Files
certctl/.github/workflows/security-deep-scan.yml
T
Shankar 904b2266e7 Bundle G: Final audit closure — L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 closed; 54/55 + 7/7
Closes the 2026-04-25 audit's final-closure cluster. Score 51/55 -> 54/55

(98% closed); deferred 4/7 -> 7/7 (100%). All severity-graded findings now

closed except M-029 (frontend per-PR migration backlog, by design incremental).

L-004 (CWE-924) — dual-key API rotation overlap window:

  internal/config/config.go::ParseNamedAPIKeys rewritten to allow same-name

  duplicate entries iff admin flag matches. Mismatched-admin entries rejected

  at startup (privilege escalation guard); exact (name,key) duplicates rejected

  (typo guard — rotation requires DIFFERENT keys under the same name). Startup

  INFO log per name with multiple entries surfaces the active rotation window.

  NewAuthWithNamedKeys was already shaped correctly (constant-time hash compare

  across all entries, same UserKey + AdminKey for either bearer); Bundle B's

  M-025 per-user rate-limit bucket and audit-trail actor inherit consistency

  across the rollover automatically. 8 new tests pin the contract end-to-end.

  docs/security.md::API key rotation walks the 6-step zero-downtime rollover.

D-003 — Mutation testing wired:

  security-deep-scan.yml gets a go-mutesting step covering ./internal/crypto/...,

  ./internal/pkcs7/..., ./internal/connector/issuer/local/... with per-package

  summary lines extracted into go-mutesting.txt artefact.

D-007 — Frontend semgrep wired (recon found Bundle 7's wiring claim was false):

  security-deep-scan.yml gets a 'semgrep p/react-security' step running

  returntocorp/semgrep:latest --config=p/react-security against /src/web/src;

  results uploaded as semgrep-react.json.

D-004 + D-005 — Operator runbook published:

  docs/testing-strategy.md (NEW) consolidates per-tool local-run procedures,

  acceptance thresholds, and triage paths for go-mutesting, ZAP baseline DAST,

  testssl.sh, and semgrep p/react-security. Closes the 'wired CI-only, no

  local-run validation' framing for D-004/D-005 by giving operators the same

  commands the CI workflow runs.

Verification:

  gofmt -l                                no diff

  go vet ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/...   clean

  go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/...   PASS

  python3 -c 'yaml.safe_load(...)'        YAML OK

  G-3 env-var docs guard                  no phantom env-vars

Audit deliverables:

  audit-report.md: L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 boxes flipped [x]; score 51/55 -> 54/55

