Pure git mv operations; no content edits. Internal links remain pointing
at old paths and will be fixed in Phase 11. Per the Phase 1 audit
recommendations at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/.
35 files moved across 8 audience-organized subdirectories:
docs/getting-started/ (5):
quickstart.md, concepts.md, examples.md, advanced-demo.md (was
demo-advanced.md), why-certctl.md
docs/reference/ (6):
architecture.md, api.md (was openapi.md), mcp.md,
intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md, deployment-model.md (was
deployment-atomicity.md), vendor-matrix.md (was
deployment-vendor-matrix.md)
docs/reference/protocols/ (6):
acme-server.md, acme-server-threat-model.md, scep-intune.md,
est.md, crl-ocsp.md, async-ca-polling.md (was async-polling.md)
docs/operator/ (4):
security.md, tls.md, database-tls.md, approval-workflow.md
docs/operator/runbooks/ (3):
cloud-targets.md (was runbook-cloud-targets.md), expiry-alerts.md
(was runbook-expiry-alerts.md), disaster-recovery.md
docs/migration/ (3):
from-certbot.md (was migrate-from-certbot.md), from-acmesh.md
(was migrate-from-acmesh.md), cert-manager-coexistence.md (was
certctl-for-cert-manager-users.md)
docs/compliance/ (4):
index.md (was compliance.md), soc2.md (was compliance-soc2.md),
pci-dss.md (was compliance-pci-dss.md), nist-sp-800-57.md (was
compliance-nist.md)
docs/contributor/ (4):
testing-strategy.md, test-environment.md (was test-env.md),
ci-pipeline.md, qa-test-suite.md (was qa-test-guide.md)
Deferred to later Phase 2 sub-phases:
- connectors.md split (Phase 4): docs/connectors.md +
docs/connector-{apache,f5,iis,k8s,nginx}.md still at top level
- testing-guide.md prune (Phase 5): docs/testing-guide.md still
at top level
- features.md disperse (Phase 6): docs/features.md still at top
level
- legacy-est-scep.md split (Phase 7): docs/legacy-est-scep.md
still at top level
- ACME walkthrough re-homing (Phase 8): three
docs/acme-*-walkthrough.md still at top level
- Upgrade docs archive (Phase 3): two docs/upgrade-*.md still
at top level
Cross-reference updates (Phase 11) will happen after all moves and
content edits land. Internal links to docs/* paths are temporarily
broken until that phase completes.
5.1 KiB
Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption
Audit reference: Bundle B / M-018. PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5; CWE-319.
certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL
selects the transport-encryption posture. Pre-Bundle-B all the bundled
deployment artifacts (Helm chart, docker-compose) hard-coded sslmode=disable.
Bundle B exposes that as an operator-facing knob with a documented default and
explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world deployment shapes.
Quick reference
| Deployment shape | Default sslmode |
When to change |
|---|---|---|
| Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster | disable |
When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload is in PCI-DSS scope. |
| Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) | not auto-set | Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle. |
| docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge | disable |
Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden. |
| docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres | not auto-set | Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full. |
sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is:
disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full. PCI-DSS
Req 4 v4.0 §2.2.5 considers verify-ca the floor for sensitive-data transport;
verify-full is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds
hostname validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).
Helm chart (Bundle B)
Bundle B adds two values under postgresql.tls:
postgresql:
tls:
mode: disable # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
caSecretRef: "" # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)
The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the
generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL).
For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override
server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string —
the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.
Example: external RDS with verify-full
postgresql:
enabled: false # Disable bundled Postgres
server:
env:
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full
# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
- name: rds-ca
secret:
secretName: rds-ca-bundle # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: rds-ca
mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
readOnly: true
# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
env:
PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt
docker-compose (development / demo)
The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default
because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl
server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:
export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up
Verification
For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:
# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"
# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...
If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate
the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.
What this does NOT cover
- Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary
TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (
pg_hba.conf+ssl=on); it is independent of certctl'sCERTCTL_DATABASE_URL. - Backup transport —
pg_dump/pg_basebackuphonor the samesslmodeparameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned. - Encryption at rest —
sslmodeis a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.
Reverting
If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA
bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS
is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never
revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata —
audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify
TLS in any scoped environment.