Files
certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap/bootstrap_test.go
T
shankar0123 3c605d5618 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

126 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package bootstrap
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_EmptyTokenIsBornDisabled pins the load-bearing
// invariant that an unset CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN closes the bootstrap
// path at construction time. The handler depends on this — without it,
// a misconfigured deploy that forgot to set the env var would expose
// the endpoint with a token of "" that an attacker could trivially
// match by also sending "".
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_EmptyTokenIsBornDisabled(t *testing.T) {
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("", nil)
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if avail {
t.Errorf("Available = true for empty token, want false")
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
t.Errorf("Validate('') for empty-token strategy = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "anything"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
t.Errorf("Validate('anything') for empty-token strategy = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
}
}
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken pins that the
// strategy maps a token mismatch to ErrInvalidToken (HTTP 401), not
// ErrDisabled (410). Misclassifying these would let a probing attacker
// distinguish "no token set" from "wrong token" via response status.
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", nil)
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "wrong-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
t.Errorf("Validate(wrong) = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", got)
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
t.Errorf("Validate('') = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", got)
}
if s.IsConsumed() {
t.Errorf("strategy consumed after failed Validate; must remain available for retry")
}
}
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption pins the invariant that the
// first valid Validate call locks the strategy. The bootstrap path is
// strictly one-shot; the second call MUST return ErrDisabled (HTTP
// 410), not ErrInvalidToken (which would suggest "wrong token, try
// again").
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption(t *testing.T) {
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", nil)
if err := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Validate = %v, want nil", err)
}
if !s.IsConsumed() {
t.Errorf("IsConsumed = false after successful Validate, want true")
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
t.Errorf("second Validate = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
}
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v", err)
}
if avail {
t.Errorf("Available = true after consumption, want false")
}
}
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath pins the invariant that
// the admin-existence probe gates Available + Validate. The strategy
// must NOT mint a second admin even if the operator forgot to unset
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN after onboarding.
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath(t *testing.T) {
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", probe)
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v", err)
}
if avail {
t.Errorf("Available = true with admin exists probe, want false")
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
t.Errorf("Validate = %v with admin exists, want ErrDisabled", got)
}
if s.IsConsumed() {
t.Errorf("strategy must NOT be consumed when admin-existence probe rejects; allows retry after operator removes the duplicate admin")
}
}
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminProbeError surfaces the error to the
// caller without consuming the strategy. The HTTP handler maps this
// to 500; the operator can retry once the underlying issue is fixed.
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminProbeError(t *testing.T) {
probeErr := errors.New("boom")
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return false, probeErr }
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", probe)
if _, err := s.Available(context.Background()); !errors.Is(err, probeErr) {
t.Errorf("Available err = %v, want probeErr", err)
}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, probeErr) {
t.Errorf("Validate err = %v, want probeErr", got)
}
if s.IsConsumed() {
t.Errorf("strategy must NOT be consumed on probe error")
}
}
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_ZeroLengthRejectedEvenWithMatchingToken belt-
// and-braces against the ConstantTimeCompare("","")=1 footgun. A
// strategy explicitly constructed with token="" is born disabled
// (ErrDisabled); but if a future caller bypasses the constructor, the
// Validate path also rejects zero-length tokens up front.
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_ZeroLengthRejectedEvenWithMatchingToken(t *testing.T) {
// Directly construct a strategy with token=""
s := &EnvTokenStrategy{token: "", tokenLength: 0, consumed: false}
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
t.Errorf("Validate('','') = %v, want ErrInvalidToken (zero-length guard)", got)
}
}