Files
certctl/docs/operator/database-tls.md
T
shankar0123 56e2ea1ad7 docs: v2.1.0 release polish — strip internal bundle/phase tags, update status for OIDC ship
README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
  shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
  + break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
  rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
  SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
  group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
  JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
  RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
  expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
  break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
  .github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
  crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
  the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).

Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
  sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
  defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
  identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
  scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
  'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
  title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
  methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
  (RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
  OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
  azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
  references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
  audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
  from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
  hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
  strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
  docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
  v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
  intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
  'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
  from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
  (API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
  break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
  separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
  parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.

No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
2026-05-11 16:54:07 +00:00

5.1 KiB

Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption

Last reviewed: 2026-05-05

Audit reference: CWE-319 (Cleartext transmission of sensitive information).

certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL selects the transport-encryption posture. The bundled deployment artifacts (Helm chart, docker-compose) historically hard-coded sslmode=disable; current builds expose that as an operator-facing knob with a documented default and explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world deployment shapes.

Quick reference

Deployment shape Default sslmode When to change
Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster disable When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload handles sensitive data.
Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) not auto-set Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle.
docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge disable Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden.
docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres not auto-set Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full.

sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is: disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full. verify-ca is the floor for sensitive-data transport; verify-full is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds hostname validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).

Helm chart

The chart exposes two values under postgresql.tls:

postgresql:
  tls:
    mode: disable          # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
    caSecretRef: ""        # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)

The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL). For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string — the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.

Example: external RDS with verify-full

postgresql:
  enabled: false   # Disable bundled Postgres

server:
  env:
    CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
      postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full

# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
  - name: rds-ca
    secret:
      secretName: rds-ca-bundle  # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...

extraVolumeMounts:
  - name: rds-ca
    mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
    readOnly: true

# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
  env:
    PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt

docker-compose (development / demo)

The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:

export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up

Verification

For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:

# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"

# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...

If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.

What this does NOT cover

  • Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (pg_hba.conf + ssl=on); it is independent of certctl's CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL.
  • Backup transportpg_dump / pg_basebackup honor the same sslmode parameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned.
  • Encryption at restsslmode is a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.

Reverting

If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata — audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify TLS in any scoped environment.