist-01 records.
// Used to construct the TXT record value: "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>".
// Required when ChallengeType is "dns-persist-01". For Let's Encrypt, use "letsencrypt.org".
DNSPersistIssuerDomain string `json:"dns_persist_issuer_domain,omitempty"`
// Profile selects the ACME certificate profile for the newOrder request.
// Let's Encrypt supports "tlsserver" (standard TLS, default) and "shortlived" (6-day certs).
// Leave empty for the CA's default profile (backward-compatible).
// See: https://letsencrypt.org/2025/01/09/acme-profiles.html
Profile string `json:"profile,omitempty"`
// ARIEnabled enables ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9773) support per CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_ENABLED.
// When enabled, the connector queries the CA's ARI endpoint to get CA-directed renewal timing.
ARIEnabled bool `json:"ari_enabled,omitempty"`
// Insecure skips TLS certificate verification when connecting to the ACME directory.
// Only use for testing with self-signed ACME servers like Pebble.
Insecure bool `json:"insecure,omitempty"`
}
// Connector implements the issuer.Connector interface for ACME-compatible CAs
// (Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, ZeroSSL, etc.).
//
// It supports HTTP-01 challenge solving via a built-in temporary HTTP server.
// The challenge server starts when needed and stops after validation completes.
//
// For HTTP-01 to work, the domain(s) being validated must resolve to the machine
// running this connector, and the configured HTTP port must be reachable from the internet.
type Connector struct {
config *Config
logger *slog.Logger
client *acme.Client
accountKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
// HTTP-01 challenge solver state
challengeMu sync.RWMutex
challengeTokens map[string]string // token → key authorization
// DNS-01 challenge solver (nil if using HTTP-01)
dnsSolver DNSSolver
}
// New creates a new ACME connector with the given configuration and logger.
func New(config *Config, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
if config != nil {
if config.HTTPPort == 0 {
config.HTTPPort = 80
}
if config.ChallengeType == "" {
config.ChallengeType = "http-01"
}
if config.DNSPropagationWait == 0 {
config.DNSPropagationWait = 30
}
}
c := &Connector{
config: config,
logger: logger,
challengeTokens: make(map[string]string),
}
// Initialize DNS solver if dns-01 or dns-persist-01 challenge type is configured
if config != nil && (config.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || config.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && config.DNSPresentScript != "" {
c.dnsSolver = NewScriptDNSSolver(config.DNSPresentScript, config.DNSCleanUpScript, logger)
logger.Info("DNS challenge solver configured",
"challenge_type", config.ChallengeType,
"present_script", config.DNSPresentScript,
"cleanup_script", config.DNSCleanUpScript)
}
return c
}
// httpClient returns an HTTP client configured for the ACME connector.
// When Insecure is true (e.g., for Pebble test servers), TLS verification is skipped.
func (c *Connector) httpClient() *http.Client {
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
if c.config != nil && c.config.Insecure {
client.Transport = &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // Intentional for test ACME servers (Pebble)
}
}
return client
}
// ValidateConfig checks that the ACME directory URL is reachable and valid.
func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
var cfg Config
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ACME config: %w", err)
}
if cfg.DirectoryURL == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("ACME directory_url is required")
}
if cfg.Email == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("ACME email is required")
}
c.logger.Info("validating ACME configuration", "directory_url", cfg.DirectoryURL, "insecure", cfg.Insecure)
// Apply config so httpClient() can use it for the directory probe.
// This persists across the function — if validation fails early, the config
// will still be set, but that's fine since a failed ValidateConfig means
// the connector won't be used.
