mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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3ef45e2ad4
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
414 lines
15 KiB
Go
414 lines
15 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"testing"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// =============================================================================
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// In-memory fakes. These exist solely to make the service-layer unit tests
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// feasible without testcontainers. Phase 12 wires the live-Postgres
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// integration suite that exercises the same code paths against the real
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// schema; this file pins the privilege-escalation invariants that don't
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// need a database.
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// =============================================================================
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type fakeRoleRepo struct {
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roles map[string]*authdomain.Role
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rolePerms map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission
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deleteFail error
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}
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func newFakeRoleRepo() *fakeRoleRepo {
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return &fakeRoleRepo{
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roles: map[string]*authdomain.Role{},
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rolePerms: map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission{},
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}
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
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r, ok := f.roles[id]
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if !ok {
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return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
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}
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return r, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) GetByName(_ context.Context, _, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
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for _, r := range f.roles {
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if r.Name == name {
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return r, nil
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}
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}
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return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) List(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
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out := make([]*authdomain.Role, 0, len(f.roles))
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for _, r := range f.roles {
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out = append(out, r)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Create(_ context.Context, r *authdomain.Role) error {
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f.roles[r.ID] = r
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Update(_ context.Context, r *authdomain.Role) error {
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f.roles[r.ID] = r
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Delete(_ context.Context, id string) error {
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if f.deleteFail != nil {
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return f.deleteFail
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}
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delete(f.roles, id)
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) ListPermissions(_ context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
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return f.rolePerms[roleID], nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) AddPermission(_ context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
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f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] = append(f.rolePerms[g.RoleID], g)
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeRoleRepo) RemovePermission(_ context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
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out := f.rolePerms[g.RoleID][:0]
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for _, x := range f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] {
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if x.PermissionID != g.PermissionID || x.ScopeType != g.ScopeType {
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out = append(out, x)
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}
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}
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f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] = out
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return nil
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}
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type fakePermissionRepo struct {
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byName map[string]*authdomain.Permission
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}
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func newFakePermissionRepo() *fakePermissionRepo {
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r := &fakePermissionRepo{byName: map[string]*authdomain.Permission{}}
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for _, p := range authdomain.CanonicalPermissions {
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r.byName[p] = &authdomain.Permission{
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ID: "p-" + p,
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Name: p,
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Namespace: p,
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}
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}
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return r
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}
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func (f *fakePermissionRepo) List(_ context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
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out := make([]*authdomain.Permission, 0, len(f.byName))
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for _, p := range f.byName {
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out = append(out, p)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakePermissionRepo) GetByName(_ context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error) {
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p, ok := f.byName[name]
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if !ok {
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return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
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}
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return p, nil
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}
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func (f *fakePermissionRepo) IsCanonical(name string) bool {
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_, ok := f.byName[name]
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return ok
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}
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// fakeActorRoleRepo mocks the actor_roles repository plus the
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// EffectivePermissions JOIN. Tests configure perms[(actorID,actorType)]
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// to return a specific permission set.
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type fakeActorRoleRepo struct {
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grants []*authdomain.ActorRole
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perms map[string][]repository.EffectivePermission
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}
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func newFakeActorRoleRepo() *fakeActorRoleRepo {
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return &fakeActorRoleRepo{
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perms: map[string][]repository.EffectivePermission{},
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}
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}
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func actorKey(id string, t authdomain.ActorTypeValue) string {
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return string(t) + ":" + id
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListByActor(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, _ string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
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var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
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for _, g := range f.grants {
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if g.ActorID == actorID && g.ActorType == actorType {
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out = append(out, g)
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}
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListByRole(_ context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
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var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
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for _, g := range f.grants {
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if g.RoleID == roleID {
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out = append(out, g)
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}
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
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f.grants = append(f.grants, ar)
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) Revoke(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, _ string) error {
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out := f.grants[:0]
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for _, g := range f.grants {
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if g.ActorID == actorID && g.ActorType == actorType && g.RoleID == roleID {
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, g)
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}
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f.grants = out
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) AdminExists(_ context.Context, _ string) (bool, error) {
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for _, g := range f.grants {
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if g.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin && g.ActorID != authdomain.DemoAnonActorID {
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return true, nil
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}
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListDistinctActors(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
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seen := map[string]*repository.ActorWithRoles{}
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for _, g := range f.grants {
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k := string(g.ActorType) + ":" + g.ActorID
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if seen[k] == nil {
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seen[k] = &repository.ActorWithRoles{
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ActorID: g.ActorID,
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ActorType: g.ActorType,
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TenantID: g.TenantID,
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}
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}
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seen[k].RoleIDs = append(seen[k].RoleIDs, g.RoleID)
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}
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out := make([]repository.ActorWithRoles, 0, len(seen))
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for _, v := range seen {
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out = append(out, *v)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) EffectivePermissions(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, _ string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
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return f.perms[actorKey(actorID, actorType)], nil
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}
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type fakeAudit struct {
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calls []struct {
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Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string
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}
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}
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func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEvent(_ context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, resourceType, resourceID string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
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f.calls = append(f.calls, struct{ Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string }{
