mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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4dc8d3fa5b
Closes the RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 surface beyond the issuance happy-path:
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/key-change (RFC 8555 §7.3.5)
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/revoke-cert (RFC 8555 §7.6)
- GET /acme/profile/<id>/renewal-info/<cert-id> (RFC 9773 ARI)
After this commit, ACME clients can rotate account keys, revoke certs
through the ACME surface (rather than only via the certctl GUI/API),
and fetch ARI for proactive renewal scheduling.
Architecture:
- Key rollover: outer JWS verified against the registered account key
(existing kid path); the inner JWS — embedded as the outer's payload
— verified against the embedded NEW jwk in a new dedicated routine
(ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner) that enforces RFC 8555 §7.3.5
inner-only invariants: MUST use jwk + MUST NOT use kid, payload
.account == outer.kid, payload.oldKey thumbprint-equals registered.
A single WithinTx swaps the stored thumbprint+pem and writes the
audit row. Concurrent-rollover safety via SELECT…FOR UPDATE on the
conflicting account row in UpdateAccountJWKWithTx; the loser
observes the winner's new thumbprint and is told to retry (409).
- Revocation: two auth paths. kid → AccountOwnsCertificate single-
indexed COUNT lookup over acme_orders. jwk → constant-time RFC 7638
thumbprint compare against the cert's pubkey. Both paths route
through service.RevocationSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor so the
existing CRL/OCSP refresh + audit + metrics pipeline applies. RFC
5280 §5.3.1 numeric reason codes clamp to certctl's
domain.ValidRevocationReasons; codes 8 (removeFromCRL) + 10
(aACompromise) clamp to 'unspecified' since they aren't in the set.
- ARI is GET-only and unauth per RFC 9773 §4. Cert-id wire shape is
base64url(AKI).base64url(serial); ParseARICertID strict-decodes,
SerialHex emits the canonical certctl-shape lowercase-no-leading-
zeros hex used in certificate_versions.serial_number.
ComputeRenewalWindow has 3 branches: bound RenewalPolicy →
[notAfter - days, notAfter - days/2]; no policy → last 33% of
validity; past expiry → [now, now + 1d] (renew immediately).
Retry-After honors CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL.
What ships:
- internal/api/acme/{keychange,ari}.go (+ phase4_test.go: 15 tests).
- internal/api/acme/order.go: RevokeCertRequest wire shape.
- internal/api/handler/acme.go: KeyChange, RevokeCert, RenewalInfo
+ 11 new writeServiceError mappings.
- internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: UpdateAccountJWKWithTx (FOR
UPDATE + expectedOldThumbprint precondition; ErrACMEAccountKey-
ConcurrentUpdate sentinel) + AccountOwnsCertificate.
- internal/service/acme.go: RotateAccountKey + RevokeCert +
RenewalInfo; CertificateRevoker + RenewalPolicyLookup interfaces;
SetRevocationDelegate + SetRenewalPolicyLookup wiring; 11 new
sentinels; 6 new metrics.
- internal/service/acme_phase4_test.go: service-layer tests for
RotateAccountKey (happy + duplicate-key) + RevokeCert (kid mismatch
+ jwk mismatch + jwk happy + already-revoked + reason-clamping) +
RenewalInfo (disabled + bad cert-id).
- internal/api/router/router.go: 6 new register calls (3 per-profile
+ 3 shorthand). Router parity exceptions extended in lockstep
(in-tree SpecParityExceptions + CI-only openapi-handler-exceptions
.yaml).
- cmd/server/main.go: SetRevocationDelegate(revocationSvc) +
SetRenewalPolicyLookup(renewalPolicyRepo) at startup.
- internal/config/config.go: CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_ENABLED (default
true) + CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL (default 6h);
BuildDirectory's ariEnabled flag now flips on under
cfg.ARIEnabled.
- docs/acme-server.md: phase status flipped to Phase 4; endpoints
table grows 6 rows (3 per-profile + 3 shorthand); FAQ section
appended explaining how to rotate keys, revoke certs, and consume
ARI.
Tests:
- 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
- 'go test -short -count=1 ./...' green across every package.
- phase4_test.go covers: keychange happy-path + 5 negatives +
MapKeyChangeErrorToProblem coverage; ARI cert-id round-trip + 6
malformed cases + BuildARICertID from a generated cert; window-
math 3 branches.
- service-layer tests confirm: RotateAccountKey atomically swaps the
thumbprint (verifies persisted state) and rejects duplicate keys;
RevokeCert routes through the stub RevocationSvc with the right
actor string + reason on the jwk path, rejects mismatched keys,
rejects already-revoked certs, clamps reason codes correctly;
RenewalInfo respects ARIEnabled + cert-id format.
Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-4'.