c.config = &cfg
// Verify that the directory URL is reachable
httpClient := c.httpClient()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, cfg.DirectoryURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to reach ACME directory: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return fmt.Errorf("ACME directory returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
if cfg.HTTPPort == 0 {
cfg.HTTPPort = 80
}
if cfg.ChallengeType == "" {
cfg.ChallengeType = "http-01"
}
// Validate challenge type
if cfg.ChallengeType != "http-01" && cfg.ChallengeType != "dns-01" && cfg.ChallengeType != "dns-persist-01" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid challenge_type: %s (must be http-01, dns-01, or dns-persist-01)", cfg.ChallengeType)
}
// Validate profile if set (alphanumeric + hyphens only)
if cfg.Profile != "" {
for _, ch := range cfg.Profile {
if !((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') || ch == '-') {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid profile: %q (must contain only alphanumeric characters and hyphens)", cfg.Profile)
}
}
}
// DNS-01 and DNS-PERSIST-01 require a present script
if (cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && cfg.DNSPresentScript == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("dns_present_script is required for %s challenge type", cfg.ChallengeType)
}
// DNS-PERSIST-01 requires an issuer domain
if cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01" && cfg.DNSPersistIssuerDomain == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("dns_persist_issuer_domain is required for dns-persist-01 challenge type (e.g., \"letsencrypt.org\")")
}
if cfg.DNSPropagationWait == 0 {
cfg.DNSPropagationWait = 30
}
c.config = &cfg
// Re-initialize DNS solver if switching to dns-01 or dns-persist-01
if (cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && cfg.DNSPresentScript != "" {
c.dnsSolver = NewScriptDNSSolver(cfg.DNSPresentScript, cfg.DNSCleanUpScript, c.logger)
}
c.logger.Info("ACME configuration validated",
"challenge_type", cfg.ChallengeType)
return nil
}
// ensureClient initializes the ACME client and account key if not already done.
func (c *Connector) ensureClient(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.client != nil {
return nil
}
// Generate an ECDSA P-256 account key
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate account key: %w", err)
}
c.accountKey = key
c.client = &acme.Client{
Key: key,
DirectoryURL: c.config.DirectoryURL,
HTTPClient: c.httpClient(),
}
// Register or retrieve the ACME account
acct := &acme.Account{
Contact: []string{"mailto:" + c.config.Email},
}
// Auto-fetch EAB credentials from ZeroSSL if directory URL is ZeroSSL and no EAB provided.
// ZeroSSL offers a public endpoint that returns EAB credentials given an email address,
// so users don't need to visit the ZeroSSL dashboard manually.
if c.config.EABKid == "" && c.config.EABHmac == "" && isZeroSSL(c.config.DirectoryURL) {
kid, hmac, eabErr := fetchZeroSSLEAB(ctx, c.config.Email)
if eabErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to auto-fetch ZeroSSL EAB credentials: %w", eabErr)
}
c.config.EABKid = kid
c.config.EABHmac = hmac
c.logger.Info("auto-fetched EAB credentials from ZeroSSL", "eab_kid", kid)
}
// External Account Binding (required by ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services, SSL.com, etc.)
if c.config.EABKid != "" && c.config.EABHmac != "" {
hmacKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(c.config.EABHmac)
if decodeErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EAB HMAC key (expected base64url): %w", decodeErr)
}
acct.ExternalAccountBinding = &acme.ExternalAccountBinding{
KID: c.config.EABKid,
Key: hmacKey,
}
c.logger.Info("using External Account Binding for ACME registration", "eab_kid", c.config.EABKid)
}
_, err = c.client.Register(ctx, acct, acme.AcceptTOS)
if err != nil {
// Account may already exist, try to get it
_, getErr := c.client.GetReg(ctx, "")
if getErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to register ACME account: %w (get existing: %v)", err, getErr)
}
c.logger.Info("using existing ACME account")
} else {
c.logger.Info("registered new ACME account", "email", c.config.Email)
}
return nil
}
// zeroSSLEABEndpoint is the ZeroSSL API endpoint for auto-generating EAB credentials.
// Variable (not const) to allow test overrides.
var zeroSSLEABEndpoint = "https://api.zerossl.com/acme/eab-credentials-email"
// isZeroSSL returns true if the ACME directory URL points to ZeroSSL.
func isZeroSSL(directoryURL string) bool {
return strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(directoryURL), "zerossl.com")
}
// fetchZeroSSLEAB retrieves EAB credentials from ZeroSSL's public API endpoint.
// ZeroSSL provides this so users don't need to visit the dashboard manually.
