Files
certctl/internal/api/middleware/middleware.go
T
Shankar Reddy 45361477ed Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
5c01c7f. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00

424 lines
13 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// RequestIDKey is the context key for storing request IDs.
type RequestIDKey struct{}
// UserKey is the context key for storing authenticated user information.
type UserKey struct{}
// AdminKey is the context key for storing admin flag information.
type AdminKey struct{}
// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
type NamedAPIKey struct {
Name string
Key string
Admin bool
}
// RequestID middleware generates a unique request ID and adds it to the request context and response headers.
func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := uuid.New().String()
w.Header().Set("X-Request-ID", id)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), RequestIDKey{}, id)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// Logging middleware logs request details including method, path, status, and duration.
// Deprecated: Use NewLogging for structured logging with slog.
func Logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
// Wrap response writer to capture status code
wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
duration := time.Since(start)
requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
log.Printf("[%s] %s %s %d %v", requestID, r.Method, r.URL.Path, wrapped.statusCode, duration)
})
}
// NewLogging creates a structured logging middleware using slog.
// Logs request_id, method, path, status, duration_ms, and remote_addr.
func NewLogging(logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
// Wrap response writer to capture status code
wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
duration := time.Since(start)
requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
logger.InfoContext(r.Context(), "request completed",
"request_id", requestID,
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"status", wrapped.statusCode,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
})
}
}
// Recovery middleware recovers from panics and returns a 500 error.
func Recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
defer func() {
if err := recover(); err != nil {
requestID := getRequestID(ctx)
// Use slog.ErrorContext so the panic log carries the same
// request-scoped trace/auth metadata as normal request logs
// (M-2 / D-3 — preserve ctx propagation on the panic path).
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "panic recovered in HTTP handler",
"request_id", requestID,
"panic", fmt.Sprintf("%v", err),
)
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Internal Server Error"}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// AuthConfig holds configuration for the Auth middleware.
type AuthConfig struct {
Type string // "api-key", "jwt", "none"
Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
}
// NewAuth creates an authentication middleware based on config.
// When Type is "none", all requests pass through (demo/development mode).
// When Type is "api-key", requests must include a valid Bearer token.
// Named keys are supported via []NamedAPIKey input.
func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
type keyEntry struct {
hash string
name string
admin bool
}
var entries []keyEntry
for _, nk := range namedKeys {
entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
name: nk.Name,
admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
if len(entries) == 1 {
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader == "" {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Extract Bearer token
if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
token := authHeader[7:]
tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
var matched *keyEntry
for i := range entries {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
matched = &entries[i]
break
}
}
if matched == nil {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
//
// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if cfg.Type == "none" {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
idx := 0
for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
if k == "" {
continue
}
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
Key: k,
Admin: false,
})
idx++
}
return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
}
// RateLimitConfig holds configuration for the rate limiter.
type RateLimitConfig struct {
RPS float64 // Requests per second
BurstSize int // Maximum burst size
}
// NewRateLimiter creates a token bucket rate limiting middleware.
// Uses a simple token bucket: tokens refill at RPS rate, burst allows short spikes.
func NewRateLimiter(cfg RateLimitConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
limiter := &tokenBucket{
rate: cfg.RPS,
burstSize: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
tokens: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
lastRefill: time.Now(),
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !limiter.allow() {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Rate limit exceeded"}`, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// tokenBucket implements a simple thread-safe token bucket rate limiter.
// This avoids importing golang.org/x/time/rate to keep dependencies minimal.
type tokenBucket struct {
mu sync.Mutex
rate float64 // tokens per second
burstSize float64 // max tokens
tokens float64 // current tokens
lastRefill time.Time // last refill time
}
func (tb *tokenBucket) allow() bool {
tb.mu.Lock()
defer tb.mu.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
elapsed := now.Sub(tb.lastRefill).Seconds()
tb.tokens += elapsed * tb.rate
if tb.tokens > tb.burstSize {
tb.tokens = tb.burstSize
}
tb.lastRefill = now
if tb.tokens < 1 {
return false
}
tb.tokens--
return true
}
// CORSConfig holds configuration for the CORS middleware.
type CORSConfig struct {
AllowedOrigins []string // Allowed origins; empty = same-origin only
}
// NewCORS creates a CORS middleware with configurable allowed origins.
// Security default: If no origins are configured, CORS headers are NOT set,
// denying all cross-origin requests (same-origin only).
// If ["*"] is configured, all origins are allowed (development/demo mode only).
// If specific origins are configured, only requests matching those origins receive CORS headers.
func NewCORS(cfg CORSConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
allowAll := false
originSet := make(map[string]bool)
for _, o := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
if o == "*" {
allowAll = true
}
originSet[o] = true
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Security default: deny CORS when no origins are configured.
// This prevents CSRF attacks from arbitrary origins.
if len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 {
// No CORS headers set — only same-origin requests can read response
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if allowAll {
// Wildcard allows all origins (development/demo only)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
} else if origin != "" && originSet[origin] {
// Exact match found in allowed origins list
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
}
// If origin is empty or not in allowlist, no CORS headers are set
// CORS preflight response headers (only meaningful if Access-Control-Allow-Origin was set)
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ContentType middleware sets the Content-Type header to application/json.
func ContentType(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// CORS middleware adds CORS headers to allow cross-origin requests.
// Deprecated: Use NewCORS for configurable origins. Kept for health endpoints.
func CORS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// GetRequestID extracts the request ID from context.
func GetRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
return getRequestID(ctx)
}
// getRequestID is an internal helper to extract request ID from context.
func getRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
id, ok := ctx.Value(RequestIDKey{}).(string)
if !ok {
return "unknown"
}
return id
}
// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context.
// Returns the name of the matched API key and whether it was found.
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
if !ok {
return ""
}
return user
}
// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context.
// Returns true if the authenticated user has admin privileges.
func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
return ok && admin
}
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
statusCode int
}
func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rw.statusCode = code
rw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// Chain chains multiple middleware functions.
func Chain(h http.Handler, middleware ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) http.Handler {
for i := len(middleware) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
h = middleware[i](h)
}
return h
}