363 lines
13 KiB
Go
363 lines
13 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) certctl
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
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package acme
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import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"math/big"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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)
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// --- Test fixtures + helpers -------------------------------------------
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func newTestRSAJWK(t *testing.T) (*rsa.PrivateKey, *jose.JSONWebKey) {
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t.Helper()
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priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
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}
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jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: priv.Public(), Algorithm: string(jose.RS256), Use: "sig"}
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return priv, jwk
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}
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func newTestECDSAJWK(t *testing.T) (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, *jose.JSONWebKey) {
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t.Helper()
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priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
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}
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jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: priv.Public(), Algorithm: string(jose.ES256), Use: "sig"}
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return priv, jwk
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}
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// signWithEmbeddedJWK builds an RFC-7515-compatible compact-serialized JWS with
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// the given protected header + payload, signed by signer. Used for
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// constructing inner-key-change blobs in tests.
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func signWithEmbeddedJWK(t *testing.T, signer interface{}, alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, payload []byte, headers map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}, embedJWK *jose.JSONWebKey) string {
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t.Helper()
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opts := &jose.SignerOptions{ExtraHeaders: headers}
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if embedJWK != nil {
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opts = opts.WithHeader("jwk", embedJWK)
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}
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sigSigner, err := jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: alg, Key: signer}, opts)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewSigner: %v", err)
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}
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obj, err := sigSigner.Sign(payload)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
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}
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out, err := obj.CompactSerialize()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CompactSerialize: %v", err)
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}
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return out
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}
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// --- KeyChange tests ----------------------------------------------------
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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url := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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kid := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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payloadJSON, err := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{
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Account: kid,
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OldKey: oldJWK,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("marshal payload: %v", err)
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}
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headers := map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}{"url": url}
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, headers, newJWK)
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got, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), kid, url, oldJWK)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner: %v", err)
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}
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if got.Payload.Account != kid {
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t.Errorf("payload.Account = %q, want %q", got.Payload.Account, kid)
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}
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if got.URL != url {
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t.Errorf("URL = %q, want %q", got.URL, url)
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}
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if got.NewJWK == nil {
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t.Errorf("NewJWK is nil")
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}
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_OldKeyMismatch(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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_, otherJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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url := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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kid := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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// payload claims an oldKey that doesn't match what's registered.
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payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{Account: kid, OldKey: otherJWK})
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headers := map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}{"url": url}
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, headers, newJWK)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), kid, url, oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerOldKeyMismatch) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerOldKeyMismatch", err)
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}
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_AccountMismatch(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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url := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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outerKID := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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// payload.Account does NOT equal outer.kid.
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payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{
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Account: "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-DIFFERENT",
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OldKey: oldJWK,
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})
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headers := map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}{"url": url}
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, headers, newJWK)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), outerKID, url, oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerAccountMismatch) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerAccountMismatch", err)
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}
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_URLMismatch(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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innerURL := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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outerURL := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change-different"
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kid := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{Account: kid, OldKey: oldJWK})
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headers := map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}{"url": innerURL}
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, headers, newJWK)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), kid, outerURL, oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerURLMismatch) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerURLMismatch", err)
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}
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_BadSignature(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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_, otherJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t) // different key embedded vs. signer
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url := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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kid := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{Account: kid, OldKey: oldJWK})
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headers := map[jose.HeaderKey]interface{}{"url": url}
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// Sign with newPriv but embed otherJWK — verification against the
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// embedded jwk will fail since the signer didn't possess otherJWK's
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// private key.
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, headers, otherJWK)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), kid, url, oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerSignatureBad) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerSignatureBad", err)
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}
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_ = newJWK
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_MalformedJWS(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte("not-a-jws"), "kid", "url", oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerMalformed) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerMalformed", err)
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}
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}
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func TestParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner_MissingURL(t *testing.T) {
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_, oldJWK := newTestRSAJWK(t)
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newPriv, newJWK := newTestECDSAJWK(t)
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url := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/key-change"
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kid := "https://example.com/acme/profile/p1/account/acme-acc-abc"
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payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(KeyChangeInnerPayload{Account: kid, OldKey: oldJWK})
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// No `url` header.
