Files
certctl/internal/api/acme/jws_test.go
T
shankar0123 44a85d6f85 acme-server: account resource + JWS verifier (Phase 1b/7)
Layers JWS-authenticated POST machinery onto the Phase 1a foundation
(commit ec88a61). After this commit, an ACME client can run

  POST /acme/profile/<id>/new-account

against certctl and successfully register an account. Account update
+ deactivation via POST /acme/profile/<id>/account/<acc-id> work.
Orders + challenges remain Phase 2 / 3.

Background:
  Two prior dispatch attempts at the original Phase 1 ("skeleton +
  directory + new-nonce + new-account" as a single commit) failed on
  go-jose v4 API speculation (jws.GetPayload, sig.Algorithm,
  jose.SHA256, etc. — none of those exist in v4). Splitting Phase 1
  into 1a (foundation, no go-jose) and 1b (this commit, all go-jose
  in one place) concentrated the JWS work where attention pays off.
  The verifier reads the actual go-jose v4 surface — ParseSigned with
  closed alg allow-list, Header struct fields (Algorithm, KeyID,
  JSONWebKey, Nonce, ExtraHeaders[HeaderKey]), JWK.Thumbprint with
  stdlib crypto.SHA256.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/jws.go: 487-line verifier + sentinel error
    family. Enforces RFC 8555 §6.2 + §6.4 + §6.5 invariants:
      - alg in {RS256, ES256, EdDSA} (closed allow-list passed to
        jose.ParseSigned — HS256 / none / etc. rejected at parse time)
      - exactly one of `kid` / `jwk` in protected header (per
        endpoint policy — new-account demands jwk, others demand kid)
      - protected `url` matches request URL exactly
      - protected `nonce` consumed against acme_nonces (badNonce on
        miss/replay/expiry per RFC 8555 §6.5.1)
      - kid round-trips against canonical AccountKID(accountID) URL
        (catches cross-profile / cross-host replay)
      - kid path: account exists + status=valid (deactivated /
        revoked accounts cannot authenticate)
      - signature verifies; post-Verify payload bytes equal
        UnsafePayloadWithoutVerification (defense in depth)
    + JWK persistence helpers (JWKToPEM / ParseJWKFromPEM round-
    trip a public-only JWK as a PEM-wrapped JSON envelope; stored
    as TEXT in acme_accounts.jwk_pem for diff-friendliness) +
    JWKThumbprint per RFC 7638.
  - internal/api/acme/jws_test.go: 16 cases covering happy paths
    (RS256 kid, ES256 jwk, EdDSA kid) + every named failure mode
    (alg-not-allowed, bad-sig, missing-nonce, unknown-nonce,
    replay, url-mismatch, mixed kid+jwk, deactivated-account,
    cross-host kid). Uses real keypairs + real go-jose Signer to
    build JWS objects.
  - internal/api/acme/account.go: NewAccountRequest /
    AccountUpdateRequest payload shapes (RFC 8555 §7.3 + §7.3.2 +
    §7.3.6) + AccountResponseJSON wire shape + MarshalAccount
    helper.
  - internal/domain/acme.go: ACMEAccount struct + ACMEAccountStatus
    closed enum (valid / deactivated / revoked).
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: full account CRUD path
    (CreateAccountWithTx with 23505-unique-violation sentinel
    translation, GetAccountByID, GetAccountByThumbprint,
    UpdateAccountContactWithTx, UpdateAccountStatusWithTx) +
    sql.ErrNoRows-wrapped repository.ErrNotFound on lookup misses.
  - internal/service/acme.go: ACMERepo interface extended;
    SetTransactor + SetAuditService wires; NewAccount (idempotent
    re-registration per RFC 8555 §7.3.1 — same JWK returns existing
    row without an update or new audit event); LookupAccount;
    UpdateAccount; DeactivateAccount; VerifyJWS adapter that bridges
    api/acme.VerifierConfig to the service-layer ACMERepo; per-op
    metrics extended (new_account_total + _failures_total +
    _idempotent_total + update_account_total + _failures_total +
    deactivate_account_total).
  - internal/service/acme_test.go: 8 new tests covering
    new-account happy path / idempotent re-registration / only-
    return-existing match + no-match / contact update / deactivate
    / lookup-not-found / requires-transactor.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: NewAccount + Account handlers.
    Account dispatches POST-as-GET (RFC 8555 §6.3 — empty body or
    {} payload returns the account row), contact update, and
    deactivation from the same endpoint. Defense-in-depth check
    that the kid path-segment matches the URL path-segment (the
    verifier already round-tripped the kid against canonical URL,
    but the handler re-asserts to catch any future verifier
    refactor).
  - internal/api/handler/acme_handler_test.go: 7 new cases
    covering happy-create, idempotent-200, only-return-existing-
    no-match-400, malformed-JWS-400, kid-URL-mismatch-401,
    deactivate, contact-update, POST-as-GET.
  - internal/api/router/router.go: 4 new Register calls (per-
    profile + shorthand for new-account and account/{acc_id}).
  - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go: SpecParityExceptions
    extended with the 4 new routes (RFC 8555 wire-protocol surface,
    not OpenAPI-shaped — same precedent as Phase 1a).
  - cmd/server/main.go: SetTransactor + SetAuditService on
    acmeService at startup so the WithinTx-based new-account /
    update / deactivate paths run with the same transactor instance
    shared across CertificateService / RevocationSvc / RenewalService.
  - docs/acme-server.md: Phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    new-account + account/<acc_id> rows; new "JWS verification
    (Phase 1b)" section enumerates the 7 invariants the verifier
    enforces; phases-cross-reference table marks 1b live.
  - go.mod / go.sum: github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.4 added.

