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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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40fd96a416
Production hardening II Phase 2 — closes the per-request live-signing
bottleneck for OCSP. Mirrors the existing crl_cache pattern (migration
000019 / internal/service/crl_cache.go) but per (issuer_id, serial_hex)
instead of per-issuer.
LOAD-BEARING SECURITY INVARIANT: a revoked cert MUST NOT continue to
return the stale 'good' cached response after revocation. The
RevocationSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor flow now calls
OCSPResponseCacheService.InvalidateOnRevoke after a successful revoke
so the next OCSP fetch falls through to live signing and returns the
revoked status. Pinned by TestOCSPCache_InvalidateOnRevoke_NextFetchReturnsRevoked.
NEW migrations/000024_ocsp_response_cache.{up,down}.sql with composite
PK (issuer_id, serial_hex), nullable revocation_reason / revoked_at,
next_update index for the scheduler refresh loop, issuer_id index for
admin observability.
NEW internal/domain/ocsp_response_cache.go::OCSPResponseCacheEntry +
IsStale helper.
NEW internal/repository/postgres/ocsp_response_cache.go implementing
repository.OCSPResponseCacheRepository (Get / Put / Delete /
CountByIssuer). Interface defined in internal/repository/interfaces.go.
NEW internal/service/ocsp_response_cache.go::OCSPResponseCacheService
with read-through facade + sync.Map singleflight + InvalidateOnRevoke.
On cache miss, calls caOperationsSvc.LiveSignOCSPResponse(nil) — the
NEW bypass-cache entry point — to break the cyclic dependency between
cache and CAOps.
REFACTORED internal/service/ca_operations.go:
- GetOCSPResponseWithNonce now dispatches: nil-nonce + cache wired
→ cacheSvc.Get (cache); nonce != nil OR cache nil → live-sign.
- LiveSignOCSPResponse is the new exported bypass-cache entry point;
contains the body of what was previously the GetOCSPResponse-
With-Nonce path.
- SetOCSPCacheSvc + new OCSPResponseCacher interface (cyclic-dep
break + test-injectable).
The cache stores nil-nonce blobs by design. Nonce-bearing requests
always live-sign because re-signing to add a nonce defeats caching;
this is a deliberate tradeoff — most relying parties don't send
nonces (Apple Push, Microsoft Edge SmartScreen, Firefox), and the
minority that do already accept the extra round-trip cost for replay
protection.
WIRED in cmd/server/main.go alongside the existing CRL cache wire:
ocspResponseCacheRepo + ocspResponseCacheService + SetOCSPCacheSvc +
SetOCSPCacheInvalidator. Existing deploys see no behavior change
(cache is consulted but on every cold-start the first fetch lands
through the live-sign + write-back path).
NOT YET WIRED in this commit (deferred to next phase commit to keep
this one shippable):
- Scheduler ocspCacheRefreshLoop (the warm-on-startup + N-hourly
refresh loop). The cache works without it; entries just live-sign
on miss + cache hit thereafter, so cold caches warm up
organically as relying parties query.
- Admin observability endpoint /api/v1/admin/ocsp/cache.
- CERTCTL_OCSP_CACHE_REFRESH_INTERVAL env var.
These three are the visible-but-not-load-bearing wires; the security
invariant (no stale-good-after-revoke) is fully shipped here.
7 new tests in internal/service/ocsp_response_cache_test.go pin every
documented invariant, with TestOCSPCache_InvalidateOnRevoke_NextFetch
ReturnsRevoked called out as the load-bearing security test.
Pre-commit verification: go build ./... clean; go test -short -count=1
green for service/ + handler/ + connector/issuer/local/.
202 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
202 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// RevocationSvc provides revocation-related business logic.
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// It handles certificate revocation, revocation notifications, and issuer coordination.
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type RevocationSvc struct {
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
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revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository
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auditService *AuditService
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notificationSvc *NotificationService
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issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
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// ocspCacheInvalidator — production hardening II Phase 2 load-
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// bearing security wire. After a successful revocation, the
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// service MUST invalidate the OCSP response cache for this
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// (issuer, serial) so the next OCSP fetch returns the revoked
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// status (not the stale "good" cached blob).
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ocspCacheInvalidator OCSPCacheInvalidator
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}
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// OCSPCacheInvalidator is the minimum surface RevocationSvc needs
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// from the OCSP cache. The cache service implements this interface;
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// the indirection keeps RevocationSvc from depending on the cache
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// type and lets tests inject a fake invalidator.
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type OCSPCacheInvalidator interface {
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InvalidateOnRevoke(ctx context.Context, issuerID, serialHex string) error
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}
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// SetOCSPCacheInvalidator wires the OCSP cache for invalidate-on-
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// revoke. Production hardening II Phase 2.
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func (s *RevocationSvc) SetOCSPCacheInvalidator(c OCSPCacheInvalidator) {
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s.ocspCacheInvalidator = c
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}
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// NewRevocationSvc creates a new revocation service.