// Returns (kid, hmac_key, error). The HMAC key is already base64url-encoded.
func fetchZeroSSLEAB(ctx context.Context, email string) (string, string, error) {
if email == "" {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("email is required for ZeroSSL EAB auto-fetch")
}
form := url.Values{"email": {email}}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, zeroSSLEABEndpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("read response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("ZeroSSL API returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
var result struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
EABKid string `json:"eab_kid"`
EABHmac string `json:"eab_hmac_key"`
ErrorMsg string `json:"error"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &result); err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("parse response: %w", err)
}
if !result.Success || result.EABKid == "" || result.EABHmac == "" {
errDetail := result.ErrorMsg
if errDetail == "" {
errDetail = string(body)
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("ZeroSSL EAB generation failed: %s", errDetail)
}
return result.EABKid, result.EABHmac, nil
}
// IssueCertificate submits a certificate issuance request to the ACME CA.
//
// Flow:
// 1. Create a new order with the CA for the requested identifiers
// 2. Solve HTTP-01 challenges for each authorization
// 3. Finalize the order by submitting the CSR
// 4. Download the issued certificate and chain
func (c *Connector) IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.IssuanceRequest) (*issuer.IssuanceResult, error) {
c.logger.Info("processing ACME issuance request",
"common_name", request.CommonName,
"san_count", len(request.SANs))
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
}
// Build the list of identifiers (domains)
identifiers := buildIdentifiers(request.CommonName, request.SANs)
// Step 1: Create order (with optional profile for CAs that support it)
order, err := c.authorizeOrderWithProfile(ctx, identifiers, c.config.Profile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create ACME order: %w", err)
}
c.logger.Info("ACME order created", "order_url", order.URI, "status", order.Status)
// Save FinalizeURL and URI before WaitOrder — WaitOrder returns a new Order
// object that may have empty FinalizeURL and URI fields (Go's crypto/acme
// WaitOrder doesn't populate Order.URI on the returned struct).
finalizeURL := order.FinalizeURL
orderURI := order.URI
// Step 2: Solve authorizations (HTTP-01 challenges)
if order.Status == acme.StatusPending {
if err := c.solveAuthorizations(ctx, order.AuthzURLs); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to solve challenges: %w", err)
}
// Wait for the order to be ready
order, err = c.client.WaitOrder(ctx, orderURI)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order failed after challenge: %w", err)
}
// Update finalizeURL from the waited order if it has one
if order.FinalizeURL != "" {
finalizeURL = order.FinalizeURL
}
// Preserve orderURI — WaitOrder doesn't populate Order.URI
if order.URI != "" {
orderURI = order.URI
}
}
if order.Status != acme.StatusReady {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order not ready, status: %s", order.Status)
}
// Step 3: Parse CSR and finalize order
csrDER, err := parseCSRPEM(request.CSRPEM)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse CSR: %w", err)
}
if finalizeURL == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME order has no finalize URL (order URI: %s, status: %s)", order.URI, order.Status)
}
// Step 3b: Finalize the order and fetch the certificate.
// CreateOrderCert POSTs the CSR to the finalize URL and attempts to retrieve
// the certificate. Some ACME servers (notably Pebble) return the order object
// per RFC 8555 rather than redirecting to the cert, which can cause
// CreateOrderCert's internal cert URL resolution to fail. In that case, we
// fall back to WaitOrder (to get the CertURL) + FetchCert.
derChain, _, err := c.client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, finalizeURL, csrDER, true)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Warn("CreateOrderCert failed, attempting manual certificate fetch",
"error", err, "order_uri", orderURI)
// The finalize POST likely succeeded (the CA issued the cert) but cert
// retrieval failed. WaitOrder returns the order in "valid" state with
// CertURL populated.
validOrder, waitErr := c.client.WaitOrder(ctx, orderURI)
if waitErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to finalize order: %w (wait fallback: %v)", err, waitErr)
}
if validOrder.CertURL == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order finalized but no certificate URL returned (original error: %w)", err)
}
c.logger.Info("fetching certificate via fallback", "cert_url", validOrder.CertURL)
fetchedChain, fetchErr := c.client.FetchCert(ctx, validOrder.CertURL, true)
if fetchErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w (original finalize error: %v)", fetchErr, err)
}
derChain = fetchedChain
}
if len(derChain) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME returned empty certificate chain")
}
// Step 4: Convert DER chain to PEM
certPEM, chainPEM, serial, notBefore, notAfter, err := parseDERChain(derChain)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate chain: %w", err)
}
c.logger.Info("ACME certificate issued",
"common_name", request.CommonName,
"serial", serial,
"not_after", notAfter)
return &issuer.IssuanceResult{
CertPEM: certPEM,
ChainPEM: chainPEM,
Serial: serial,
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
OrderID: orderURI,
}, nil
}
// RenewCertificate renews a certificate by creating a new ACME order.