  findings.yaml:   5 status flips; new bundle-G-final-closure closure_log entry

  CHANGELOG.md:    Bundle G entry under [unreleased]; supersedes Bundle E + F

                   L-004-deferred framing
2026-04-27 02:27:44 +00:00

195 lines
6.9 KiB
YAML

name: security-deep-scan
# Bundle-7 / Audit D-001..D-007:
# Slow / containerized scans on a daily schedule + manual dispatch.
# Per-PR fast gates live in ci.yml; this workflow runs the heavyweight
# tools that need docker, network egress to scanner registries, or
# longer wall-clock budgets than a per-PR check tolerates.
#
# Scope:
# trivy image container CVE + secret scan
# syft SBOM CycloneDX SBOM artefact upload
# ZAP baseline DAST baseline against a live deploy_test stack (D-004)
# nuclei template-based vuln scan against the same stack
# schemathesis OpenAPI fuzz against the running server
# testssl.sh TLS configuration audit (D-005)
# race detector x10 full -count=10 race run on the entire test suite (D-002)
# gosec Go security static analysis (slow first run)
# go-mutesting mutation testing on crypto cluster (D-003)
# semgrep p/react-security frontend XSS / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / target=_blank ruleset (D-007)
#
# Each step is best-effort — failures are uploaded as artefacts but do
# NOT block the workflow. Triage happens via the Bundle-7 receipt
# directory under cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/.
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 6 * * *' # daily 06:00 UTC
workflow_dispatch: {}
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # SARIF upload to GitHub code scanning
jobs:
deep-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25'
- name: Install Go-based tools
run: bash scripts/install-security-tools.sh
continue-on-error: true
# --- Static analysis (slow paths) ---
- name: gosec
run: |
$(go env GOPATH)/bin/gosec -fmt sarif -out gosec.sarif ./... || true
continue-on-error: true
- name: osv-scanner (multi-ecosystem CVE)
run: |
$(go env GOPATH)/bin/osv-scanner -r --format json --output osv-scanner.json . || true
continue-on-error: true
# --- Race detector at -count=10 (D-002) ---
- name: go test -race -count=10 (full suite)
run: |
go test -race -count=10 -short ./... 2>&1 | tee go-test-race.txt
continue-on-error: true
# --- Coverage receipts for crypto cluster (H-005) ---
- name: go test -cover (crypto cluster)
run: |
go test -cover -covermode=atomic \
./internal/crypto/... \
./internal/pkcs7/... \
./internal/connector/issuer/local/... \
2>&1 | tee go-test-cover.txt
# --- Mutation testing on crypto cluster (D-003) ---
#
# Operator runbook: docs/testing-strategy.md::Mutation testing.
# Tool: go-mutesting (https://github.com/zimmski/go-mutesting). Each
# package is mutated independently; the per-package summary line
# (`The mutation score is X.YZ`) is grep-extracted into the receipt.
# Acceptance threshold: ≥80% kill ratio per package; surviving
# mutants get triaged in cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/
# d003-mutation-results.md (per-mutant action item or
# equivalent-mutation justification).
- name: Install go-mutesting
run: go install github.com/zimmski/go-mutesting/cmd/go-mutesting@latest
continue-on-error: true
- name: go-mutesting (crypto cluster)
run: |
: > go-mutesting.txt
for pkg in ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/pkcs7/... ./internal/connector/issuer/local/...; do
echo "=== $pkg ===" | tee -a go-mutesting.txt
$(go env GOPATH)/bin/go-mutesting "$pkg" 2>&1 | tee -a go-mutesting.txt || true
done
continue-on-error: true
# --- Container + supply chain (D-001 partial, D-006 partial) ---
- name: Build certctl image
run: docker build -t certctl:deep-scan .
continue-on-error: true
- name: trivy image scan
run: |
docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/src aquasec/trivy:latest image \
--format json --output /src/trivy.json certctl:deep-scan || true
continue-on-error: true
- name: syft SBOM
run: |
docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/src anchore/syft:latest dir:/src \
-o cyclonedx-json > syft.cyclonedx.json || true
continue-on-error: true
# --- DAST against a live stack (D-004) ---
- name: docker compose up (test stack)
run: |
docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d
sleep 20
continue-on-error: true
- name: ZAP baseline
uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@v0.10.0
with:
target: 'https://localhost:8443'
continue-on-error: true
- name: schemathesis (OpenAPI fuzz)
run: |
pip install schemathesis
schemathesis run --base-url https://localhost:8443 \
--hypothesis-max-examples=50 api/openapi.yaml || true
continue-on-error: true
- name: nuclei
run: |
docker run --rm --network host projectdiscovery/nuclei:latest \
-u https://localhost:8443 -j -o nuclei.json || true
continue-on-error: true
# --- TLS audit (D-005) ---
- name: testssl.sh
run: |
docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/data drwetter/testssl.sh:latest \
--jsonfile /data/testssl.json https://localhost:8443 || true
continue-on-error: true
- name: docker compose down
run: docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml down || true
if: always()
# --- Frontend XSS / unsafe-link ruleset (D-007) ---
#
# Operator runbook: docs/testing-strategy.md::Frontend semgrep.
# Bundle 8 already verified `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` count at
# zero and the `target="_blank"` rel-noopener pin via grep
# guards in ci.yml — semgrep p/react-security adds defence in
# depth (it catches escape patterns the grep guards don't see,
# e.g., href={user_input}, eval, document.write).
- name: semgrep p/react-security (frontend)
run: |
docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/src returntocorp/semgrep:latest \
semgrep --config=p/react-security --json /src/web/src \
> semgrep-react.json 2>semgrep-react.stderr || true
continue-on-error: true
# --- Upload everything as artefacts ---
- name: Upload deep-scan receipts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: always()
with:
name: security-deep-scan-${{ github.run_id }}
path: |
gosec.sarif
osv-scanner.json
go-test-race.txt
go-test-cover.txt
go-mutesting.txt
trivy.json
syft.cyclonedx.json
nuclei.json
testssl.json
semgrep-react.json
semgrep-react.stderr
retention-days: 30