Atomicity: every account-state mutation writes its acme_accounts row
+ its audit_events row inside one repository.Transactor.WithinTx
call — the canonical certctl atomicity contract (matches
CertificateService.Create at internal/service/certificate.go:131).
Idempotent re-registration explicitly does NOT write an audit row
(RFC 8555 §7.3.1 returns the existing row unmodified).

Tests: 16 jws_test.go cases + 11 service tests + 11 handler tests
all pass under -short. Bad-signature test uses a real registered
account whose stored JWK is a different keypair from the signer's,
so the JWS parses cleanly but jose.Verify rejects — exercises the
ErrJWSSignatureInvalid path directly.

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-1b".
2026-05-03 13:21:56 +00:00

571 lines
18 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) certctl
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
package acme
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// --- test fixtures + helpers --------------------------------------------
// stubAccounts implements AccountLookup with a static map.
type stubAccounts struct {
byID map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount
}
func (s *stubAccounts) LookupAccount(accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
acct, ok := s.byID[accountID]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrJWSAccountNotFound
}
return acct, nil
}
// stubNonces implements NonceConsumer with a one-shot map. Used == true
// after first Consume.
type stubNonces struct {
known map[string]bool // nonce → consumed?
}
func newStubNonces(nonces ...string) *stubNonces {
s := &stubNonces{known: make(map[string]bool, len(nonces))}
for _, n := range nonces {
s.known[n] = false
}
return s
}
func (s *stubNonces) ConsumeNonce(nonce string) error {
used, ok := s.known[nonce]
if !ok {
return errors.New("not found")
}
if used {
return errors.New("already used")
}
s.known[nonce] = true
return nil
}
const testKID = "https://server/acme/profile/prof-corp/account/acme-acc-test123"
const testURL = "https://server/acme/profile/prof-corp/new-account"
func testAccountKID(accountID string) string {
return "https://server/acme/profile/prof-corp/account/" + accountID
}
// genRSAKey, genECKey, genEdKey return a freshly-generated keypair
// suitable for signing JWS objects. Tests share the same key per-case
// to keep failures localized to the verifier rather than cross-test
// state.
func genRSAKey(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {
t.Helper()
k, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa keygen: %v", err)
}
return k
}
func genECKey(t *testing.T) *ecdsa.PrivateKey {
t.Helper()
k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa keygen: %v", err)
}
return k
}
func genEdKey(t *testing.T) (ed25519.PublicKey, ed25519.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ed25519 keygen: %v", err)
}
return pub, priv
}
// signWithKID builds a flattened JWS using kid (registered-account flow).
func signWithKID(t *testing.T, key interface{}, alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, kid, url, nonce string, payload interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal payload: %v", err)
}
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: alg, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).
WithHeader(jose.HeaderKey("url"), url).
WithHeader("kid", kid).
WithHeader("nonce", nonce),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new signer: %v", err)
}
jws, err := signer.Sign(body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
out := jws.FullSerialize()
return out
}
// signWithJWK builds a flattened JWS embedding the public JWK
// (new-account flow). The Signer with EmbedJWK=true attaches the
// JSONWebKey to the protected header.
func signWithJWK(t *testing.T, key interface{}, alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, url, nonce string, payload interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal payload: %v", err)
}
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: alg, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{EmbedJWK: true}).
WithHeader(jose.HeaderKey("url"), url).
WithHeader("nonce", nonce),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new signer (embed jwk): %v", err)
}
jws, err := signer.Sign(body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
return jws.FullSerialize()
}
// --- JWK round-trip helpers --------------------------------------------
func TestJWKRoundTrip_RSA(t *testing.T) {
k := genRSAKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &k.PublicKey}
pem, err := JWKToPEM(jwk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("JWKToPEM: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(pem, "BEGIN ACME ACCOUNT JWK") {
t.Fatalf("PEM missing header: %s", pem)
}
parsed, err := ParseJWKFromPEM(pem)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseJWKFromPEM: %v", err)
}
if !parsed.Valid() {
t.Fatal("parsed jwk is not valid")
}
}
func TestJWKThumbprint_StableAcrossKeyTypes(t *testing.T) {
rsaJWK := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &genRSAKey(t).PublicKey}
rsaThumb1, err := JWKThumbprint(rsaJWK)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa thumb: %v", err)
}
rsaThumb2, err := JWKThumbprint(rsaJWK)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa thumb 2: %v", err)
}
if rsaThumb1 != rsaThumb2 {
t.Errorf("thumbprint not stable: %q vs %q", rsaThumb1, rsaThumb2)
}
// Different keys produce different thumbprints.
otherJWK := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &genRSAKey(t).PublicKey}
otherThumb, err := JWKThumbprint(otherJWK)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("other thumb: %v", err)
}
if rsaThumb1 == otherThumb {
t.Error("two distinct keys collided on thumbprint")
}
}
// --- VerifyJWS happy paths ---------------------------------------------
func TestVerifyJWS_Happy_RS256_KID(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &key.PublicKey}
pem, _ := JWKToPEM(jwk)
thumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(jwk)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-test123": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-test123", JWKPEM: pem, JWKThumbprint: thumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid, ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("nonce-001"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithKID(t, key, jose.RS256, testKID, testURL, "nonce-001", map[string]any{"hello": "world"})
v, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: false})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyJWS: %v", err)
}
if v.Account == nil || v.Account.AccountID != "acme-acc-test123" {
t.Errorf("account = %+v, want acme-acc-test123", v.Account)
}
if v.JWK != nil {
t.Errorf("JWK should be nil on kid path; got %+v", v.JWK)
}
if v.Nonce != "nonce-001" {
t.Errorf("nonce = %q", v.Nonce)
}
if v.URL != testURL {
t.Errorf("url = %q", v.URL)
}
if v.Algorithm != "RS256" {
t.Errorf("algorithm = %q", v.Algorithm)
}
var payload map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(v.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("payload not json: %v", err)
}
if payload["hello"] != "world" {
t.Errorf("payload = %+v", payload)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Happy_ES256_JWK(t *testing.T) {
key := genECKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("nonce-002"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithJWK(t, key, jose.ES256, testURL, "nonce-002", map[string]any{"new": "account"})
v, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyJWS: %v", err)
}
if v.JWK == nil {
t.Fatal("JWK should be populated on jwk path")
}
if v.Account != nil {
t.Errorf("Account should be nil on jwk path; got %+v", v.Account)
}
if v.Algorithm != "ES256" {
t.Errorf("algorithm = %q", v.Algorithm)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Happy_EdDSA_KID(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv := genEdKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: pub}
pem, _ := JWKToPEM(jwk)
thumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(jwk)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-ed1": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-ed1", JWKPEM: pem, JWKThumbprint: thumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid, ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("nonce-003"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
kid := testAccountKID("acme-acc-ed1")
body := signWithKID(t, priv, jose.EdDSA, kid, testURL, "nonce-003", struct{}{})
v, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: false})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyJWS: %v", err)
}
if v.Algorithm != "EdDSA" {
t.Errorf("algorithm = %q, want EdDSA", v.Algorithm)
}
}
// --- VerifyJWS rejection paths -----------------------------------------
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_AlgNotInAllowList(t *testing.T) {
// HS256 (HMAC-SHA256, symmetric) is forbidden by RFC 8555 §6.2.
key := []byte("supersecretkey32byteslongforhmac")
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).
WithHeader(jose.HeaderKey("url"), testURL).
WithHeader("kid", testKID).
WithHeader("nonce", "n"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hs256 signer: %v", err)
}
jws, _ := signer.Sign([]byte("{}"))
body := jws.FullSerialize()
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
_, err = VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected algorithm-rejected error; got nil")
}
// ParseSigned filters the alg before we ever see the JWS, so the
// error wraps ErrJWSMalformed (the verifier can't distinguish
// "wrong format" from "bad alg" at this layer — both manifest as
// malformed).
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSMalformed) && !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSAlgorithmRejected) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSMalformed or ErrJWSAlgorithmRejected", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_BadSignature(t *testing.T) {
signingKey := genRSAKey(t)
// The verifier resolves the account row's stored JWK and uses its
// public component as the verify key. Register an account whose
// stored JWK is a DIFFERENT key — same shape, different material.
// The JWS parses cleanly but Verify returns "verification failed".
storedKey := genRSAKey(t)
storedJWK := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &storedKey.PublicKey}
storedPEM, _ := JWKToPEM(storedJWK)
storedThumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(storedJWK)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-test123": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-test123", JWKPEM: storedPEM, JWKThumbprint: storedThumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid, ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n1"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithKID(t, signingKey, jose.RS256, testKID, testURL, "n1", map[string]any{"x": 1})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected signature-invalid error; got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSSignatureInvalid) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSSignatureInvalid wrapper", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_NonceMissingFromHeader(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces(),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
signer, _ := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{EmbedJWK: true}).
WithHeader(jose.HeaderKey("url"), testURL),
// nonce omitted intentionally
)
jws, _ := signer.Sign([]byte("{}"))
body := jws.FullSerialize()
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSMissingNonce) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSMissingNonce", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_NonceUnknown(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces(), // no nonces issued
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithJWK(t, key, jose.RS256, testURL, "ghost-nonce", map[string]any{})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSBadNonce) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSBadNonce", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_NonceReplay(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-replay"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithJWK(t, key, jose.RS256, testURL, "n-replay", map[string]any{})
if _, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first verify: %v", err)
}
// Replay — same JWS, second time.