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actor, string(actorType), action, "", resourceID,
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})
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
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f.calls = append(f.calls, struct{ Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string }{
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actor, string(actorType), action, eventCategory, resourceID,
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})
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return nil
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// Authorizer tests
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// =============================================================================
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func TestAuthorizer_GlobalGrantBeatsSpecificScope(t *testing.T) {
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r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
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r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
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{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
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}
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az := NewAuthorizer(r)
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scopeID := "iss-foo"
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ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeIssuer, &scopeID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CheckPermission err: %v", err)
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}
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if !ok {
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t.Errorf("global cert.read grant should match scoped request; got false")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorizer_NoGrantReturnsFalse(t *testing.T) {
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r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
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az := NewAuthorizer(r)
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ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "bob", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.delete", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
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}
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if ok {
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t.Errorf("actor with no grants should not pass any permission check")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID(t *testing.T) {
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r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
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scope := "p-corp"
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r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
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{PermissionName: "profile.edit", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scope},
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}
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az := NewAuthorizer(r)
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matchID := "p-corp"
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wrongID := "p-other"
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ok, _ := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "profile.edit", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &matchID)
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if !ok {
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t.Errorf("scoped grant on p-corp should match request for p-corp")
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}
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ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "profile.edit", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &wrongID)
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if ok {
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t.Errorf("scoped grant on p-corp should NOT match request for p-other")
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// RoleService tests
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// =============================================================================
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func newRoleServiceWithFakes() (*RoleService, *fakeAudit, *fakeActorRoleRepo) {
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roleRepo := newFakeRoleRepo()
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permRepo := newFakePermissionRepo()
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actorRepo := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
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audit := &fakeAudit{}
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az := NewAuthorizer(actorRepo)
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return NewRoleService(roleRepo, permRepo, az, audit), audit, actorRepo
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}
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func TestRoleService_NoCallerReturnsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
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rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
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_, err := rs.List(context.Background(), nil)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
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t.Errorf("nil caller should return ErrUnauthenticated, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestRoleService_CallerWithoutPermissionForbidden(t *testing.T) {
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rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
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caller := &Caller{ActorID: "bob", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
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_, err := rs.List(context.Background(), caller)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden) {
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t.Errorf("caller without auth.role.list should be forbidden; got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestRoleService_SystemCallerBypassesGate(t *testing.T) {
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rs, audit, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
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role := &authdomain.Role{ID: "r-x", Name: "x", Description: "test"}
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if err := rs.Create(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), role); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("system caller should bypass auth.role.create gate; got %v", err)
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}
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if len(audit.calls) != 1 || audit.calls[0].Action != "role.create" {
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t.Errorf("expected one role.create audit row, got %+v", audit.calls)
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}
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}
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func TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical(t *testing.T) {
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rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
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err := rs.AddPermission(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), "r-admin", "fake.permission", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidPermission) {
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t.Errorf("non-canonical permission should be rejected; got %v", err)
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// ActorRoleService tests — privilege-escalation guard
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// =============================================================================
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func newActorRoleServiceWithFakes() (*ActorRoleService, *fakeActorRoleRepo, *fakeAudit) {
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roleRepo := newFakeRoleRepo()
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actorRepo := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
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audit := &fakeAudit{}
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az := NewAuthorizer(actorRepo)
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return NewActorRoleService(actorRepo, roleRepo, az, audit), actorRepo, audit
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}
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func TestActorRoleService_GrantRequiresAuthRoleAssign(t *testing.T) {
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svc, repo, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
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// Caller bob has cert.read but NOT auth.role.assign.
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repo.perms[actorKey("bob", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
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{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
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}
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caller := &Caller{ActorID: "bob", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
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err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), caller, &authdomain.ActorRole{
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ActorID: "carol", ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), RoleID: "r-admin",
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})
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfRoleAssignment) {
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t.Errorf("Grant without auth.role.assign should fail with ErrSelfRoleAssignment; got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestActorRoleService_GrantSucceedsWithAuthRoleAssign(t *testing.T) {
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svc, repo, audit := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
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// Caller alice holds auth.role.assign globally.
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repo.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
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{PermissionName: "auth.role.assign", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
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}
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caller := &Caller{ActorID: "alice", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
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err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), caller, &authdomain.ActorRole{
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ActorID: "carol", ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), RoleID: "r-viewer",
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Grant should succeed when caller holds auth.role.assign; got %v", err)
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}
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if len(audit.calls) != 1 || audit.calls[0].Action != "actor_role.grant" {
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t.Errorf("expected one actor_role.grant audit row; got %+v", audit.calls)
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}
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}
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|
func TestActorRoleService_GrantRejectsReservedDemoActor(t *testing.T) {
|
|
svc, _, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
|
err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
|
ActorID: authdomain.DemoAnonActorID,
|
|
RoleID: "r-viewer",
|
|
})
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor) {
|
|
t.Errorf("Grant against actor-demo-anon should be rejected; got %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestActorRoleService_RevokeRejectsReservedDemoActor(t *testing.T) {
|
|
svc, _, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
|
err := svc.Revoke(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), authdomain.DemoAnonActorID, domain.ActorTypeAnonymous, "r-admin")
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor) {
|
|
t.Errorf("Revoke against actor-demo-anon should be rejected; got %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// PermissionService tests
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
func TestPermissionService_IsRegistered(t *testing.T) {
|
|
repo := newFakePermissionRepo()
|
|
ps := NewPermissionService(repo)
|
|
if !ps.IsRegistered("cert.read") {
|
|
t.Errorf("cert.read should be in canonical catalogue")
|
|
}
|
|
if ps.IsRegistered("not.a.real.permission") {
|
|
t.Errorf("non-canonical permission should NOT be registered")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// CallerFromContext returns ErrUnauthenticated until Phase 3 wires the
|
|
// middleware; pin the contract here so the upgrade is observable.
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
func TestCallerFromContext_Phase2ReturnsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
|
_, err := CallerFromContext(context.Background())
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
|
|
t.Errorf("Phase 2 stub should return ErrUnauthenticated; got %v. Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge.", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|