// The process is identical to issuance — ACME doesn't distinguish between new and renewal.
func (c *Connector) RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.RenewalRequest) (*issuer.IssuanceResult, error) {
c.logger.Info("processing ACME renewal request",
"common_name", request.CommonName,
"san_count", len(request.SANs))
return c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
CommonName: request.CommonName,
SANs: request.SANs,
CSRPEM: request.CSRPEM,
})
}
// RevokeCertificate revokes a certificate at the ACME CA.
func (c *Connector) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.RevocationRequest) error {
c.logger.Info("processing ACME revocation request", "serial", request.Serial)
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
}
// ACME revocation requires the certificate DER, not just the serial.
// For now, log a warning. Full revocation requires storing the cert DER
// or re-fetching it from the order.
c.logger.Warn("ACME revocation requires certificate DER bytes; serial-only revocation not supported in V1",
"serial", request.Serial)
return fmt.Errorf("ACME revocation by serial not supported in V1; provide certificate DER")
}
// GetOrderStatus retrieves the current status of an ACME order.
func (c *Connector) GetOrderStatus(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*issuer.OrderStatus, error) {
c.logger.Info("fetching ACME order status", "order_id", orderID)
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
}
order, err := c.client.GetOrder(ctx, orderID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get order: %w", err)
}
status := &issuer.OrderStatus{
OrderID: orderID,
Status: string(order.Status),
UpdatedAt: time.Now(),
}
return status, nil
}
// solveAuthorizations processes all authorization URLs and solves their challenges.
// Supports HTTP-01, DNS-01, and DNS-PERSIST-01 challenge types based on configuration.
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizations(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
switch c.config.ChallengeType {
case "dns-01":
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx, authzURLs)
case "dns-persist-01":
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01(ctx, authzURLs)
default:
return c.solveAuthorizationsHTTP01(ctx, authzURLs)
}
}
// solveAuthorizationsHTTP01 solves challenges using the HTTP-01 method.
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsHTTP01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
// Start the challenge server
srv, err := c.startChallengeServer()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to start challenge server: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
// Derive the challenge-server shutdown context from the parent ctx so
// values (trace IDs, deadlines) propagate, but detach from its
// cancellation so Shutdown always gets its full budget even when the
// parent was cancelled (M-2 / D-3).
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = srv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
c.logger.Debug("challenge server stopped")
}()
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
}
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
continue
}
// Find the HTTP-01 challenge
var httpChallenge *acme.Challenge
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
if ch.Type == "http-01" {
httpChallenge = ch
break
}
}
if httpChallenge == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no HTTP-01 challenge found for %s", authz.Identifier.Value)
}
// Compute the key authorization
keyAuth, err := c.client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(httpChallenge.Token)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to compute key authorization: %w", err)
}
// Store it for the challenge server to serve
c.challengeMu.Lock()
c.challengeTokens[httpChallenge.Token] = keyAuth
c.challengeMu.Unlock()
c.logger.Info("accepting HTTP-01 challenge",
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value,
"token", httpChallenge.Token)
// Tell the CA we're ready
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, httpChallenge); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept challenge: %w", err)
}
// Wait for authorization to be valid
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("authorization failed for %s: %w", authz.Identifier.Value, err)
}
c.logger.Info("authorization validated", "domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
// Clean up token
c.challengeMu.Lock()
delete(c.challengeTokens, httpChallenge.Token)
c.challengeMu.Unlock()
}
return nil
}
// solveAuthorizationsDNS01 solves challenges using the DNS-01 method.
// DNS-01 is required for wildcard certificates (*.example.com) and works
// when the server is not publicly reachable on port 80.