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSBadNonce) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSBadNonce on replay", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_URLMismatch(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-url"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithJWK(t, key, jose.RS256, testURL, "n-url", map[string]any{})
// Hand the verifier a different URL than the one signed.
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), "https://server/acme/different", VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSURLMismatch) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSURLMismatch", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_ExpectKidGotJWK(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-mix1"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithJWK(t, key, jose.RS256, testURL, "n-mix1", map[string]any{})
// New-account expects jwk; we set ExpectNewAccount=false so this
// flow demands kid.
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: false})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSExpectKidGotJWK) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSExpectKidGotJWK", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_ExpectJWKGotKid(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &key.PublicKey}
pem, _ := JWKToPEM(jwk)
thumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(jwk)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-test123": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-test123", JWKPEM: pem, JWKThumbprint: thumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid, ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-mix2"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithKID(t, key, jose.RS256, testKID, testURL, "n-mix2", map[string]any{})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{ExpectNewAccount: true})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSExpectJWKGotKid) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSExpectJWKGotKid", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_AccountUnknown(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-acct"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithKID(t, key, jose.RS256, testKID, testURL, "n-acct", map[string]any{})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSAccountNotFound) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSAccountNotFound", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_AccountDeactivated(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &key.PublicKey}
pem, _ := JWKToPEM(jwk)
thumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(jwk)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-test123": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-test123", JWKPEM: pem, JWKThumbprint: thumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusDeactivated, // ← deactivated
ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-deact"),
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
body := signWithKID(t, key, jose.RS256, testKID, testURL, "n-deact", map[string]any{})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSAccountInactive) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSAccountInactive", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyJWS_Reject_KIDMismatchesProfile(t *testing.T) {
key := genRSAKey(t)
jwk := &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: &key.PublicKey}
pem, _ := JWKToPEM(jwk)
thumb, _ := JWKThumbprint(jwk)
cfg := VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &stubAccounts{byID: map[string]*domain.ACMEAccount{
"acme-acc-test123": {
AccountID: "acme-acc-test123", JWKPEM: pem, JWKThumbprint: thumb,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid, ProfileID: "prof-corp",
},
}},
Nonces: newStubNonces("n-cross"),
// AccountKID expects prof-corp; the test JWS uses a kid that
// claims prof-corp BUT we're going to feed an off-canonical
// kid that doesn't match.
AccountKID: testAccountKID,
}
// Sign with a kid that points at a different host. The verifier's
// AccountKID round-trip-check should reject it.
wrongKID := "https://different-host/acme/profile/prof-corp/account/acme-acc-test123"
body := signWithKID(t, key, jose.RS256, wrongKID, testURL, "n-cross", map[string]any{})
_, err := VerifyJWS(cfg, []byte(body), testURL, VerifyOptions{})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from kid round-trip mismatch")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJWSMalformed) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrJWSMalformed (round-trip mismatch)", err)
}
}
// MapJWSErrorToProblem coverage check: every exported sentinel maps
// to a typed Problem (not the default malformed catch-all).
func TestMapJWSErrorToProblem_KnownSentinels(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
err error
wantTyp string
}{
{ErrJWSBadNonce, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce"},
{ErrJWSMissingNonce, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce"},
{ErrJWSAccountNotFound, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist"},
{ErrJWSAccountInactive, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
{ErrJWSURLMismatch, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
{ErrJWSSignatureInvalid, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized"},
{ErrJWSAlgorithmRejected, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSExpectJWKGotKid, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSExpectKidGotJWK, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSBothKidAndJWK, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSNeitherKidNorJWK, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSInvalidJWK, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSWrongType, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
{ErrJWSPayloadMismatch, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal"},
{ErrJWSMalformed, "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:malformed"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
p := MapJWSErrorToProblem(tc.err)
if p.Type != tc.wantTyp {
t.Errorf("err=%v: type = %q, want %q", tc.err, p.Type, tc.wantTyp)
}
if p.Status == 0 {
t.Errorf("err=%v: status was 0", tc.err)
}
}
}