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innerBytes := signWithEmbeddedJWK(t, newPriv, jose.ES256, payloadJSON, nil, newJWK)
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_, err := ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner([]byte(innerBytes), kid, url, oldJWK)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrKeyChangeInnerURLMissing) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want ErrKeyChangeInnerURLMissing", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMapKeyChangeErrorToProblem_Coverage(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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err error
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wantType string
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}{
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerSignatureBad, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerOldKeyMismatch, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerAccountMismatch, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerForbidsKID, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerMissingJWK, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerOldKeyMissing, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerURLMismatch, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
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{ErrKeyChangeInnerMalformed, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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got := MapKeyChangeErrorToProblem(c.err)
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if got.Type != c.wantType {
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t.Errorf("err=%v: got type %q, want %q", c.err, got.Type, c.wantType)
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}
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}
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}
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// --- ARI tests ----------------------------------------------------------
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func TestParseARICertID_Roundtrip(t *testing.T) {
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aki := []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0x01, 0x02}
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serial := []byte{0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78}
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certID := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(aki) + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(serial)
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got, err := ParseARICertID(certID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ParseARICertID: %v", err)
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}
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if string(got.AKI) != string(aki) {
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t.Errorf("AKI: got %x, want %x", got.AKI, aki)
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}
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if string(got.Serial) != string(serial) {
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t.Errorf("Serial: got %x, want %x", got.Serial, serial)
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}
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// SerialHex must match canonical certctl shape.
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wantSerialHex := "12345678"
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if got.SerialHex() != wantSerialHex {
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t.Errorf("SerialHex: got %q, want %q", got.SerialHex(), wantSerialHex)
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}
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}
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func TestParseARICertID_Malformed(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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certID string
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wantErr error
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}{
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{"missing dot", "abc123nodot", ErrARICertIDMalformed},
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{"too many dots", "a.b.c", ErrARICertIDMalformed},
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{"empty aki", ".YWJj", ErrARICertIDEmpty},
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{"empty serial", "YWJj.", ErrARICertIDEmpty},
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{"non-base64 aki", "!!!!.YWJj", ErrARICertIDDecodeAKI},
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{"non-base64 serial", "YWJj.!!!!", ErrARICertIDDecodeSeria},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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_, err := ParseARICertID(c.certID)
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if !errors.Is(err, c.wantErr) {
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t.Errorf("got err=%v, want %v", err, c.wantErr)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestBuildARICertID_FromGeneratedCert(t *testing.T) {
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// Build a self-signed cert with an explicit AKI and serial.
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priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("genkey: %v", err)
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}
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template := &x509.Certificate{
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SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0x12345678),
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "test"},
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NotBefore: time.Now(),
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NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
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AuthorityKeyId: []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef},
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BasicConstraintsValid: true,
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IsCA: true,
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, &priv.PublicKey, priv)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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certPEM := string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}))
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certID, err := BuildARICertID(certPEM)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BuildARICertID: %v", err)
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}
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parts := strings.Split(certID, ".")
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if len(parts) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("got %d parts, want 2", len(parts))
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}
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wantAKI := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef})
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if parts[0] != wantAKI {
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t.Errorf("AKI part: got %q, want %q", parts[0], wantAKI)
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}
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}
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func TestComputeRenewalWindow_WithPolicy(t *testing.T) {
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now := time.Date(2026, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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notAfter := time.Date(2026, 7, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) // 61 days out
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cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{ExpiresAt: notAfter}
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version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
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NotBefore: time.Date(2026, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
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NotAfter: notAfter,
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}
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policy := &domain.RenewalPolicy{RenewalWindowDays: 30}
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start, end := ComputeRenewalWindow(cert, version, policy, now)
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wantStart := notAfter.Add(-30 * 24 * time.Hour) // 2026-06-01
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wantEnd := wantStart.Add(15 * 24 * time.Hour) // 2026-06-16
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if !start.Equal(wantStart) {
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t.Errorf("start: got %v, want %v", start, wantStart)
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}
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if !end.Equal(wantEnd) {
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t.Errorf("end: got %v, want %v", end, wantEnd)
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}
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}
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func TestComputeRenewalWindow_NoPolicy_LastThird(t *testing.T) {
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now := time.Date(2026, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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notBefore := time.Date(2026, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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notAfter := time.Date(2026, 7, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) // 91-day validity
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cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{ExpiresAt: notAfter}
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version := &domain.CertificateVersion{NotBefore: notBefore, NotAfter: notAfter}
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start, end := ComputeRenewalWindow(cert, version, nil, now)
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// Validity = 91 days; thirty3 ~30d, end_offset = 10d. Start is in
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// the future from `now` (Jun 2026), so no clamp.
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if start.Before(now) {
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t.Errorf("start before now: got %v", start)
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|
}
|
|
if !end.After(start) && !end.Equal(start) {
|
|
t.Errorf("end before start: start=%v end=%v", start, end)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestComputeRenewalWindow_PastExpiry_RenewNow(t *testing.T) {
|
|
now := time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
notAfter := time.Date(2026, 7, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) // 1 month ago
|
|
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{ExpiresAt: notAfter}
|
|
|
|
start, end := ComputeRenewalWindow(cert, nil, nil, now)
|
|
// Expect a "renew now" 1-day window starting at now.
|
|
if !start.Equal(now) {
|
|
t.Errorf("start: got %v, want %v", start, now)
|
|
}
|
|
if want := now.Add(24 * time.Hour); !end.Equal(want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("end: got %v, want %v", end, want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|