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("DNS-01 challenge type configured but no DNS solver available")
}
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
}
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
continue
}
// Find the DNS-01 challenge
var dnsChallenge *acme.Challenge
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
if ch.Type == "dns-01" {
dnsChallenge = ch
break
}
}
if dnsChallenge == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no DNS-01 challenge found for %s", authz.Identifier.Value)
}
// Compute the DNS-01 key authorization (base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest)
keyAuth, err := c.client.DNS01ChallengeRecord(dnsChallenge.Token)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to compute DNS-01 key authorization: %w", err)
}
domain := authz.Identifier.Value
c.logger.Info("presenting DNS-01 challenge",
"domain", domain,
"token", dnsChallenge.Token)
// Create the DNS TXT record
if err := c.dnsSolver.Present(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to present DNS record for %s: %w", domain, err)
}
// Wait for DNS propagation (ctx-aware so graceful shutdown can interrupt — F-003)
propagationWait := time.Duration(c.config.DNSPropagationWait) * time.Second
c.logger.Info("waiting for DNS propagation",
"domain", domain,
"wait_seconds", c.config.DNSPropagationWait)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
_ = c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth)
return ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(propagationWait):
}
// Tell the CA we're ready
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, dnsChallenge); err != nil {
// Clean up even on failure
_ = c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept DNS-01 challenge: %w", err)
}
// Wait for authorization to be valid
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
_ = c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth)
return fmt.Errorf("DNS-01 authorization failed for %s: %w", domain, err)
}
c.logger.Info("DNS-01 authorization validated", "domain", domain)
// Clean up the DNS record
if err := c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth); err != nil {
c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up DNS record (non-fatal)",
"domain", domain,
"error", err)
}
}
return nil
}
// solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01 solves challenges using the DNS-PERSIST-01 method.
// DNS-PERSIST-01 uses a standing TXT record at _validation-persist.<domain> that persists
// across renewals. The record contains the CA's issuer domain and the ACME account URI,
// authorizing unlimited future issuances without per-renewal DNS updates.
//
// Flow:
// 1. For each authorization, check if it's already valid (standing record exists)
// 2. If pending, find the dns-persist-01 challenge
// 3. Build the TXT record value: "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>"
// 4. Create the _validation-persist TXT record via the present script (one-time)
// 5. Wait for propagation, then accept the challenge
// 6. No cleanup — the record is permanent by design
//
// See: draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist (IETF), CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-088v3
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns-persist-01 challenge type configured but no DNS solver available")
}
// Get the account URI for the TXT record value
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ACME client init for dns-persist-01: %w", err)
}
acct, err := c.client.GetReg(ctx, "")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get ACME account URI for dns-persist-01: %w", err)
}
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
}
// If already valid (standing record recognized), skip
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
c.logger.Info("dns-persist-01 authorization already valid (standing record recognized)",
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
continue
}
// Find the dns-persist-01 challenge
var persistChallenge *acme.Challenge
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
if ch.Type == "dns-persist-01" {
persistChallenge = ch
break
}
}
// Fallback: if the CA doesn't offer dns-persist-01 yet, try dns-01
if persistChallenge == nil {
c.logger.Warn("dns-persist-01 challenge not offered by CA, falling back to dns-01",
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx, authzURLs)
}
domain := authz.Identifier.Value
// Build the persistent TXT record value per draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist:
// "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>"
recordValue := fmt.Sprintf("%s; accounturi=%s", c.config.DNSPersistIssuerDomain, acct.URI)
c.logger.Info("creating persistent DNS validation record",
"domain", domain,
"fqdn", "_validation-persist."+domain,
"issuer_domain", c.config.DNSPersistIssuerDomain,
"account_uri", acct.URI)
// Create the standing TXT record via the present script.
// The script receives CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN="_validation-persist.<domain>"
// and CERTCTL_DNS_VALUE="<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>".
if err := c.presentPersistRecord(ctx, domain, persistChallenge.Token, recordValue); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create persistent DNS record for %s: %w", domain, err)
}
// Wait for DNS propagation (ctx-aware so graceful shutdown can interrupt — F-003)
propagationWait := time.Duration(c.config.DNSPropagationWait) * time.Second
c.logger.Info("waiting for DNS propagation",
"domain", domain,
"wait_seconds", c.config.DNSPropagationWait)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(propagationWait):
}
// Tell the CA we're ready
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, persistChallenge); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept dns-persist-01 challenge: %w", err)
}
// Wait for authorization to be valid
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns-persist-01 authorization failed for %s: %w", domain, err)
}
c.logger.Info("dns-persist-01 authorization validated (record is now permanent)",
"domain", domain)
// No cleanup — the record is permanent by design.
