mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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43075a1b5c
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status counters + reload-trust endpoint. Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation: - internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the original plaintext byte-for-byte). - ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in- memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey- Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm / ErrServerKeygenDisabled. - ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2 multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth even if the route was registered). - New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen + /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml + openapi-parity guard updated. Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation: - New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration 000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6 follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it). - domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-* EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985 PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID. - ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU / attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take down the entire endpoint. Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust: - internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12 named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape + ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust() SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter. - Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at every success/failure leg. - internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim: Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added to AdminGatedHandlers). - New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/ est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard reproduced clean. - cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per- profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() + HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up. - Per-profile counter isolation regression test (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time pointer-identity check. Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean (excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build — disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/ service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1 already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED). Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases 8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation / docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
193 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
193 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
package router
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/handler"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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)
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: per-profile EST router
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// registration. Pins:
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//
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// 1. Empty PathID maps to /.well-known/est/ (legacy backward-compat).
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// 2. Non-empty PathID maps to /.well-known/est/<pathID>/.
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// 3. Multi-profile registration produces 4N routes (cacerts + simpleenroll
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// + simplereenroll + csrattrs per profile).
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// 4. Each registered route reaches the right handler instance — no
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// cross-profile bleed-through (proven by the per-profile mock
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// GetCACerts response carrying the profile tag).
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//
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// The mock service is a minimal ESTService implementation that records
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// which profile served the request via the GetCACerts response — the test
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// asserts it sees the right per-profile string echoed back, which would
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// only happen if the right handler was wired to the right path.
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// estProfileMockService is a per-profile-tagged mock ESTService for
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// router-level tests. The CA cert PEM string carries the profile tag so
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// the caller can verify which profile's handler served a given request.
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type estProfileMockService struct {
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tag string
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) GetCACerts(_ context.Context) (string, error) {
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// Return a syntactically-valid PEM that embeds the profile tag in the
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// cert body. The handler converts this PEM to PKCS#7 via PEMToDERChain
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// — for the cross-bleed test we only need to confirm the right service
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// was reached. Use a minimal PEM that won't parse as a real cert (the
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// test asserts on the error path, which still routes through the right
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// service mock).
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return "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) SimpleEnroll(_ context.Context, _ string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return &domain.ESTEnrollResult{CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}, nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) SimpleReEnroll(_ context.Context, _ string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return &domain.ESTEnrollResult{CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}, nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) SimpleServerKeygen(_ context.Context, _ string) (*domain.ESTServerKeygenResult, error) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) GetCSRAttrs(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
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// Return non-empty bytes so the handler returns 200 + the body. The body
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// won't carry a profile tag (csrattrs is base64-encoded ASN.1; sticking
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// a literal in here would not survive the encoding round-trip), but the
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// 200 vs 204 status itself is enough to prove the right service was
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// reached — the legacy mock returns 204 (nil bytes), this mock returns
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// 200, and a wrong-handler bleed would produce the wrong status.
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return []byte("PROFILE=" + s.tag), nil
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}
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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svc := &estProfileMockService{tag: "legacy"}
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
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"": handler.NewESTHandler(svc),
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})
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// /.well-known/est/cacerts is a GET. The handler will fail at the
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// PEM-to-DER step because our mock returns a malformed PEM, but the
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// service WAS reached (the 500 we get back is from the handler's
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// pkcs7 conversion, not from a routing error). Use csrattrs instead
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// — it's GET and our mock returns clean bytes.
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs — code %d, want 200 (legacy root should be registered; body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
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"corp": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "corp"}),
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})
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// /.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs should reach the corp handler.
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("GET /.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs — code %d, want 200 (per-profile route should be registered; body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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// /.well-known/est/ root must NOT be registered when only non-empty PathIDs exist.
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req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
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w = httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound && w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
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t.Errorf("/.well-known/est/csrattrs without legacy profile — code %d, want 404 or 405 (no handler should be registered)", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed pins the
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// load-bearing dispatch invariant: each profile's PathID routes to its OWN
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// handler instance. A regression that mis-wired the dispatch would surface
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// as profile A's traffic hitting profile B's mock, observable here because
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// each mock embeds its tag in the response.
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
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"": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "default"}),
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"corp": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "corp"}),
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"iot": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "iot"}),
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})
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cases := []struct {
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path string
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wantTag string
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}{
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{"/.well-known/est/csrattrs", "default"},
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{"/.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs", "corp"},
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{"/.well-known/est/iot/csrattrs", "iot"},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tc.path, nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("code %d, want 200 (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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// The handler base64-encodes csrattrs bytes; decode our literal
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// to confirm the right profile's mock was hit.
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body := w.Body.String()
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// PROFILE=<tag> is emitted by the mock; the handler base64-
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// encodes the bytes in the body. Two checks: status was 200
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// (above) AND the base64-decoded body would carry the tag.
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// We don't decode here — the SCEP equivalent uses substring
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// match against the raw body too; for EST the raw body IS
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// base64 of "PROFILE=<tag>". Decode-and-match is the
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// same verification operation; substring against the raw
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// base64 works because each profile's tag has a unique
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// base64 prefix.
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if !contains(body, base64Tag(tc.wantTag)) {
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t.Errorf("body = %q, want base64-encoded PROFILE=%s prefix", body, tc.wantTag)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{})
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound && w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
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t.Errorf("/.well-known/est/csrattrs with no profiles registered — code %d, want 404 or 405", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// base64Tag returns the base64-encoded form of "PROFILE=<tag>" — used by
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// the cross-bleed test to verify the mock's response made it through the
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// handler's base64 encoding step. Local helper to avoid importing
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// encoding/base64 just for this; the encoding is tiny and stable.
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func base64Tag(tag string) string {
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// stdlib produces "UFJPRklMRT0=" for "PROFILE=" — but each tag
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// changes the suffix, so we match on the stable prefix only.
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// "PROFILE=" → standard base64 "UFJPRklMRT0=" (when alone).
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// "PROFILE=corp" → "UFJPRklMRT1jb3Jw"
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// "PROFILE=iot" → "UFJPRklMRT1pb3Q="
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// "PROFILE=default" → "UFJPRklMRT1kZWZhdWx0"
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// All share the prefix "UFJPRklMRT" (= base64 of "PROFILE"). The tag
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// suffix differs, which is what cross-bleed would change.
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switch tag {
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case "default":
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return "UFJPRklMRT1kZWZhdWx0"
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case "corp":
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return "UFJPRklMRT1jb3Jw"
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case "iot":
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return "UFJPRklMRT1pb3Q"
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}
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return "UFJPRklMRT" // safe fallback prefix
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}
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