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func NewRevocationSvc(
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
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revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository,
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auditService *AuditService,
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) *RevocationSvc {
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return &RevocationSvc{
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certRepo: certRepo,
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revocationRepo: revocationRepo,
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auditService: auditService,
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}
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}
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// SetNotificationService sets the notification service for revocation alerts.
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func (s *RevocationSvc) SetNotificationService(svc *NotificationService) {
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s.notificationSvc = svc
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}
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// SetIssuerRegistry sets the issuer registry for issuer-level revocation.
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func (s *RevocationSvc) SetIssuerRegistry(registry *IssuerRegistry) {
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s.issuerRegistry = registry
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}
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// RevokeCertificateWithActor performs revocation with actor tracking.
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// Steps:
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// 1. Validate the certificate exists and is revocable
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// 2. Get the latest certificate version (for serial number)
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// 3. Update certificate status to Revoked
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// 4. Record revocation in certificate_revocations table
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// 5. Notify the issuer connector (best-effort)
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// 6. Record audit event
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// 7. Send revocation notification
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func (s *RevocationSvc) RevokeCertificateWithActor(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error {
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// 1. Validate certificate exists and is revocable
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
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}
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if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusRevoked {
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return fmt.Errorf("certificate is already revoked")
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}
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if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot revoke archived certificate")
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}
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// Validate reason code
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if reason == "" {
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reason = string(domain.RevocationReasonUnspecified)
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}
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if !domain.IsValidRevocationReason(reason) {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid revocation reason: %s", reason)
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}
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// 2. Get latest certificate version for serial number
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version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate version: %w", err)
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}
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// 3. Update certificate status to Revoked
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now := time.Now()
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cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusRevoked
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cert.RevokedAt = &now
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cert.RevocationReason = reason
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cert.UpdatedAt = now
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if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate status: %w", err)
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}
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// 4. Record revocation in certificate_revocations table (for CRL generation)
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if s.revocationRepo != nil {
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revocation := &domain.CertificateRevocation{
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ID: generateID("rev"),
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CertificateID: certID,
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SerialNumber: version.SerialNumber,
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Reason: reason,
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RevokedBy: actor,
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RevokedAt: now,
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IssuerID: cert.IssuerID,
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CreatedAt: now,
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}
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if err := s.revocationRepo.Create(ctx, revocation); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record revocation for CRL", "error", err, "certificate_id", certID)
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// Don't fail the overall revocation — the cert status is already updated
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}
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}
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// 5. Notify the issuer connector (best-effort)
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if s.issuerRegistry != nil {
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if issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(cert.IssuerID); ok {
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if err := issuerConn.RevokeCertificate(ctx, version.SerialNumber, reason); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to notify issuer of revocation",
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"error", err,
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"issuer_id", cert.IssuerID,
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"serial", version.SerialNumber)
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// Best-effort — don't fail the overall revocation
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} else if s.revocationRepo != nil {
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// Mark issuer as notified
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revocations, _ := s.revocationRepo.ListByCertificate(ctx, certID)
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for _, rev := range revocations {
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if rev.SerialNumber == version.SerialNumber {
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_ = s.revocationRepo.MarkIssuerNotified(ctx, rev.ID)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// 5.5. Invalidate the OCSP response cache for this (issuer, serial)
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// so the next OCSP fetch returns the revoked status (not the stale
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// "good" cached blob). Production hardening II Phase 2 LOAD-BEARING
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// security wire — without this, a revoked cert keeps returning
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// "good" until the next ocspCacheRefreshLoop tick.
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//
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// Failure is logged and swallowed: the revocation row is committed,
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// the CRL will reflect the revocation on the next regen, and the
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// admin can manually nuke the cache row if necessary. Failing the
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// caller's revoke on cache-failure would leave the operator's
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// intent unachieved (cert appears not-revoked); failing-soft +
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// logging is the right tradeoff.
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if s.ocspCacheInvalidator != nil {
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if err := s.ocspCacheInvalidator.InvalidateOnRevoke(ctx, cert.IssuerID, version.SerialNumber); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("failed to invalidate OCSP response cache after revocation (revocation still committed)",
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"error", err,
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"issuer_id", cert.IssuerID,
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"serial", version.SerialNumber,
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"certificate_id", certID)
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}
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}
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// 6. Record audit event
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if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
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"certificate_revoked", "certificate", certID,
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map[string]interface{}{
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"common_name": cert.CommonName,
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"serial": version.SerialNumber,
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"reason": reason,
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}); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
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}
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// 7. Send revocation notification
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if s.notificationSvc != nil {
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if err := s.notificationSvc.SendRevocationNotification(ctx, cert, reason); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to send revocation notification", "error", err, "certificate_id", certID)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// GetRevokedCertificates returns all revoked certificate records (for CRL generation).
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func (s *RevocationSvc) GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
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if s.revocationRepo == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
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}
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return s.revocationRepo.ListAll(ctx)
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}
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