// Future renewals will skip challenge solving entirely (authz.Status == StatusValid).
}
return nil
}
// presentPersistRecord creates a _validation-persist TXT record using the DNS solver.
// Unlike dns-01 which uses _acme-challenge, dns-persist-01 uses _validation-persist.
func (c *Connector) presentPersistRecord(ctx context.Context, domain, token, recordValue string) error {
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("DNS solver not configured")
}
// Use PresentPersist if available (ScriptDNSSolver) — targets _validation-persist prefix.
if solver, ok := c.dnsSolver.(*ScriptDNSSolver); ok {
return solver.PresentPersist(ctx, domain, token, recordValue)
}
// For other DNSSolver implementations, fall back to Present.
// Custom implementations should read CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN to determine the record name.
return c.dnsSolver.Present(ctx, domain, token, recordValue)
}
// startChallengeServer starts an HTTP server that responds to ACME HTTP-01 challenges.
// It listens on the configured HTTP port and serves challenge tokens at
// /.well-known/acme-challenge/{token}.
func (c *Connector) startChallengeServer() (*http.Server, error) {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/acme-challenge/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
token := r.URL.Path[len("/.well-known/acme-challenge/"):]
c.challengeMu.RLock()
keyAuth, ok := c.challengeTokens[token]
c.challengeMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
c.logger.Warn("unknown challenge token", "token", token)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
c.logger.Debug("serving challenge response", "token", token)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(keyAuth))
})
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", c.config.HTTPPort)
srv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: mux,
}
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to listen on %s: %w", addr, err)
}
go func() {
c.logger.Info("challenge server started", "address", addr)
if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
c.logger.Error("challenge server error", "error", err)
}
}()
return srv, nil
}
// buildIdentifiers constructs ACME domain identifiers from common name and SANs.
func buildIdentifiers(commonName string, sans []string) []acme.AuthzID {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var ids []acme.AuthzID
// Add CN first
if commonName != "" {
seen[commonName] = true
ids = append(ids, acme.AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: commonName})
}
// Add SANs, deduplicating
for _, san := range sans {
if san != "" && !seen[san] {
seen[san] = true
ids = append(ids, acme.AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: san})
}
}
return ids
}
// parseCSRPEM decodes a PEM-encoded CSR to DER bytes.
func parseCSRPEM(csrPEM string) ([]byte, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode CSR PEM")
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected PEM type: %s (expected CERTIFICATE REQUEST)", block.Type)
}
return block.Bytes, nil
}
// parseDERChain converts a DER certificate chain to PEM strings and extracts metadata.
func parseDERChain(derChain [][]byte) (certPEM string, chainPEM string, serial string, notBefore time.Time, notAfter time.Time, err error) {
if len(derChain) == 0 {
err = fmt.Errorf("empty certificate chain")
return
}
// First cert is the leaf
leafCert, parseErr := x509.ParseCertificate(derChain[0])
if parseErr != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("failed to parse leaf certificate: %w", parseErr)
return
}
serial = leafCert.SerialNumber.String()
notBefore = leafCert.NotBefore
notAfter = leafCert.NotAfter
// Encode leaf to PEM
certPEM = string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Bytes: derChain[0],
}))
// Encode remaining chain certs to PEM
for i := 1; i < len(derChain); i++ {
chainPEM += string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Bytes: derChain[i],
}))
}
return
}
// GenerateCRL is not supported by ACME issuers.
func (c *Connector) GenerateCRL(ctx context.Context, revokedCerts []issuer.RevokedCertEntry) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not support CRL generation")
}
// SignOCSPResponse is not supported by ACME issuers.
func (c *Connector) SignOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, req issuer.OCSPSignRequest) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not support OCSP response signing")
}
// GetCACertPEM is not supported by ACME issuers (the CA chain is returned per-issuance).
func (c *Connector) GetCACertPEM(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not provide a static CA certificate; chain is returned per-issuance")
}